Event Notification Report for October 05, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/04/2000 - 10/05/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37413
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: OSCAR PIPKINS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: OSCAR PIPKINS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/05/2000
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2000
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2000
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2000
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNIT OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS OF FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
"During evaluations associated with a condition (CR-WF3-2000-1088), previously reported in a one hour call on 9/18/00 (Event #37341 ), it was determined today that a similar condition exists in Fire Area 39. The condition found today, assuming a hypothetical Appendix R fire in the area, could conceivably have resulted in the loss of all three charging pumps. The Waterford 3 FSAR (Section 9.5.1) states that (for Fire Area 39) 'in the event that an unmitigated fire is in the charging pump area, either Charging Pump A or Charging Pump B and AB will be available for reactivity control and reactor coolant makeup...'. This availability is based on an exemption granted per SSER 8 and LP&L exemption request letter W3P84-0709. The exemption for part height firewalls around charging pump 'A' cable trays and conduit being provided with fire wrap. It was determined today that the conduits and cable trays for Charging Pump A and AHI8A (which provides cooling to the charging pump 'A' area) have not been completely wrapped. Thus an appendix R fire in fire area RAB39 has the potential to disable all
three charging pumps. The charging pumps are required for cold shutdown actions and as such per Appendix R, repairs are allowed. However in order to take credit for repair actions, specific procedures and staged materials for such repairs are required. These provisions were not in place. This condition is being reported as being outside the design basis of the fire protection program. The cables and conduits were immediately identified as impaired and compensatory actions were established (hourly fire watches). The condition has been entered into the plant corrective action program (CR-WF3-2000-1169)."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"During evaluations associated with a condition (CR-WF3-2000-1088), previously reported in a one hour call on 9/18/00 (Event #37341 ), it was determined today that a similar condition exists in Fire Area 39. The condition found today, assuming a hypothetical Appendix R fire in the area, could conceivably have resulted in the loss of all three charging pumps. The Waterford 3 FSAR (Section 9.5.1) states that (for Fire Area 39) 'in the event that an unmitigated fire is in the charging pump area, either Charging Pump A or Charging Pump B and AB will be available for reactivity control and reactor coolant makeup...'. This availability is based on an exemption granted per SSER 8 and LP&L exemption request letter W3P84-0709. The exemption for part height firewalls around charging pump 'A' cable trays and conduit being provided with fire wrap. It was determined today that the conduits and cable trays for Charging Pump A and AHI8A (which provides cooling to the charging pump 'A' area) have not been completely wrapped. Thus an appendix R fire in fire area RAB39 has the potential to disable all
three charging pumps. The charging pumps are required for cold shutdown actions and as such per Appendix R, repairs are allowed. However in order to take credit for repair actions, specific procedures and staged materials for such repairs are required. These provisions were not in place. This condition is being reported as being outside the design basis of the fire protection program. The cables and conduits were immediately identified as impaired and compensatory actions were established (hourly fire watches). The condition has been entered into the plant corrective action program (CR-WF3-2000-1169)."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37415
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING, LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE (EMAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING, LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE (EMAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/06/2000
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2000
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DETACHED FROM DRIVE ROD
"The licensee notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection (WDOH), of an additional mechanical failure involving the same Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device which suffered
a 'source disconnect' as reported in event #WA-00-046. The device is specifically licensed for density process measurements and uses a Cesium 137 sealed source, Amersham Model CDC.711M not to exceed 74 gigabecquerels (2 curies). The source is normally mounted at the end of a source rod, approximately six feet long. In this particular model version, the source rod consists of two screw-together extensions (approximately two and a half feet each) which screw into the same diameter source holder (approximately half a foot long). When operating, the rod with source is lowered through the shielded storage position, into the integral and enclosed dry well tube. When not in operation, the rod with source is raised to place the source into a safe position inside the main shielding. On September 13, the top screw connection came unscrewed apparently due to prolonged mechanical vibration. This 'disconnect' was repaired and the gauge returned to operation on September 18. At the same time the lower screw connection was found to be partially unscrewed as well. Both connections were opened, cleaned, coated with 'Lok-tite' and tightened.
"On October 5, during routine 'end of shift' return of the source to the shielded position, the source rod snapped off at the lower screw connection. The operator was able to quickly grab the exposed end of the source holder
and prevent the source from falling to the bottom of the dry well. The source was successfully locked out in the shielded storage position. Examination of the source rod indicates that the male screw connector sheared off at its juncture with the main body of the rod section. The cause of this additional failure is under investigation. The manufacturer is working on a retrofit for all four gauges of this type at this licensee's facility. Department staff will be present during the retrofit."
HOO NOTE: See event #37353
"The licensee notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection (WDOH), of an additional mechanical failure involving the same Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device which suffered
a 'source disconnect' as reported in event #WA-00-046. The device is specifically licensed for density process measurements and uses a Cesium 137 sealed source, Amersham Model CDC.711M not to exceed 74 gigabecquerels (2 curies). The source is normally mounted at the end of a source rod, approximately six feet long. In this particular model version, the source rod consists of two screw-together extensions (approximately two and a half feet each) which screw into the same diameter source holder (approximately half a foot long). When operating, the rod with source is lowered through the shielded storage position, into the integral and enclosed dry well tube. When not in operation, the rod with source is raised to place the source into a safe position inside the main shielding. On September 13, the top screw connection came unscrewed apparently due to prolonged mechanical vibration. This 'disconnect' was repaired and the gauge returned to operation on September 18. At the same time the lower screw connection was found to be partially unscrewed as well. Both connections were opened, cleaned, coated with 'Lok-tite' and tightened.
"On October 5, during routine 'end of shift' return of the source to the shielded position, the source rod snapped off at the lower screw connection. The operator was able to quickly grab the exposed end of the source holder
and prevent the source from falling to the bottom of the dry well. The source was successfully locked out in the shielded storage position. Examination of the source rod indicates that the male screw connector sheared off at its juncture with the main body of the rod section. The cause of this additional failure is under investigation. The manufacturer is working on a retrofit for all four gauges of this type at this licensee's facility. Department staff will be present during the retrofit."
HOO NOTE: See event #37353