Event Notification Report for October 10, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/09/2000 - 10/10/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37421
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WESLEY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WESLEY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/10/2000
Notification Time: 20:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2000
Event Time: 19:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2000
Notification Time: 20:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2000
Event Time: 19:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
KEN BARR (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP STARTED UNEXPECTEDLY
"During turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing the pump started when it should not have. A check of the procedure found that it was not correctly removed from service for the test."
It is believed that a jumper placement was done wrong and is being investigated.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing the pump started when it should not have. A check of the procedure found that it was not correctly removed from service for the test."
It is believed that a jumper placement was done wrong and is being investigated.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37422
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: LON PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: LON PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/11/2000
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2000
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2000
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2000
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
KEN BARR (R2)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"At approximately 1700 hours on October 10, 2000 GNF-A Operations determined that one of two controls established for moderation control on material feed to a process area located within an Moderation Restricted Area (MRA) had been lost. The controls require two samples that verify acceptable moisture content for the feed material. One of two required moisture samples was not analyzed due to an inadvertent purge of the moisture sample request from the IMR (In-process Material Release) database, and the material was improperly released for processing.
"The second independent moisture sample was performed and confirmed the measured moisture content was satisfactory, therefore no unsafe condition existed.
"This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due to loss of a single control on moderation. Material can feed to affected moderation restricted area (MRA) of process have been suspended pending investigation and implementation of corrective actions.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low safety significance - independent control on moderation remained intact; material met moisture specifications.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: Multiple failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION , GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Moderation: Process equipment limited to uniform moisture content of 10.5 wt. % (105,000 ppm H2O). Moderation Safety Factor = safety moderation limit / process moderation limit = 105,000 / 4000 = 26.2.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): Affected equipment contained approximately 100 kgs of UO2 and gadolinia (Gd2O3) at a target enrichment of ~4.40 wt. % U235. The vibromill blender process equipment is located in the moderation-restricted area, which is demonstrated safe for uniform moderation limit of 10.5 % water equivalent moderation (105,000 ppm H2O).
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: One of two required moisture samples was not analyzed due to an inadvertent purge of the moisture sample request from the IMR (In-process Material Release) database, and the material was improperly released for processing in the gad shop MRA.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: 1. Feed material re-sampled for moisture content - results satisfactory (<4000 ppm H2O). 2. Suspended material can feed to the affected process area. 3. Investigation and implementation of corrective actions pending."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Region 2 (David Ayres), the New Hanover County and North Carolina State agencies of this event.
"At approximately 1700 hours on October 10, 2000 GNF-A Operations determined that one of two controls established for moderation control on material feed to a process area located within an Moderation Restricted Area (MRA) had been lost. The controls require two samples that verify acceptable moisture content for the feed material. One of two required moisture samples was not analyzed due to an inadvertent purge of the moisture sample request from the IMR (In-process Material Release) database, and the material was improperly released for processing.
"The second independent moisture sample was performed and confirmed the measured moisture content was satisfactory, therefore no unsafe condition existed.
"This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due to loss of a single control on moderation. Material can feed to affected moderation restricted area (MRA) of process have been suspended pending investigation and implementation of corrective actions.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low safety significance - independent control on moderation remained intact; material met moisture specifications.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: Multiple failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION , GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Moderation: Process equipment limited to uniform moisture content of 10.5 wt. % (105,000 ppm H2O). Moderation Safety Factor = safety moderation limit / process moderation limit = 105,000 / 4000 = 26.2.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): Affected equipment contained approximately 100 kgs of UO2 and gadolinia (Gd2O3) at a target enrichment of ~4.40 wt. % U235. The vibromill blender process equipment is located in the moderation-restricted area, which is demonstrated safe for uniform moderation limit of 10.5 % water equivalent moderation (105,000 ppm H2O).
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: One of two required moisture samples was not analyzed due to an inadvertent purge of the moisture sample request from the IMR (In-process Material Release) database, and the material was improperly released for processing in the gad shop MRA.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: 1. Feed material re-sampled for moisture content - results satisfactory (<4000 ppm H2O). 2. Suspended material can feed to the affected process area. 3. Investigation and implementation of corrective actions pending."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Region 2 (David Ayres), the New Hanover County and North Carolina State agencies of this event.