Event Notification Report for September 15, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/14/2000 - 09/15/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37332373473733037325
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37332
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: M MLYNARBK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: M MLYNARBK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 23:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 23:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2000
Notification Time: 23:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 23:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2000
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
DAN SULLIVAN (FEMA)
MARK RING (R3)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
DAN SULLIVAN (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT - UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 1GPM
The plant is in hot shutdown making preparations for startup. Reactor coolant is back leaking from loop "1A" through two check valves into a safety injection tank. The safety injection tank is approximately 95% full. If the tank should over pressurize the relief valve will relieve to the containment. The primary containment integrity is set. The maximum leak rate observed was 1.64 GPM. The licensee has taken steps to seat the check valves and is now measuring the leak rate again. The unusual event was declared at 2325.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the state and Van Buren county.
* * * UPDATE AT 0145 ON 9/16/00 BY SLEEPER, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee terminated the unusual event at 0121. Unidentified leakage has returned to its normal value of less than 1 GPM. The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. The Operations center notified the RDO (RING); NRR EO (ZWOLINSKI); IRO (CONGEL) and FEMA (CEGIELSKI).
The plant is in hot shutdown making preparations for startup. Reactor coolant is back leaking from loop "1A" through two check valves into a safety injection tank. The safety injection tank is approximately 95% full. If the tank should over pressurize the relief valve will relieve to the containment. The primary containment integrity is set. The maximum leak rate observed was 1.64 GPM. The licensee has taken steps to seat the check valves and is now measuring the leak rate again. The unusual event was declared at 2325.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the state and Van Buren county.
* * * UPDATE AT 0145 ON 9/16/00 BY SLEEPER, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee terminated the unusual event at 0121. Unidentified leakage has returned to its normal value of less than 1 GPM. The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. The Operations center notified the RDO (RING); NRR EO (ZWOLINSKI); IRO (CONGEL) and FEMA (CEGIELSKI).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37347
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GREEN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GREEN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 09/19/2000
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 04:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2000
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 04:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ESF ACTUATION - CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS)
On 9/15/00, at 0446 the CREFS initiated due to receiving an actuation signal based on control building high gas activity. All automatic actions were verified to have occurred. It was determined that the control building high gas activity was caused by a temperature inversion and not an actual plant condition (i.e., radiological release). The control building high gas activity alarm cleared at 0450 and at 0459 CREFS was returned to a normal standby lineup.
It was originally believed that this condition was not reportable due to it being an invalid actuation. Further review of this condition has determined that the condition was the result of a valid signal caused by an environmental condition.
Resident Inspector was notified.
On 9/15/00, at 0446 the CREFS initiated due to receiving an actuation signal based on control building high gas activity. All automatic actions were verified to have occurred. It was determined that the control building high gas activity was caused by a temperature inversion and not an actual plant condition (i.e., radiological release). The control building high gas activity alarm cleared at 0450 and at 0459 CREFS was returned to a normal standby lineup.
It was originally believed that this condition was not reportable due to it being an invalid actuation. Further review of this condition has determined that the condition was the result of a valid signal caused by an environmental condition.
Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37330
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JESSE JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JESSE JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 15:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2000
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 15:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR AFTER ENTERING THE RESTRICTIVE AREA OF THE POWER TO FLOW MAP.
On September 15, 2000 at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit 2 was manually scrammed per operating procedure during turbine testing in preparation for the refuel outage.
The manual scram was due to entering restricted area of the power to flow map from Technical Specification 3.4.1, after the trip of the "2B" recirculation pump. All rods fully inserted and the reactor was shutdown. Reactor level during the scram lowered to 0" and a Group II and III primary and secondary containment isolation was received. The isolations functioned as designed. The plant is stable in hot shutdown with the main condenser as a heat sink and the feedwater system is in service for level control. No radioactive release or Emergency Core Cooling System injection occurred during the scram.
