Event Notification Report for September 28, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/27/2000 - 09/28/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37386
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHERBA
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHERBA
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 09/28/2000
Notification Time: 01:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2000
Event Time: 01:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2000
Notification Time: 01:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2000
Event Time: 01:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ELECTRICAL BUS OUTAGE WILL AFFECT TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM
"This event notification is for planned maintenance on Cook Unit 1's electrical buses that remove power from a portion of the TSC ventilation system. Contingencies are established to restore power to the TSC ventilation fan (if needed) to support Emergency Plan execution. The fan that will be unavailable boosts airflow through the TSC ventilation charcoal clean-up filter subsystem. Ventilation flow will still pass through this filter without the booster fan, but TSC pressure will not be boosted to limit infiltration. Use of this fan is dependent on radiological conditions, if radiological conditions warrant its use, and it is not available, the TSC will relocate to the Unit 2 Control Room in accordance with plant procedures. Reporting this event is consistent with NUREG-1022, Rev 1 criteria for reporting loss of ERFs.
"No adverse consequences are expected from this outage. The TSC ventilation booster fan is expected to be unavailable for 48 hours, starting at 0121 hours on 9-28-2000. Contingencies have been planned to restore power to the booster fan in 8 to 10 hours if needed. Follow-up notification will be made when the TSC is again fully available. The NRC Senior Site Resident Inspector has been informed of this planned evolution."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/01/00 @ 0948 BY COBB TO GOULD * * *
The onsite TSC emergency response facility has been restored as of 0515 and it is fully available for use.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 3 RDO(Clayton) has been notified.
"This event notification is for planned maintenance on Cook Unit 1's electrical buses that remove power from a portion of the TSC ventilation system. Contingencies are established to restore power to the TSC ventilation fan (if needed) to support Emergency Plan execution. The fan that will be unavailable boosts airflow through the TSC ventilation charcoal clean-up filter subsystem. Ventilation flow will still pass through this filter without the booster fan, but TSC pressure will not be boosted to limit infiltration. Use of this fan is dependent on radiological conditions, if radiological conditions warrant its use, and it is not available, the TSC will relocate to the Unit 2 Control Room in accordance with plant procedures. Reporting this event is consistent with NUREG-1022, Rev 1 criteria for reporting loss of ERFs.
"No adverse consequences are expected from this outage. The TSC ventilation booster fan is expected to be unavailable for 48 hours, starting at 0121 hours on 9-28-2000. Contingencies have been planned to restore power to the booster fan in 8 to 10 hours if needed. Follow-up notification will be made when the TSC is again fully available. The NRC Senior Site Resident Inspector has been informed of this planned evolution."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/01/00 @ 0948 BY COBB TO GOULD * * *
The onsite TSC emergency response facility has been restored as of 0515 and it is fully available for use.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 3 RDO(Clayton) has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37387
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/28/2000
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2000
Event Time: 18:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2000
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2000
Event Time: 18:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - PUMP POWER SUPPLY DOES NOT MEET SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS
On September 28, 2000 at approximately 1835, it was determined that the power cable routing for the 'B' charging pump is not in accordance with the assumptions in the Millstone Unit 3 Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition could have resulted in the inability to maintain RCP seal cooling in the event of a design basis fire. This condition is historical in nature. In accordance with the Millstone Unit 3 Technical Requirements Manual, a fire watch has been established in the affected area as a compensatory measure until a corrective action plan can be developed and implemented. All other fire protection features in the affected areas are operable.
The cable is supposed to be run inside of a fire curtain, but instead was run outside of this curtain.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
On September 28, 2000 at approximately 1835, it was determined that the power cable routing for the 'B' charging pump is not in accordance with the assumptions in the Millstone Unit 3 Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition could have resulted in the inability to maintain RCP seal cooling in the event of a design basis fire. This condition is historical in nature. In accordance with the Millstone Unit 3 Technical Requirements Manual, a fire watch has been established in the affected area as a compensatory measure until a corrective action plan can be developed and implemented. All other fire protection features in the affected areas are operable.
The cable is supposed to be run inside of a fire curtain, but instead was run outside of this curtain.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37388
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES KOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES KOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/28/2000
Notification Time: 19:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2000
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2000
Notification Time: 19:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2000
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL LOSS OF RHR AND ACCIDENT MITIGATION CAPABILITY
ON 09/28/00 AT 04:30 HRS. SURVEILLANCE TESTING SHOWED THAT A CHECK VALVE FAILED TO ISOLATE FLOW BETWEEN THE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM AND THE NON-SAFETY
RELATED UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER (SW) SYSTEM. FAILURE TO PREVENT FLOW FROM THE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM TO THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COULD RENDER BOTH ESW SUBSYSTEMS INOPERABLE.
AT 05:58 ON 09/28/00, A MANUALLY OPERATED BLOCK VALVE WAS CLOSED BETWEEN THE SYSTEMS TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF THE ESW SUBSYSTEMS. THIS ACTION ENSURES THAT BOTH ESW
SUBSYSTEMS ARE MAINTAINED OPERABLE.
FURTHER EVALUATION AND TESTING WAS PERFORMED AND AT 17:30 HRS. ON 09/28/00, THE CONCLUSION WAS REACHED THAT THIS CONDITION COULD ALONE HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ESW SYSTEM SAFETY FUNCTION.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
ON 09/28/00 AT 04:30 HRS. SURVEILLANCE TESTING SHOWED THAT A CHECK VALVE FAILED TO ISOLATE FLOW BETWEEN THE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM AND THE NON-SAFETY
RELATED UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER (SW) SYSTEM. FAILURE TO PREVENT FLOW FROM THE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM TO THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COULD RENDER BOTH ESW SUBSYSTEMS INOPERABLE.
AT 05:58 ON 09/28/00, A MANUALLY OPERATED BLOCK VALVE WAS CLOSED BETWEEN THE SYSTEMS TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF THE ESW SUBSYSTEMS. THIS ACTION ENSURES THAT BOTH ESW
SUBSYSTEMS ARE MAINTAINED OPERABLE.
FURTHER EVALUATION AND TESTING WAS PERFORMED AND AT 17:30 HRS. ON 09/28/00, THE CONCLUSION WAS REACHED THAT THIS CONDITION COULD ALONE HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ESW SYSTEM SAFETY FUNCTION.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.