Event Notification Report for September 30, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/29/2000 - 09/30/2000
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37393
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: HILL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: HILL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/30/2000
Notification Time: 05:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2000
Event Time: 01:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2000
Notification Time: 05:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2000
Event Time: 01:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE AND THE UNIT ENTERED A 14 DAY LCO ACTION STATEMENT.
At 0110 hours on September 30, 2000, the Unit One High Pressure Cooling Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable following failure to successfully complete QCOS 2300-26, HPCI CCST Suction Check Valve Closure Test. QCOS 2300-26 is an Inservice Testing surveillance used to verify closure of the HPCI pump Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) suction check valve. The valve could not be verified to be closed by the surveillance and the system was declared inoperable, as required by the procedure. The time of the LCO entry was at 0048 hours when the system was made inoperable for performance of the surveillance. Unit One is currently in a 14 day LCO per Technical Specification 3.5.A.3. The HPCI system is currently in the normal standby line-up, available for injection if required, pending troubleshooting.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1724 EDT ON 10/04/00 FROM DAVE BOWMAN TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This is a retraction of the ENS call made on 09/30/00 concerning the inoperabilty of the HPCI system following the failure of the HPCI Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) suction check valve to close during a surveillance."
"We have completed our evaluation and have determined that a redundant isolation valve was operable and would have isolated the CCST suction to HPCI and would not have prevented the HPCI alternate suction from the torus to provide an adequate source of water for HPCI to meet its safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera).
At 0110 hours on September 30, 2000, the Unit One High Pressure Cooling Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable following failure to successfully complete QCOS 2300-26, HPCI CCST Suction Check Valve Closure Test. QCOS 2300-26 is an Inservice Testing surveillance used to verify closure of the HPCI pump Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) suction check valve. The valve could not be verified to be closed by the surveillance and the system was declared inoperable, as required by the procedure. The time of the LCO entry was at 0048 hours when the system was made inoperable for performance of the surveillance. Unit One is currently in a 14 day LCO per Technical Specification 3.5.A.3. The HPCI system is currently in the normal standby line-up, available for injection if required, pending troubleshooting.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1724 EDT ON 10/04/00 FROM DAVE BOWMAN TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This is a retraction of the ENS call made on 09/30/00 concerning the inoperabilty of the HPCI system following the failure of the HPCI Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) suction check valve to close during a surveillance."
"We have completed our evaluation and have determined that a redundant isolation valve was operable and would have isolated the CCST suction to HPCI and would not have prevented the HPCI alternate suction from the torus to provide an adequate source of water for HPCI to meet its safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37394
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/01/2000
Notification Time: 03:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2000
Event Time: 23:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2000
Notification Time: 03:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2000
Event Time: 23:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT ENTERED LCO ACTION STATEMENT WHEN BOTH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT UNIT COOLERS WHERE DECLARED INOPERABLE.
On 09/30/00 at 2333, both Primary Containment Unit Coolers were declared inoperable based on an apparent failure to fully meet required volumetric flow rates. The Tech Spec SR 3.6.1.7.2 required values are greater than or equal to 50,000 CFM. Actual calculated values were determined to be approximately 45,000 CFM for Unit cooler A and 48,000 CFM for Unit cooler B. This condition may impact the ability of these unit coolers to perform their design safety functions. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 b.2.iii.D for loss of function required to mitigate an accident. Activities to restore function include evaluation of test data and methodology, cleaning of unit cooler coils, verification of calibration data, and verification of system alignment.
The plant is in a 8 hour LCO to restore one of the coolers to operable status or be in mode 3 within the following 12 hours.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/1/00 AT 2320 BY HUSTON, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
Both Primary Containment Unit Coolers A and B (Divisions I and II) have been re-tested satisfactorily verifying both safety function and Tech Spec operability. The station declared both Containment Unit Cooler A and B operable and exited the LCO regarding Primary Containment Unit Coolers at 1048 hours on 10/1/00
The station is evaluating information developed to determine whether a retraction is warranted.
