Event Notification Report for September 29, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/28/2000 - 09/29/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37389373903739137392
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37389
Rep Org: NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNION REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: MONROE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: S. JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: UNION REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: MONROE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: S. JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 09/29/2000
Notification Time: 09:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2000
Notification Time: 09:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
FRITZ STURZ (NMSS)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
FRITZ STURZ (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
An employee of the Union Regional Medical Center received an overexposure based upon the results of dosimetery readings for the May-June 2000 monitoring period. The individual's whole body TLD indicated the following doses: 7762 mrem deep, 8168 mrem eye lens, and 8577 mrem shallow. In addition, the individual's ring TLD indicated a dose of 11460 mrem. The State of North Carolina is currently investigating this incident.
An employee of the Union Regional Medical Center received an overexposure based upon the results of dosimetery readings for the May-June 2000 monitoring period. The individual's whole body TLD indicated the following doses: 7762 mrem deep, 8168 mrem eye lens, and 8577 mrem shallow. In addition, the individual's ring TLD indicated a dose of 11460 mrem. The State of North Carolina is currently investigating this incident.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37390
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/29/2000
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 13:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2000
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 13:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 55 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 55% POWER
At 1357 on 09/29/00, while performing planned refueling outage shutdown activities, a manual scram (RPS actuation) was actuated in response to decreasing reactor water level due to both reactor feed pump turbines (RFPT) being tripped. RFPT 'B' had been secured as per planned activities; RFPT 'A' tripped on low suction pressure (cause unknown at this time).
At the time of the manual scram, reactor water level was 22" and decreasing. HPCI and RCIC both automatically actuated to recover reactor water level. The lowest observed reactor water level was - 48".
PCIV Groups 2 and 5, and Secondary Containment isolated as expected. SBGT actuated as expected.
Investigation is continuing.
Recirculation pumps continued to run and decay heat is being removed by steaming to the main condenser. The 'A' reactor feed pump has been started.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
At 1357 on 09/29/00, while performing planned refueling outage shutdown activities, a manual scram (RPS actuation) was actuated in response to decreasing reactor water level due to both reactor feed pump turbines (RFPT) being tripped. RFPT 'B' had been secured as per planned activities; RFPT 'A' tripped on low suction pressure (cause unknown at this time).
At the time of the manual scram, reactor water level was 22" and decreasing. HPCI and RCIC both automatically actuated to recover reactor water level. The lowest observed reactor water level was - 48".
PCIV Groups 2 and 5, and Secondary Containment isolated as expected. SBGT actuated as expected.
Investigation is continuing.
Recirculation pumps continued to run and decay heat is being removed by steaming to the main condenser. The 'A' reactor feed pump has been started.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37391
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/29/2000
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 13:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2000
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 13:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE
At 1320 hours on 9/29/00, the seismic bolts of the Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) control panel door were discovered missing. At 1450, Engineering determined that the seismic qualification of the control panel was in question with these bolts missing.
On 9/27/00, during the day shift, the Division 3 DG was tested per Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 9080.02, DIESEL GENERATOR 1C OPERABILITY - MANUAL AND QUICK START OPERABILITY. This procedure requires instrumentation to be connected within the local control panel (1E22-S001B). The bolts to this panel were discovered missing today at 1320. It is possible that they had been missing since the performance of CPS 9080.02 but is unknown at this time. The Division 3 DG is not analyzed for these missing bolts and is considered inoperable while in this condition.
This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D) as a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, a single-train safety system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, since the Division 3 DG is an essential support system for the HPCS system needed to mitigate a small break LOCA concurrent with a Loss of offsite power.
The bolts were restored at 1442 today and the Division 3 DG is operable.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1826 BY SCHOTTEL TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
Further evaluation of this condition by engineering concluded that the absence of the bolts was seismically acceptable. A calculation determined that the estimated impact acceleration resulting from the unsecured door impacting the panel is 0.06g. Because this acceleration is small in relation to the seismic test margin documented in the original seismic calculation of the panel, the unsecured door would not have prevented the control panel from performing its safety function during seismic events. On this basis, the Division 3 DG and HPCS safety functions were not adversely affected by the absence of the bolts. Therefore, this issue Is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73 and this event notification is retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The Reg 3 RDO(Vegel) was informed.
