Event Notification Report for September 14, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/13/2000 - 09/14/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
373243732237327373513731937354
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37324
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KERRY ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KERRY ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 01:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 23:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 01:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 23:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC RELAY COIL FAILED CAUSING SOME ISOLATIONS
The primary containment isolation logic relay 16A-K61 coil apparently burned out causing the relay to de-energize. This caused valves 20 MOV-94 (DW equipment sump pump inboard isolation), 20 MOV-82 (DW floor sump pump inboard isolation), and 10 MOV-18 (RHR shutdown cooling inboard isolation) to receive a close signal. 20 MOV-94 and -82 went closed while 10 MOV-18 was already closed. The drywell sumps can not be pumped down. This places the plant in the coolant leakage monitoring per technical specification 3.6.d which allows 24 hours for repair of the problem. The problem is being worked on and investigated and it is expected to be completed within the 24 hour limit.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The primary containment isolation logic relay 16A-K61 coil apparently burned out causing the relay to de-energize. This caused valves 20 MOV-94 (DW equipment sump pump inboard isolation), 20 MOV-82 (DW floor sump pump inboard isolation), and 10 MOV-18 (RHR shutdown cooling inboard isolation) to receive a close signal. 20 MOV-94 and -82 went closed while 10 MOV-18 was already closed. The drywell sumps can not be pumped down. This places the plant in the coolant leakage monitoring per technical specification 3.6.d which allows 24 hours for repair of the problem. The problem is being worked on and investigated and it is expected to be completed within the 24 hour limit.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37322
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GLENN KRAUSE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GLENN KRAUSE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/14/2000
Notification Time: 17:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 14:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2000
Notification Time: 17:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 14:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
During the performance of a sample of the SLC storage tank, the chemistry technician discovered a small piece of foreign material in the sample. Upon further investigation several pieces of foreign material (appears to be plastic) were found floating on the top, and what appears to be 2 large plastic bags floating near the bottom of the tank. At time 1422 CST the SLC system was declared inoperable due to a potential for the bags to cause a loss of the SLC safety function. Riverbend Station entered Limiting Condition of Operation for Technical Specification 3.3.1.7 action C to restore one SLC subsystem to OPERABLE within 8 hours. Efforts are underway to remove all foreign material from the SLC system storage tank. If one train of SLC system has not been restored within 8 hours the licensee has an additional 12 hours to be in Hot Shutdown. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 09/14/00 AT 2247 ET BY HUSTON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
The foreign material found in the SLC Tank has been removed to the extent possible. Additional inspections with underwater camera and boroscopic equipment reveal no additional plastic. Riverbend Station has declared the system operable and has exited the Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation for the system at time 2059 CT. Safety function has been restored. Foreign material removed appears to be two large thin plastic bags, light brown in color. R4DO (G. Sanborn) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee of the update.
During the performance of a sample of the SLC storage tank, the chemistry technician discovered a small piece of foreign material in the sample. Upon further investigation several pieces of foreign material (appears to be plastic) were found floating on the top, and what appears to be 2 large plastic bags floating near the bottom of the tank. At time 1422 CST the SLC system was declared inoperable due to a potential for the bags to cause a loss of the SLC safety function. Riverbend Station entered Limiting Condition of Operation for Technical Specification 3.3.1.7 action C to restore one SLC subsystem to OPERABLE within 8 hours. Efforts are underway to remove all foreign material from the SLC system storage tank. If one train of SLC system has not been restored within 8 hours the licensee has an additional 12 hours to be in Hot Shutdown. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 09/14/00 AT 2247 ET BY HUSTON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
The foreign material found in the SLC Tank has been removed to the extent possible. Additional inspections with underwater camera and boroscopic equipment reveal no additional plastic. Riverbend Station has declared the system operable and has exited the Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation for the system at time 2059 CT. Safety function has been restored. Foreign material removed appears to be two large thin plastic bags, light brown in color. R4DO (G. Sanborn) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee of the update.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37327
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
ERROR IDENTIFIED IN LOCA MODEL THAT COULD RESULT IN PEAK CLAD TEMPERATURE > 2200°F
"At 1830 hours on September 14, 2000, a condition potentially outside the design basis of the facility was identified at CR-3. This event notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.46 for an error identified in the Evaluation Model for CR-3 which may result in peak clad temperature in excess of 2200°F. This notification is being made while the unit is shutdown prior to entry into MODE 2 following a recent maintenance outage.
"The condition is that, in the event of a small break loss of coolant accident involving the core flood line at CR-3, it may be necessary to shut down the CR-3 reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin in order to limit peak cladding temperatures to less than 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (the 10 CFR 50.46 limit for peak cladding temperatures). The current licensing/design basis analysis assumes that the pumps are shut down within 2 minutes of loss of subcooling margin.
"Existing procedural guidance in Emergency Operating Procedure requires turning off the reactor coolant pumps as an immediate manual action in response to loss of subcooling margin. Operator actions to trip the reactor coolant pumps are routinely monitored in training. Thc action to turn off the reactor coolant pumps upon loss of subcooling margin is routinely completed within 1 minute in plant simulator accident training unannounced casualty scenarios.