The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. The Operations Center notified the R4DO (Cain).
* * * RETRACTION 2005 EST 10/30/2000 FROM CHASE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"On September 30, 2000 at 2333, both primary containment unit coolers A and B were declared inoperable based on an apparent failure to meet required volumetric flow rates (50,000 CFM) as stated in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.7.2. This event was reported as a loss of function in accordance with 10CFR50.72 b.2.iii.D.
"During Engineering evaluations of unit cooler condition, the surveillance test methodology was noted to contain a unit cooler face area that was smaller than the area depicted in the applicable design information. In-field measurements were taken on the unit coolers. These field measurements confirmed that a larger face area value should have been incorporated into the test methodology. Effectively, RBS had imposed a more conservative face area value resulting in lowering the as calculated flow rates that are used to determine acceptability.
"Recalculation of the volumetric flow using the appropriate area resulted in the required Technical Specification SR 3.6.1.7.2 flow rate of 50,000 cubic feet per minute being achieved for primary containment unit cooler B. Therefore, primary containment unit cooler B was actually operable on September 30, 2000, at 2333 and at least one operable unit cooler was always maintained. Therefore, this issue was not reportable.
"The coils of primary containment unit coolers A and B were also cleaned. Subsequently, using either the previous or recalculated value for the unit cooler face area, both unit coolers re-tested satisfactorily and were restored to service."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R4DO (Harrell).
On 09/30/00 at 2333, both Primary Containment Unit Coolers were declared inoperable based on an apparent failure to fully meet required volumetric flow rates. The Tech Spec SR 3.6.1.7.2 required values are greater than or equal to 50,000 CFM. Actual calculated values were determined to be approximately 45,000 CFM for Unit cooler A and 48,000 CFM for Unit cooler B. This condition may impact the ability of these unit coolers to perform their design safety functions. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 b.2.iii.D for loss of function required to mitigate an accident. Activities to restore function include evaluation of test data and methodology, cleaning of unit cooler coils, verification of calibration data, and verification of system alignment.
The plant is in a 8 hour LCO to restore one of the coolers to operable status or be in mode 3 within the following 12 hours.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/1/00 AT 2320 BY HUSTON, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
Both Primary Containment Unit Coolers A and B (Divisions I and II) have been re-tested satisfactorily verifying both safety function and Tech Spec operability. The station declared both Containment Unit Cooler A and B operable and exited the LCO regarding Primary Containment Unit Coolers at 1048 hours on 10/1/00
The station is evaluating information developed to determine whether a retraction is warranted.
The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. The Operations Center notified the R4DO (Cain).
* * * RETRACTION 2005 EST 10/30/2000 FROM CHASE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"On September 30, 2000 at 2333, both primary containment unit coolers A and B were declared inoperable based on an apparent failure to meet required volumetric flow rates (50,000 CFM) as stated in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.7.2. This event was reported as a loss of function in accordance with 10CFR50.72 b.2.iii.D.
"During Engineering evaluations of unit cooler condition, the surveillance test methodology was noted to contain a unit cooler face area that was smaller than the area depicted in the applicable design information. In-field measurements were taken on the unit coolers. These field measurements confirmed that a larger face area value should have been incorporated into the test methodology. Effectively, RBS had imposed a more conservative face area value resulting in lowering the as calculated flow rates that are used to determine acceptability.
"Recalculation of the volumetric flow using the appropriate area resulted in the required Technical Specification SR 3.6.1.7.2 flow rate of 50,000 cubic feet per minute being achieved for primary containment unit cooler B. Therefore, primary containment unit cooler B was actually operable on September 30, 2000, at 2333 and at least one operable unit cooler was always maintained. Therefore, this issue was not reportable.
"The coils of primary containment unit coolers A and B were also cleaned. Subsequently, using either the previous or recalculated value for the unit cooler face area, both unit coolers re-tested satisfactorily and were restored to service."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R4DO (Harrell).