Event Notification Report for September 17, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/16/2000 - 09/17/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
373403734337334373353733637337
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37340
Rep Org: NORTH CAROLINA DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: WATAUGA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: BOONE State: NC
County:
License #: 095-0491-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Licensee: WATAUGA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: BOONE State: NC
County:
License #: 095-0491-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/18/2000
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2000
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
A member of the cleaning staff at Watauga Regional Medical Center in Boone, NC removed the linens from the room of an I -131 patient in isolation. The mistake was caught by one of the nuclear medicine technicians and the linens were retrieved from the linen company. There was no spread of contamination.
A member of the cleaning staff at Watauga Regional Medical Center in Boone, NC removed the linens from the room of an I -131 patient in isolation. The mistake was caught by one of the nuclear medicine technicians and the linens were retrieved from the linen company. There was no spread of contamination.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37343
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: HOWARD SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: HOWARD SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 09/18/2000
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 06:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2000
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 06:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OPERATORS MANUALLY STARTED EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS
"On September 17, 2000, at about 0620 PDT, 2-ME-201 (non-safety containment normal chiller) tripped on low oil pressure. Operators began to start the containment normal chiller 2-ME-202, but stopped when prestart checks indicated low freon level. Because containment temperatures were slowly increasing, plant operators placed the emergency containment cooler units in service and started an additional containment dome air circulator. To perform their ESF function, the containment emergency coolers automatically actuate on safety injection actuation signal and on containment pressure, but not on containment temperature. SCE considered that the emergency coolers were not performing an ESF function during this occurrence, and a report to the NRC was not required.
"On September 18, 2000, at 1000 PDT, SCE determined that actuation of the emergency cooler units could be considered to meet the clarification provided in section 3.3.2 of NUREG-1022, Rev. 1. Therefore, SCE is conservatively and voluntarily providing this report to the NRC. After determining that 2-ME-202 was functional with an indicated low freon level, plant operators started 2-ME-202 at about 0818 PDT, terminating this occurrence. The emergency coolers and dome air circulators operated as designed. At the time of this occurrence, both units 2 and 3 were operating at about 100% power. Unit 1 remains permanently defueled."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
"On September 17, 2000, at about 0620 PDT, 2-ME-201 (non-safety containment normal chiller) tripped on low oil pressure. Operators began to start the containment normal chiller 2-ME-202, but stopped when prestart checks indicated low freon level. Because containment temperatures were slowly increasing, plant operators placed the emergency containment cooler units in service and started an additional containment dome air circulator. To perform their ESF function, the containment emergency coolers automatically actuate on safety injection actuation signal and on containment pressure, but not on containment temperature. SCE considered that the emergency coolers were not performing an ESF function during this occurrence, and a report to the NRC was not required.
"On September 18, 2000, at 1000 PDT, SCE determined that actuation of the emergency cooler units could be considered to meet the clarification provided in section 3.3.2 of NUREG-1022, Rev. 1. Therefore, SCE is conservatively and voluntarily providing this report to the NRC. After determining that 2-ME-202 was functional with an indicated low freon level, plant operators started 2-ME-202 at about 0818 PDT, terminating this occurrence. The emergency coolers and dome air circulators operated as designed. At the time of this occurrence, both units 2 and 3 were operating at about 100% power. Unit 1 remains permanently defueled."
The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37334
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 08:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 08:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
BRIEF ENTRY INTO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3
"During attempts to restore Train 'A' Safety Injection (SI) system following planned testing, the Train 'B' SI system was rendered inoperable for 1 minute requiring entry in TS 3.0.3. The high and low head injection systems were operable.
