Event Notification Report for September 21, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/20/2000 - 09/21/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37359
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LUCAS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LUCAS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/21/2000
Notification Time: 06:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2000
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2000
Notification Time: 06:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2000
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) - UNANALYZED COND OP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) - UNANALYZED COND OP
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
TURBINE DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEED PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE WAS DISCOVERED LOCKED.
The turbine driven Emergency Feed pump discharge valve (XV601036-EF) was discovered locked closed instead of locked open as required. This condition rendered the turbine driven Emergency Feed pump inoperable. The valve was last operated on 8/4/00. During the period when the discharge valve was closed, both diesels had been removed from service for maintenance. The "A" D/G was removed from service between 9/5/00 - 9/6/00 and the "B" D/G was removed from service between 9/19/00 - 9/20/00. The licensee is investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The turbine driven Emergency Feed pump discharge valve (XV601036-EF) was discovered locked closed instead of locked open as required. This condition rendered the turbine driven Emergency Feed pump inoperable. The valve was last operated on 8/4/00. During the period when the discharge valve was closed, both diesels had been removed from service for maintenance. The "A" D/G was removed from service between 9/5/00 - 9/6/00 and the "B" D/G was removed from service between 9/19/00 - 9/20/00. The licensee is investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37361
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN POPIELARSKI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN POPIELARSKI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/21/2000
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2000
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2000
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - EMERGENCY SIREN INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - EMERGENCY SIREN INOP
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS IN DEGRADED CONDITION
"On September 21, 2000 at 1530, it was identified that at least 17 of Peach Bottom's 97 Emergency Offsite Sirens were in a degraded condition. The exact cause of the degraded sirens is not known at this time, but the ability of the licensee to detect the degraded sirens has been compromised due to poor maintenance practices. A plan is being developed and implemented to repair the degraded sirens and appropriate interim compensatory measures are being put in place to compensate for the degraded condition."
An investigation is underway into this matter. The contractor responsible for the siren maintenance has no other responsibilities on site.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 2253 EDT ON 9/23/00 BY JIM VASH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee reported that 15 of the 17 sirens that were in degraded conditions have been restored to service. The remaining 2 sirens are expected to be restored to service early next weeks.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Richard Barkley) has been notified.
"On September 21, 2000 at 1530, it was identified that at least 17 of Peach Bottom's 97 Emergency Offsite Sirens were in a degraded condition. The exact cause of the degraded sirens is not known at this time, but the ability of the licensee to detect the degraded sirens has been compromised due to poor maintenance practices. A plan is being developed and implemented to repair the degraded sirens and appropriate interim compensatory measures are being put in place to compensate for the degraded condition."
An investigation is underway into this matter. The contractor responsible for the siren maintenance has no other responsibilities on site.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 2253 EDT ON 9/23/00 BY JIM VASH TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee reported that 15 of the 17 sirens that were in degraded conditions have been restored to service. The remaining 2 sirens are expected to be restored to service early next weeks.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Richard Barkley) has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37362
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DONALD CHASE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DONALD CHASE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/21/2000
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2000
Event Time: 11:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2001
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2000
Event Time: 11:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSSIBILITY THAT BOTH DIVISION 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATORS WERE INOPERABLE FOR 9 HOURS
"This condition deals with a past Reportability issue. During a condition report review for Functional Failure/Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure determination (FF/MPFF), River Bend has determined that both Standby Diesel Generators may have been inoperable at the same time.
"A failure in a light socket related to the Division I Diesel Generator created a functional failure in that during a seismic event, the breaker logic for the Division I diesel generator output breaker could have been affected in such a way that the breaker would not close. The failed light socket was identified and corrected on 9/5/00 as part of work to replace the light bulb. Since the MAI on the light bulb failure was written on 8/22/00, it is assumed that the socket failure occurred at that time.
"During the same time period, a lube oil leak developed on the Division II oil supply which has been determined to be a functional failure. The damaged oil line was replaced on 8/30/00.
"Therefore, based on the functional failure determinations, there is an overlapping period of approximately 9 hours that the Division I and II diesel generators may not have been capable of performing their design bases function.
"This report is being made based on the information available at this time. River Bend will continue to evaluate the condition associated with the potential Division I inoperability and will assess the reportability of this condition further based on the results of that evaluation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1317 ON 1/18/2001 BY WYMORE, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The original conclusion assumed that the two light socket wires in the Division I panel which were dislodged but still energized would come into contact during a seismic event and potentially blow a fuse in the safety bus breaker control circuit. A detailed mockup was tested to the RBS seismic response curves. The wires never contacted each other and there was no short circuit. A seismic event would not have caused a breaker control failure as had been assumed.
The results of the seismic test indicates that the Division I diesel generator was fully capable of responding to an automatic start signal despite the damaged light base and loose wiring.
Based on the observed condition and the seismic test data obtained, a determination was made that there was no concurrent time of inoperability for Division I and Division II diesel generators. Division I diesel generator was out-of-service for approximately 4 hours on September 5, 2000, to replace the light socket and some adjacent wiring. Division II diesel generator was out-of-service on August 30, 2000, to repair the lube oil pipe.
Based on this information, the condition is not reportable and the 50.72 report is retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the R4DO (Kennedy).
"This condition deals with a past Reportability issue. During a condition report review for Functional Failure/Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure determination (FF/MPFF), River Bend has determined that both Standby Diesel Generators may have been inoperable at the same time.
"A failure in a light socket related to the Division I Diesel Generator created a functional failure in that during a seismic event, the breaker logic for the Division I diesel generator output breaker could have been affected in such a way that the breaker would not close. The failed light socket was identified and corrected on 9/5/00 as part of work to replace the light bulb. Since the MAI on the light bulb failure was written on 8/22/00, it is assumed that the socket failure occurred at that time.
"During the same time period, a lube oil leak developed on the Division II oil supply which has been determined to be a functional failure. The damaged oil line was replaced on 8/30/00.
"Therefore, based on the functional failure determinations, there is an overlapping period of approximately 9 hours that the Division I and II diesel generators may not have been capable of performing their design bases function.
"This report is being made based on the information available at this time. River Bend will continue to evaluate the condition associated with the potential Division I inoperability and will assess the reportability of this condition further based on the results of that evaluation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1317 ON 1/18/2001 BY WYMORE, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The original conclusion assumed that the two light socket wires in the Division I panel which were dislodged but still energized would come into contact during a seismic event and potentially blow a fuse in the safety bus breaker control circuit. A detailed mockup was tested to the RBS seismic response curves. The wires never contacted each other and there was no short circuit. A seismic event would not have caused a breaker control failure as had been assumed.
The results of the seismic test indicates that the Division I diesel generator was fully capable of responding to an automatic start signal despite the damaged light base and loose wiring.
Based on the observed condition and the seismic test data obtained, a determination was made that there was no concurrent time of inoperability for Division I and Division II diesel generators. Division I diesel generator was out-of-service for approximately 4 hours on September 5, 2000, to replace the light socket and some adjacent wiring. Division II diesel generator was out-of-service on August 30, 2000, to repair the lube oil pipe.
Based on this information, the condition is not reportable and the 50.72 report is retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the R4DO (Kennedy).