The turbine was tripped in accordance with the refuel outage plan when the recirculation pump tripped. The plan was to perform turbine testing and then to manually scram the reactor at the same power level.
The reactor was manually scrammed less than one minute after entering the restricted area of the power to flow map. No power oscillations were seen.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1715 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ANDREW WINTER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"On September 15, 2000 PBAPS reported that Unit 2 was manually scrammed in accordance with operating instructions during turbine testing. The report identified that the manual scram was initiated based on entering the restricted area of the power to flow map after the tripping of the 2B Recirculation Pump. This notification is being retracted based on the following:
"NUREG 1022 Revision 1 specifically states that 'The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily....This indicates an intent to require reporting actuations of features that mitigate the consequences of significant events.' Therefore, the following is an analysis of these two underlying reasons for reporting ESF actuations:
1. The need for the ESF to mitigate the consequences of an event:
The September 15, 2000 PBAPS manual scram was initiated because the plant operator made a conservative decision in accordance with station procedures to initiate a reactor scram. At the time this decision was made, the plant conditions were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively established by the licensee and the operator made the correct decision to commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate the consequences of this evolution. Moreover, plant conditions were not changing in a direction that would have required the manual scram to mitigate the consequences of significant events.
2. Events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily:
The actuation of a manual scram and the subsequent PCIS Group II and Ill actuations were part of a preplanned shutdown for the commencement of the PBAPS Unit 2's thirteenth refueling outage (2R13) and were necessary to complete the plant shutdown. The decision to insert the manual scram in accordance with station procedures, resulted in the preplanned shutdown commencing slightly early. Therefore, the ESP did not actuate unnecessarily since it was already planned to shutdown the plant by inserting a manual scram.
"Therefore, based on the above discussion, this event is not reportable because the manual scram resulted from and was, in accordance with the licensee's procedure, and part of a preplanned sequence of reactor operation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (William Ruland) has been notified.
***** UPDATE AT 1554 ON 10/03/00 FROM ANDREW WINTER TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
Via this update, the licensee is resubmitting this event notification because the event was determined to represent an unplanned ESF actuation. The licensee is also providing additional clarification to the original report because it was determined that the unit was not operating in an unrestricted region of the technical specifications.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On September 23, 2000, PBAPS submitted a retraction to Event #37330. After further review, it was determined that the basis for the PBAPS retraction was not consistent with the NRC interpretation of the reporting requirement. Therefore, the following event report is being resubmitted:"
"On September 15, 2000, PBAPS Unit 2 was manually scrammed. The manual reactor scram was initiated by the plant operator based on the understanding that the plant conditions placed the plant in the restricted area of the power-to-flow map after the unplanned tripping of the 2B Reactor Recirculation Pump. The plant conditions at the time of the manual scram were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively established by the licensee to commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate the consequences of this evolution. Furthermore, the plant was not in an unrestricted region of Technical Specification 3.4.1, and emergency systems subsequently performed as required."
"Although the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate an event, it is the conclusion of the licensee that this event does represent an unplanned ESF actuation. Therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to submit a Licensee Event Report by 10/15/00. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Linville).
On September 15, 2000 at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit 2 was manually scrammed per operating procedure during turbine testing in preparation for the refuel outage.
The manual scram was due to entering restricted area of the power to flow map from Technical Specification 3.4.1, after the trip of the "2B" recirculation pump. All rods fully inserted and the reactor was shutdown. Reactor level during the scram lowered to 0" and a Group II and III primary and secondary containment isolation was received. The isolations functioned as designed. The plant is stable in hot shutdown with the main condenser as a heat sink and the feedwater system is in service for level control. No radioactive release or Emergency Core Cooling System injection occurred during the scram.
The turbine was tripped in accordance with the refuel outage plan when the recirculation pump tripped. The plan was to perform turbine testing and then to manually scram the reactor at the same power level.
