Event Notification Report for October 03, 2000

ISSUANCE OF A PRESS RELEASE REGARDING A TEMPORARY WORK STOPPAGE ON MOST PLANT DISMANTLEMENT ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING A CONTAMINATION INCIDENT

At 1250 on 10/03/00, the licensee issued a press release regarding an incident that occurred on 09/29/00. The following text is a portion of a this press release:

"Maine Yankee has temporarily halted work on most plant dismantlement activities following an incident last Friday [09/29/00] where the clothing of 4 workers was slightly contaminated with radiological material. The workers were welding shielding plates in 2 waste shipping containers on the non-nuclear side of the plant. The shipping containers previously had been mistakenly released from the nuclear side of the facility. There was no measurable internal dose to the workers or skin contamination from the incident. The radiological dose to the exposed workers was less than one millirem. In Maine, the annual radiological dose an individual receives from all sources, natural and manmade, is about 350 millirem."

"The clothing contamination was discovered early Saturday morning when one of the workers who had been sent to perform a task on the nuclear side of the plant alarmed a radiation monitor when exiting. Technicians identified the shipping containers as the source of the contamination and evaluated 3 other workers who had been working on the containers. No contamination was found on the clothing of these individuals. Maine Yankee also followed up with another ten workers who worked on the containers during the day shift Friday to determine whether there were any additional articles of contaminated clothing. Three of these individuals were found to have slightly contaminated clothing. As a precautionary measure, Maine Yankee is surveying the homes and vehicles of the affected workers. No additional contamination has been identified."

"An analysis is underway to determine specifically how the contaminated containers were released to the non-nuclear side of the plant. Radiological work will only resume when Maine Yankee's senior management is convinced work control procedures are appropriate and are being implemented thoroughly and completely. Maine Yankee has discussed this incident and our response with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of Maine."

" 'Controlling radiological material is fundamental to the success of the decommissioning project. That is why, even though there is no health concern as a result of this incident, we stopped plant dismantlement activities until we have convinced ourselves that we are ready to return to work,' said Mike Meisner, Maine Yankee President. Meisner added, 'I am pleased, however, that redundant controls and processes we have in place as well as our professional staff helped us identify the problem and react appropriately.' "

The licensee notified an onsite NRC inspector. (Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact name and telephone number.)

DISCOVERY THAT REACTOR POWER EXCEEDED 100% FOR A PERIOD OF GREATER THAT 8 HOURS DUE TO AN INSTRUMENT FAILURE ON THE LEADING EDGE FLOW METER

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"St. Lucie Unit 2 average power level was calculated to have been 100.1% power for greater than 8 hours on September 25, 2000. This power level resulted from an instrumentation failure on the Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM) which was utilized by the [Digital Data Processing System (DDPS)] Plant Computer Calorimetric power level indication. A failure in the DP1 transducer path on the 'A' Loop of the LEFM instrument resulted in a decreasing feedwater (FW) flow output value."

"Detailed analysis of the plant's performance over September 24, 2000, and September 25, 2000, indicate an unexpected decrease in 'A' LEFM Feedwater Flow indicated to the DDPS beginning approximately mid-day on September 24, 2000, without a corresponding decrease in 'A' Venturi based Feedwater Flow. A direct and corresponding decrease in DDPS Calorimetric Power results from the 'A' LEFM FW Flow decrease. A corresponding decrease in 'B' side LEFM or Venturi FW Flow was not present. This confirmed the Vendor's initial report of an 'A' side instrumentation problem within the LEFM System. The Operations Crew questioned this decrease and initiated conservative action as a result of DDPS Calorimetric Power observed to be lowering. Prior to and during the LEFM instrument failure, the indicated Calorimetric Power level in use by the plant operators did not exceed 100.0% for greater than 8 hours. The LEFM transducer was repaired and returned to service [on] October 1, 2000."

"Based upon subsequent analysis of 'B' side LEFM FW Flow and 'A' [and] 'B' side Venturi FW Flow, the change in power was approximately 0.2% reactor power. The maximum power level was approximately 99.9% on September 24, 2000, and approximately 100.1% (with a maximum of 100.2%) power on September 25, 2000. An increase to 100.2% is well within the uncertainty for DDPS Calorimetric Power of 1.3% and initial power assumed within the Safety Analysis of 2%."

"This event was determined to be reportable at 15:22 on October 3, 2000, in accordance with St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating License condition 2.F: Operation of St. Lucie Unit 2 in excess of 100% power for greater than 8 hours is in excess of the plant's Operating License limit of 'not in excess of 2700 megawatts thermal (100% power).' The Unit 2 License requires that [the licensee] 'shall report any violations of these requirements within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region II, or his designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written follow-up report with 14 days.' "

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

DISCOVERY THAT AN AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN OF AN AUTOCLAVE ON 09/26/00 WAS A VALID SAFETY SYSTEM ACTIVATION (24-hour report)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel:

"At 0835 [hours] on 10/03/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent was informed by the Autoclave System Engineer that a Safety System actuation that occurred on 09/29/00 was a valid event. At the time of the event, all indications available to the operators indicated an invalid activation. The autoclave was declared inoperable, and testing of the instruments for as-found readings was performed. After obtaining the as-found readings on the instrument loops, additional testing was conducted during the evening of 10/02/00. This steam load testing allowed the pressure to reach the trip point assigned value for shell high steam shutdown. Based on this information, we are reporting an actuation of a safety system. There was no release of radioactive material from this event."

Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the Department of Energy site representative.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING A SHIPMENT OF CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL AT AMERICAN METAL AND IRON COMPANY IN SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

A few months ago, American Metal and Iron Company sent a shipment of scrap metal to South Korea. South Korea subsequently rejected the material and returned it to American Metal and Iron Company in San Jose, California, because the material was contaminated with radium-226. (American Metal and Iron Company is a scrap metals dealer/metal recycler, and the scrap metal involved was a mixture of sheet metal conduit that had been compressed into a 4' by 4' by 6' block weighing approximately 1 ton.)

American Metal and Iron Company representatives originally thought that the material had come from Lawrence Livermore and that it was the responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE). Accordingly, American Metal and Iron Company representatives contacted DOE, and a DOE representative responded to the site to characterize the contamination. The highest radiation reading at the surface of the scrap metal was 0.2 mR/hour, and the highest wipe test result was 3,000 dpm.

DOE subsequently denied that this was their material because the contract for Lawrence Livermore expired in January and because American Metal and Iron Company received the material a few months ago. In addition, DOE regulations would not allow DOE to sent out metal contaminated with oil. At the time of this notification, American Metal and Iron Company personnel did not know where they got the material.

On the premise that this is not DOE material, the State of California Radiologic Health Branch plans to assume responsibility to make sure that American Metal and Iron Company either sends the material to a licensed waste site for disposal or gets a health physicist to characterize the material and provide a request as to why they should not sent it to a licensed waste site.

The State (Kent Prendergast) requested that this information be entered as an event report and into the N-Med system. The State also reported that they had received calls from both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the NRC Region 4 office regarding this issue.

HOO NOTE: At 1312 EDT on 10/03/00, the NRC Operations Center received some information regarding this
issue from an independent marine surveyor in Oakland, CA. At 1354 EDT, the same individual
reported that the survey meter had been read incorrectly and that this was a none issue. In order to
ensure that all of the appropriate parties were involved and that appropriate actions were being
taken, a conference call was subsequently conducted at 1500 EDT with representatives from the
State of California, EPA Region IX, and the NRC. Participants included the State of California Office
of Emergency Services (Richard Osborne) and EPA San Francisco (Terry Brubaker) as well as
NRC representatives from the Region IV office (Dave Loveless and Dwight Chamberlain), the Office
of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (Brian Smith and Fred Brown), and Incident Response
Operations (Charles Miller). During this conference call, it was agreed that the State would followup
on this event and report the results to both EPA and NRC Region IV.

(Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number, the address for American Metal and Iron Company, and the name and telephone number of the independent marine surveyor.)

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE

Failed to receive proper indication of turbine position circuitry indicating lamp following HPCI system run at rated pressure. Investigation by station personnel identified a failed oil pressure switch which provides indication of stop valve closure to turbine reset circuit.

Failure of the switch prevents automatic and remote reset of HPCI turbine trips. This failure renders HPCI inoperable and would prevent it from fulfilling its safety function. Technical Specification 3.5.a (14 days to return to service or shutdown) entered. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are fully operable.

Efforts are proceeding to repair/replace the switch.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.

LOAD CELL CALIBRATION DATA FOR SOME FREEZER SUBLIMERS FOUND TO BE NON - CONSERVATIVE.

At 1528 on 10/03/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by engineering that load cell calibration data for some freezer sublimers was suspected to be in error. The load cells are part of the High High Weight Trip System for the freezer sublimers which is required by Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) to be operable. Data for many of the load cells calibrated on site shows the identified load cells do not meet the specifications credited in the existing setpoint calculations and the calibration procedures. The problem appears to be consistent among the load cells. The load cells data indicates less weight than what was actually applied. It has been determined that this deficiency may affect the ability of the freezer sublimers' ability to actuate the High High Weight Trip System at the required Limited Control Setting (LCS). This deficiency would not affect the ability of the freezer sublimers to actuate the High High Weight Trip System below the Safety Limit (SL). There are 30 of the 10,000 lb. Capacity and 4 of the 20,000 lb. capacity load cells that are affected. Investigation revealed that none of the four 20,000 lb. Load cells have been installed. The 20,000 lb. Load cells are being controlled to ensure they are not installed. The affected in service freezer sublimers were declared inoperable by the PSS. Engineering is reviewing work package data and the freezer sublimers that do not contain suspected load cells are being returned to service. Resolution of this issue is being pursued by Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering.

The equipment is required by TSR to be available and operable and should have been operating. No redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

* * * UPDATE 2140EDT ON 10/5/00 FROM ERIC WALKER TO S. SANDIN * * *

"UPDATE: During the investigation of the initiating event, a more detailed review of load cell data, including vendor calibration data, was performed with additional load cells being called into question. The vendor data indicated levels which were in the non-conservative direction. The location of the additional load cells was determined and 8 additional freezer sublimers were declared inoperable (two of these 8 were already inoperable). 6 freezer sublimers had been in operation with the suspect load cells installed, and the High High Weight Trip System was required, but would not have operated as required by the TSR. This deficiency would not have allowed the freezer sublimer to exceed the TSR Safety Limit. No redundant equipment was available to perform the intended safety functions. This is reportable as required by 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)."

The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Site Representative have been informed. Notified R3DO(Madera) and EO(Hodges).

NON - LICENSED OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY STARTED THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG).

At 2055 on October 3, 2000, the "A" EDG received an emergency start signal in response to an inadvertent actuation of the EDG local emergency start pushbutton. The local emergency start pushbutton was inadvertently actuated by non-licensed Operations personnel while reviewing procedural guidance for emergency starting the EDG from the local control panel.

The EDG achieved rated voltage and speed following the start signal, but was not required to connect to the Class 1E distribution system during the event. The EDG was subsequently secured and restored to a standby status.

Evaluations to determine the cause for why reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) was not initially identified will be addressed within the station's corrective action program.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.