Event Notification Report for September 23, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/22/2000 - 09/23/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37371
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COTTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COTTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/23/2000
Notification Time: 03:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2000
Event Time: 00:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Notification Time: 03:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2000
Event Time: 00:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 7 | Power Operation | 7 | Power Operation |
AUTOMATIC FEEDWATER ISOLATION DURING PLANT SHUTDOWN
"Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced an Automatic Feedwater Isolation on high steam generator water level from the 21 B steam generator. The main turbine valves were closed and the unit was off line. This occurred during plant shutdown for refueling at 00:37. Unit 2 was at 7% reactor power at the time of the feedwater isolation. The steam generators were being fed using normal feedwater through the bypass feedwater regulating valves. Steam removal was via the condenser steam dump system. The feedwater isolation occurred shortly after the planned main turbine overspeed trip test was completed. The feedwater isolation resulted in the closure of feed water isolation valves 2FWS-HYV157A, B, and C and the trip of the running main feedwater pump 2FWS-P21A. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps started as designed upon the trip of the running main feedwater pump. All ESF equipment was verified to respond as expected. New positioners were installed on the bypass feedwater regulating valves prior to the Unit 2 shutdown for refueling and may have changed the control response.
"Plant shutdown continued and at 00:39 Unit 2 entered Mode 2. After the steam generator water level returned to below the ESF setpoint, normal feedwater flow was re-established via 2FWS-P21A and the bypass feedwater regulating valves at 00:42. Heat removal was maintained at all times via the condenser steam dump removal system. The auxiliary feedwater pumps were manually secured at 00:46. Unit 2 entered Mode 3 at 01:12 and preparations are being made for cooldown to Mode 5. A root cause analysis is being performed to investigate the ESF actuation."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced an Automatic Feedwater Isolation on high steam generator water level from the 21 B steam generator. The main turbine valves were closed and the unit was off line. This occurred during plant shutdown for refueling at 00:37. Unit 2 was at 7% reactor power at the time of the feedwater isolation. The steam generators were being fed using normal feedwater through the bypass feedwater regulating valves. Steam removal was via the condenser steam dump system. The feedwater isolation occurred shortly after the planned main turbine overspeed trip test was completed. The feedwater isolation resulted in the closure of feed water isolation valves 2FWS-HYV157A, B, and C and the trip of the running main feedwater pump 2FWS-P21A. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps started as designed upon the trip of the running main feedwater pump. All ESF equipment was verified to respond as expected. New positioners were installed on the bypass feedwater regulating valves prior to the Unit 2 shutdown for refueling and may have changed the control response.
"Plant shutdown continued and at 00:39 Unit 2 entered Mode 2. After the steam generator water level returned to below the ESF setpoint, normal feedwater flow was re-established via 2FWS-P21A and the bypass feedwater regulating valves at 00:42. Heat removal was maintained at all times via the condenser steam dump removal system. The auxiliary feedwater pumps were manually secured at 00:46. Unit 2 entered Mode 3 at 01:12 and preparations are being made for cooldown to Mode 5. A root cause analysis is being performed to investigate the ESF actuation."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37372
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK SOENS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK SOENS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/23/2000
Notification Time: 05:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2000
Event Time: 01:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Notification Time: 05:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2000
Event Time: 01:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
FEMA, DOE, DOA (fax)
HHS, EPA, DOT (fax)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
FEMA, DOE, DOA (fax)
HHS, EPA, DOT (fax)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 40 | Power Operation | 18 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE OF NEW JERSEY INVOLVING RELEASE OF SECONDARY CONDENSATE CONTAINING HYDRAZINE TO THE DELAWARE RIVER
"During a planned downpower, a flange leak developed on the 15C feedwater heater condensate line. The leakage rate was approximately 100 gpm. This resulted in water containing hydrazine entering a storm drain which leads to the Delaware River. A 15 minute notification was made to the State of New Jersey at 0135. Sample results indicated 30 ppb hydrazine with the limit being 10 ppb. The 15C feedwater heater is being isolated and cooled down with leakage at approximately 25 gpm. The plant is stable with power at 18% and the turbine offline in accordance with the scheduled downpower. [The] 15 SW pump is INOPERABLE but available due to planned maintenance. [The] 13 Charging Pump is INOPERABLE due to a preexisting condition."
The licensee estimates that 8-12 hours will be required to cooldown and isolate the affected feedwater heater condensate line. Meanwhile, efforts are underway to contain the leakage for reprocessing. There were no injuries associated with the 250 degree condensate leakage. The licensee informed the state of New Jersey, the Lower Alloways Creek Township and will inform the NRC resident inspector.
"During a planned downpower, a flange leak developed on the 15C feedwater heater condensate line. The leakage rate was approximately 100 gpm. This resulted in water containing hydrazine entering a storm drain which leads to the Delaware River. A 15 minute notification was made to the State of New Jersey at 0135. Sample results indicated 30 ppb hydrazine with the limit being 10 ppb. The 15C feedwater heater is being isolated and cooled down with leakage at approximately 25 gpm. The plant is stable with power at 18% and the turbine offline in accordance with the scheduled downpower. [The] 15 SW pump is INOPERABLE but available due to planned maintenance. [The] 13 Charging Pump is INOPERABLE due to a preexisting condition."
The licensee estimates that 8-12 hours will be required to cooldown and isolate the affected feedwater heater condensate line. Meanwhile, efforts are underway to contain the leakage for reprocessing. There were no injuries associated with the 250 degree condensate leakage. The licensee informed the state of New Jersey, the Lower Alloways Creek Township and will inform the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37373
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN CRAIG
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN CRAIG
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/23/2000
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2000
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2000
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER LOST POWER UNEXPECTEDLY DURING MAINTENANCE
It was determined at 1615 EDT on 9/23/00 that the unexpected loss of power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) during a planned maintenance procedure on 9/18/00 at 2000 EDT constituted a reportable event as a major loss of assessment capability. Power was restored at 2107 on 9/18/00 and all functions restored. It has been determined that the loss of power should have been expected as part of the maintenance and a review of the event is ongoing.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
It was determined at 1615 EDT on 9/23/00 that the unexpected loss of power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) during a planned maintenance procedure on 9/18/00 at 2000 EDT constituted a reportable event as a major loss of assessment capability. Power was restored at 2107 on 9/18/00 and all functions restored. It has been determined that the loss of power should have been expected as part of the maintenance and a review of the event is ongoing.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.