The reactor was manually scrammed less than one minute after entering the restricted area of the power to flow map. No power oscillations were seen.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1715 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ANDREW WINTER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"On September 15, 2000 PBAPS reported that Unit 2 was manually scrammed in accordance with operating instructions during turbine testing. The report identified that the manual scram was initiated based on entering the restricted area of the power to flow map after the tripping of the 2B Recirculation Pump. This notification is being retracted based on the following:
"NUREG 1022 Revision 1 specifically states that 'The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily....This indicates an intent to require reporting actuations of features that mitigate the consequences of significant events.' Therefore, the following is an analysis of these two underlying reasons for reporting ESF actuations:
1. The need for the ESF to mitigate the consequences of an event:
The September 15, 2000 PBAPS manual scram was initiated because the plant operator made a conservative decision in accordance with station procedures to initiate a reactor scram. At the time this decision was made, the plant conditions were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively established by the licensee and the operator made the correct decision to commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate the consequences of this evolution. Moreover, plant conditions were not changing in a direction that would have required the manual scram to mitigate the consequences of significant events.
2. Events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily:
The actuation of a manual scram and the subsequent PCIS Group II and Ill actuations were part of a preplanned shutdown for the commencement of the PBAPS Unit 2's thirteenth refueling outage (2R13) and were necessary to complete the plant shutdown. The decision to insert the manual scram in accordance with station procedures, resulted in the preplanned shutdown commencing slightly early. Therefore, the ESP did not actuate unnecessarily since it was already planned to shutdown the plant by inserting a manual scram.
"Therefore, based on the above discussion, this event is not reportable because the manual scram resulted from and was, in accordance with the licensee's procedure, and part of a preplanned sequence of reactor operation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (William Ruland) has been notified.
***** UPDATE AT 1554 ON 10/03/00 FROM ANDREW WINTER TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
Via this update, the licensee is resubmitting this event notification because the event was determined to represent an unplanned ESF actuation. The licensee is also providing additional clarification to the original report because it was determined that the unit was not operating in an unrestricted region of the technical specifications.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On September 23, 2000, PBAPS submitted a retraction to Event #37330. After further review, it was determined that the basis for the PBAPS retraction was not consistent with the NRC interpretation of the reporting requirement. Therefore, the following event report is being resubmitted:"
"On September 15, 2000, PBAPS Unit 2 was manually scrammed. The manual reactor scram was initiated by the plant operator based on the understanding that the plant conditions placed the plant in the restricted area of the power-to-flow map after the unplanned tripping of the 2B Reactor Recirculation Pump. The plant conditions at the time of the manual scram were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively established by the licensee to commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate the consequences of this evolution. Furthermore, the plant was not in an unrestricted region of Technical Specification 3.4.1, and emergency systems subsequently performed as required."
"Although the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate an event, it is the conclusion of the licensee that this event does represent an unplanned ESF actuation. Therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to submit a Licensee Event Report by 10/15/00. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Linville).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37325
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID HANKS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID HANKS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 10:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 06:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 10:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2000
Event Time: 06:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCE
A Baxter Wilson Station 500 kV breaker opened inducing a grid disturbance that caused a reactor scram for an unknown reason. The breaker opening cause a loss of one offsite source. The disturbance also was picked up as an undervoltage on bus 15, which caused the division 3 (high pressure core spray) diesel generator to start. The bus 16, which is fed from the same engineered safeguards features transformer, did not pick up the undervoltage condition. The reactor core isolation cooling system started and injected. The licensee is investigating the actual cause of the reactor scram.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A Baxter Wilson Station 500 kV breaker opened inducing a grid disturbance that caused a reactor scram for an unknown reason. The breaker opening cause a loss of one offsite source. The disturbance also was picked up as an undervoltage on bus 15, which caused the division 3 (high pressure core spray) diesel generator to start. The bus 16, which is fed from the same engineered safeguards features transformer, did not pick up the undervoltage condition. The reactor core isolation cooling system started and injected. The licensee is investigating the actual cause of the reactor scram.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.