"Train 'A' SI was inoperable due to planned RCS pressure isolation valve inservice testing. During the Train 'A' SI testing, valve 1HV-8802A (SI-PMP A TO HOT LEG 1&4 ISO VLV) had to be manually closed. In order to return Train 'A' SI to service, 1HV-8802A would have to be manually unseated and then electrically stroked. The Train 'A' SI pump was placed in PTL [pull-to-lock] to ensure that the SI pump would not run out should the SI pump auto start. The control room staff, however did not recognize the impact on Train 'B' SI, during stroke of 1HV-8802A with the SIP TO COLD LEG isolation valves (1HV-8821 A&B) open. In this configuration, the potential existed to run out the Train 'B' SI pump should the pump auto start. The control staff within a few minutes of stroking 1 HV-8802A recognized the entry into TS 3.0.3."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
"During attempts to restore Train 'A' Safety Injection (SI) system following planned testing, the Train 'B' SI system was rendered inoperable for 1 minute requiring entry in TS 3.0.3. The high and low head injection systems were operable.
"Train 'A' SI was inoperable due to planned RCS pressure isolation valve inservice testing. During the Train 'A' SI testing, valve 1HV-8802A (SI-PMP A TO HOT LEG 1&4 ISO VLV) had to be manually closed. In order to return Train 'A' SI to service, 1HV-8802A would have to be manually unseated and then electrically stroked. The Train 'A' SI pump was placed in PTL [pull-to-lock] to ensure that the SI pump would not run out should the SI pump auto start. The control room staff, however did not recognize the impact on Train 'B' SI, during stroke of 1HV-8802A with the SIP TO COLD LEG isolation valves (1HV-8821 A&B) open. In this configuration, the potential existed to run out the Train 'B' SI pump should the pump auto start. The control staff within a few minutes of stroking 1 HV-8802A recognized the entry into TS 3.0.3."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37335
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREGG R. PITTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREGG R. PITTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 15:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 15:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 70 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNEXPECTED MAIN TURBINE TRIP CAUSED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM.
During power ascension following a planned outage, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately 70% reactor power. The scram signal was generated when the Main Turbine tripped. The cause of the Turbine Trip is being investigated. All control rods fully inserted. Reactor pressure is stable and being controlled through Turbine Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser. One additional scram signal was received on low Reactor Vessel Water Level during level recovery efforts. Reactor level control is stable and being fed from the condensate/feedwater system. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems are operable and in standby.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
During power ascension following a planned outage, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 automatically scrammed from approximately 70% reactor power. The scram signal was generated when the Main Turbine tripped. The cause of the Turbine Trip is being investigated. All control rods fully inserted. Reactor pressure is stable and being controlled through Turbine Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser. One additional scram signal was received on low Reactor Vessel Water Level during level recovery efforts. Reactor level control is stable and being fed from the condensate/feedwater system. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems are operable and in standby.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37336
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY MAU
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY MAU
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 06:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 06:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
A licensee employee in the protected area was found with a metal flask containing a small amount of alcohol, approximately one teaspoon or less. It was later determined that the individual was unaware that the flask was in his coat pocket. The individual was escorted offsite. A behavior observation was performed, and the individual was allowed to return to work.
The NRC Resident will be notified of this event by the licensee.
The NRC Resident will be notified of this event by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37337
Rep Org: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Licensee: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 16:47 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2000
Event Time: 16:47 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
ELLIS MERSCHOFF (RA)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
DAN SULLIVAN (FEMA)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
ELLIS MERSCHOFF (RA)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
DAN SULLIVAN (FEMA)
COURTESY NOTIFICATION OF A DOE EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT AN INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) IN IDAHO.
At 1647MDT, DOE INEEL declared a Site Area Emergency due to wildland fires on DOE controlled property, 2 miles North East of INTEC. The ISFSI containing the TMI spent fuel is not threatened. This notification is a courtesy call only and does not involve the NRC Radiological Emergency Plan. No NRC assistance is requested.
DOE INEEL has notified the State of Idaho, all surrounding counties and DOE Headquarters.
At 1647MDT, DOE INEEL declared a Site Area Emergency due to wildland fires on DOE controlled property, 2 miles North East of INTEC. The ISFSI containing the TMI spent fuel is not threatened. This notification is a courtesy call only and does not involve the NRC Radiological Emergency Plan. No NRC assistance is requested.
DOE INEEL has notified the State of Idaho, all surrounding counties and DOE Headquarters.