Event Notification Report for October 12, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/11/2000 - 10/12/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37425
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/12/2000
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2000
Event Time: 18:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2000
Event Time: 18:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK 31 INOPERABLE DURING MAINTENANCE
On July 21, 2000, the Spray Additive Tank 31 Outlet Isolation Valve (SI-1841) was shut for approximately eight and one half-hours, to perform maintenance on one of the downstream automatic Sodium Hydroxide isolation valves. This would have effectively prevented Sodium Hydroxide from being sprayed into Containment if the Spray Pumps had been required. This is not in accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.B.1.a and the associated Bases which requires the Spray Additive Tank to be operable above Cold Shutdown.
Therefore, isolation of this tank could have potentially placed the Containment Spray System outside of its design basis; however, the investigation of this event is ongoing.
This event was discovered by the System Engineer while performing a periodic review of system unavailability (time) in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
*** UPDATE AT 1537 ON 11/07/00 FROM TRACY SUDOKO TO LEIGH TROCINE ***
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This notification is an update to Event No. 37425. [Indian Point 3] reported, on 10/12/00, that the Containment Spray (CS) System NaOH Spray Additive Tank (SAT) outlet isolation valve (SI-1841) was shut for approximately eight and one-half hours on 07/21/00 to perform preventative maintenance on a downstream automatic NaOH SAT isolation valve. This report was made because this event placed the CS system outside of its design basis as per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)."
"The Technical Specification (TS) provides no allowed outage time for the SAT, so a TS-required shutdown should have been initiated, and the plant [should have been shut down] within 4 hours. Further review of the Emergency Plan Action Levels (EAL), specifically EAL 7.1.1, determined that [a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE)] is required to be declared if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the TS [limiting condition for operation (LCO)] action statement time. Entry into an NUE was not made when the event occurred on 07/21/00."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable state and local agencies. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Michele Evans), NRR EO (Tad Marsh), IRO (Joe Giitter), and FEMA (Tony Cegielsky).
On July 21, 2000, the Spray Additive Tank 31 Outlet Isolation Valve (SI-1841) was shut for approximately eight and one half-hours, to perform maintenance on one of the downstream automatic Sodium Hydroxide isolation valves. This would have effectively prevented Sodium Hydroxide from being sprayed into Containment if the Spray Pumps had been required. This is not in accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.B.1.a and the associated Bases which requires the Spray Additive Tank to be operable above Cold Shutdown.
Therefore, isolation of this tank could have potentially placed the Containment Spray System outside of its design basis; however, the investigation of this event is ongoing.
This event was discovered by the System Engineer while performing a periodic review of system unavailability (time) in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
*** UPDATE AT 1537 ON 11/07/00 FROM TRACY SUDOKO TO LEIGH TROCINE ***
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This notification is an update to Event No. 37425. [Indian Point 3] reported, on 10/12/00, that the Containment Spray (CS) System NaOH Spray Additive Tank (SAT) outlet isolation valve (SI-1841) was shut for approximately eight and one-half hours on 07/21/00 to perform preventative maintenance on a downstream automatic NaOH SAT isolation valve. This report was made because this event placed the CS system outside of its design basis as per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)."
"The Technical Specification (TS) provides no allowed outage time for the SAT, so a TS-required shutdown should have been initiated, and the plant [should have been shut down] within 4 hours. Further review of the Emergency Plan Action Levels (EAL), specifically EAL 7.1.1, determined that [a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE)] is required to be declared if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the TS [limiting condition for operation (LCO)] action statement time. Entry into an NUE was not made when the event occurred on 07/21/00."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as applicable state and local agencies. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Michele Evans), NRR EO (Tad Marsh), IRO (Joe Giitter), and FEMA (Tony Cegielsky).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37423
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL CROGEN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL CROGEN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/12/2000
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2000
Event Time: 06:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2000
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2000
Event Time: 06:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
ED GOODWIN (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
TAD MARSH (EO)
KEN BARR (R2)
ED GOODWIN (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
TAD MARSH (EO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
POTENTIAL CONDITION OF A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BOUNDARY DEGRADATION
The following text is s portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"... The plant is currently in Cold Shutdown (Mode 6) of Refueling Outage 12."
"On October 7 [at] 2000 [hours], plant personnel identified an accumulation of approximately 100 pounds of boric acid in the 'A' hot leg area of the reactor vessel. Some boric acid and insulation was removed from the area of the suspected leak path to allow for further inspection."
"On October 12 at 0630 hours, plant personnel visually identified a potential leak area on the first weld off the reactor vessel at the nozzle to pipe connection of the 'A' loop hot leg. Visual inspection has revealed trace amounts of boron buildup on the weld between the vessel nozzle and the hot leg pipe. Based on this preliminary information, plant personnel suspect some leakage has occurred through the pressure boundary at this weld."
"The RCS is currently depressurized. We have suspended preparations to remove the reactor vessel head to allow time to perform [non-destructive examination (NDE)] on the weld. V.C. Summer expects the NDE inspection to be completed around noon today. The results will be used to develop repair plans."
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed of the condition."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/12/00 @ 1452 BY CROGEN TO GOULD * * *
V. C. Summer is providing an update to the initial 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) notification made at 0907 this morning. Plant personnel have completed the cleanup and dye penetrant test of the weld on the 'A' RCS Hot Leg. The test has confirmed a 4" long hairline crack in the weld between the hot leg piping and the Reactor vessel nozzle. This pipe is about 30" in diameter. This weld is located about 3 feet from the vessel wall and is accessible in the inspection port at the Reactor vessel flange area. The crack is located about 17" from the top of the pipe.
The plant will continue defueling and initiate weld repair of the affected nozzle. Technical and repair support is being pursued at this time to make appropriate inspections and repairs.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been made aware of the latest findings.
The Reg 2 RDO(Barr), EO(Goodwin), IRO(Giitter) were notified.
The following text is s portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"... The plant is currently in Cold Shutdown (Mode 6) of Refueling Outage 12."
"On October 7 [at] 2000 [hours], plant personnel identified an accumulation of approximately 100 pounds of boric acid in the 'A' hot leg area of the reactor vessel. Some boric acid and insulation was removed from the area of the suspected leak path to allow for further inspection."
"On October 12 at 0630 hours, plant personnel visually identified a potential leak area on the first weld off the reactor vessel at the nozzle to pipe connection of the 'A' loop hot leg. Visual inspection has revealed trace amounts of boron buildup on the weld between the vessel nozzle and the hot leg pipe. Based on this preliminary information, plant personnel suspect some leakage has occurred through the pressure boundary at this weld."
"The RCS is currently depressurized. We have suspended preparations to remove the reactor vessel head to allow time to perform [non-destructive examination (NDE)] on the weld. V.C. Summer expects the NDE inspection to be completed around noon today. The results will be used to develop repair plans."
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed of the condition."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/12/00 @ 1452 BY CROGEN TO GOULD * * *
V. C. Summer is providing an update to the initial 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) notification made at 0907 this morning. Plant personnel have completed the cleanup and dye penetrant test of the weld on the 'A' RCS Hot Leg. The test has confirmed a 4" long hairline crack in the weld between the hot leg piping and the Reactor vessel nozzle. This pipe is about 30" in diameter. This weld is located about 3 feet from the vessel wall and is accessible in the inspection port at the Reactor vessel flange area. The crack is located about 17" from the top of the pipe.
The plant will continue defueling and initiate weld repair of the affected nozzle. Technical and repair support is being pursued at this time to make appropriate inspections and repairs.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been made aware of the latest findings.
The Reg 2 RDO(Barr), EO(Goodwin), IRO(Giitter) were notified.