At 1320 hours on 9/29/00, the seismic bolts of the Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) control panel door were discovered missing. At 1450, Engineering determined that the seismic qualification of the control panel was in question with these bolts missing.
On 9/27/00, during the day shift, the Division 3 DG was tested per Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 9080.02, DIESEL GENERATOR 1C OPERABILITY - MANUAL AND QUICK START OPERABILITY. This procedure requires instrumentation to be connected within the local control panel (1E22-S001B). The bolts to this panel were discovered missing today at 1320. It is possible that they had been missing since the performance of CPS 9080.02 but is unknown at this time. The Division 3 DG is not analyzed for these missing bolts and is considered inoperable while in this condition.
This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D) as a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, a single-train safety system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, since the Division 3 DG is an essential support system for the HPCS system needed to mitigate a small break LOCA concurrent with a Loss of offsite power.
The bolts were restored at 1442 today and the Division 3 DG is operable.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1826 BY SCHOTTEL TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
Further evaluation of this condition by engineering concluded that the absence of the bolts was seismically acceptable. A calculation determined that the estimated impact acceleration resulting from the unsecured door impacting the panel is 0.06g. Because this acceleration is small in relation to the seismic test margin documented in the original seismic calculation of the panel, the unsecured door would not have prevented the control panel from performing its safety function during seismic events. On this basis, the Division 3 DG and HPCS safety functions were not adversely affected by the absence of the bolts. Therefore, this issue Is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73 and this event notification is retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The Reg 3 RDO(Vegel) was informed.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37392
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/29/2000
Notification Time: 22:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 15:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2000
Notification Time: 22:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2000
Event Time: 15:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION
At 1522 on 09/29/00, the PSS office was notified that a secondary condensate alarm was received on the C-360 position 3 autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 according to TSR 2.1.4.3. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure, removed from service and the WICS system was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Troubleshooting was initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.
The safety system actuation is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety Analysis Report section 6.9, table 1 criterion J.2 Safety System actuation due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification
The NRC Senior Resident has bean notified of this event.
***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 2155 EDT ON 10/04/00 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah personnel:
"THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Investigation and troubleshooting by the System Engineer revealed that the gain adjustment on one of the WICS channels had drifted out of tolerance. Historical discussions with the component manufacturer had concluded that the WICS alarm cards are susceptible to drift, due to age and fluctuations in temperature. These cards are exposed to ambient temperatures, but the cards are rated for the range of temperatures at the autoclaves. Given this and other indications that the WICS actuation signals were invalid, i.e., not the result of water backing up in the drain, it has been concluded that the subject actuations were caused by invalid signals (instrument drift) and thus, [do] not meet the criteria for reporting."
Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS EO (Hodges).
At 1522 on 09/29/00, the PSS office was notified that a secondary condensate alarm was received on the C-360 position 3 autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 according to TSR 2.1.4.3. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure, removed from service and the WICS system was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Troubleshooting was initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.
The safety system actuation is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety Analysis Report section 6.9, table 1 criterion J.2 Safety System actuation due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification
The NRC Senior Resident has bean notified of this event.
***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 2155 EDT ON 10/04/00 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah personnel:
"THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Investigation and troubleshooting by the System Engineer revealed that the gain adjustment on one of the WICS channels had drifted out of tolerance. Historical discussions with the component manufacturer had concluded that the WICS alarm cards are susceptible to drift, due to age and fluctuations in temperature. These cards are exposed to ambient temperatures, but the cards are rated for the range of temperatures at the autoclaves. Given this and other indications that the WICS actuation signals were invalid, i.e., not the result of water backing up in the drain, it has been concluded that the subject actuations were caused by invalid signals (instrument drift) and thus, [do] not meet the criteria for reporting."
Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS EO (Hodges).