"Plant personnel for CR-3 have determined that, based upon the existing procedural guidance and simulator training experience, there is reasonable expectation that procedurally directed operator actions will successfully shut down the reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin and therefore, the peak cladding temperature will remain unchanged and below the 2200 degrees Fahrenheit limit of 10 CFR 50.46. Thus, the CR-3 emergency core cooling systems continue to be operable because, based upon engineering judgement, the systems are capable of performing their intended safety function.
"This determination that a condition potentially outside the design basis of the plant will be followed with more detailed evaluation and analysis of the issue. It is possible that the-follow-up analysis-will provide technical justification which demonstrates that CR-3 remains within the existing design basis.
"CR-3 is reporting this prior to placing the plant in operation. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as 'Any event or condition during operation that results in a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.' CR-3 is currently in a shutdown condition in the process of performing a plant start-up. Therefore, the one-hour criteria of this reporting requirement is not in effect.
"At its most fundamental level, PSC 2-00 identifies an analytical issue that requires resolution. A telecon with NRC technical staff held on 9/13/2000 identified the analytical issue as one that is principally concerned with an ECCS evaluation model assumption. The safety significance was alleviated by discussions on consistent, demonstrated performance of immediate operator action to trip the RCPs well within 1 minute, with no challenge to the preliminary (conservative) accident analysis. Additionally, discussions were also presented on the relative probability of this specific scenario. The combination of the break with the specific failure represents a very small probability (<E-10), which helps diminish the safety significance of this scenario.
"CR3 is proceeding with an approach that conservatively addresses Mode 2 restraint because decay heat power is low at this time since the reactor is shutdown and will not increase significantly until further power operation is commenced."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
"At 1830 hours on September 14, 2000, a condition potentially outside the design basis of the facility was identified at CR-3. This event notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.46 for an error identified in the Evaluation Model for CR-3 which may result in peak clad temperature in excess of 2200°F. This notification is being made while the unit is shutdown prior to entry into MODE 2 following a recent maintenance outage.
"The condition is that, in the event of a small break loss of coolant accident involving the core flood line at CR-3, it may be necessary to shut down the CR-3 reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin in order to limit peak cladding temperatures to less than 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (the 10 CFR 50.46 limit for peak cladding temperatures). The current licensing/design basis analysis assumes that the pumps are shut down within 2 minutes of loss of subcooling margin.
"Existing procedural guidance in Emergency Operating Procedure requires turning off the reactor coolant pumps as an immediate manual action in response to loss of subcooling margin. Operator actions to trip the reactor coolant pumps are routinely monitored in training. Thc action to turn off the reactor coolant pumps upon loss of subcooling margin is routinely completed within 1 minute in plant simulator accident training unannounced casualty scenarios.
"Plant personnel for CR-3 have determined that, based upon the existing procedural guidance and simulator training experience, there is reasonable expectation that procedurally directed operator actions will successfully shut down the reactor coolant pumps within 1 minute of loss of subcooling margin and therefore, the peak cladding temperature will remain unchanged and below the 2200 degrees Fahrenheit limit of 10 CFR 50.46. Thus, the CR-3 emergency core cooling systems continue to be operable because, based upon engineering judgement, the systems are capable of performing their intended safety function.
"This determination that a condition potentially outside the design basis of the plant will be followed with more detailed evaluation and analysis of the issue. It is possible that the-follow-up analysis-will provide technical justification which demonstrates that CR-3 remains within the existing design basis.
"CR-3 is reporting this prior to placing the plant in operation. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as 'Any event or condition during operation that results in a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.' CR-3 is currently in a shutdown condition in the process of performing a plant start-up. Therefore, the one-hour criteria of this reporting requirement is not in effect.
"At its most fundamental level, PSC 2-00 identifies an analytical issue that requires resolution. A telecon with NRC technical staff held on 9/13/2000 identified the analytical issue as one that is principally concerned with an ECCS evaluation model assumption. The safety significance was alleviated by discussions on consistent, demonstrated performance of immediate operator action to trip the RCPs well within 1 minute, with no challenge to the preliminary (conservative) accident analysis. Additionally, discussions were also presented on the relative probability of this specific scenario. The combination of the break with the specific failure represents a very small probability (<E-10), which helps diminish the safety significance of this scenario.
"CR3 is proceeding with an approach that conservatively addresses Mode 2 restraint because decay heat power is low at this time since the reactor is shutdown and will not increase significantly until further power operation is commenced."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37351
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: RABA-KISTNER
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L01571-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: RABA-KISTNER
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L01571-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN (FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 09/19/2000
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2000
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST/STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
"Troxler Model 3411B: Serial No. 12037, with the following sources: assayed 5.4 millicurie Cs-137; Serial No. 40-9359 and assayed 39 millicuries Am-241/Be; Serial No. 47-7153. The gauge was stolen or lost on the job site September 14, 2000. The gauge was placed in the back of a company pickup without a case and was not secured. The driver/operator remembers placing the tailgate in the up/closed position. The driver had a short conversation away from the truck and then departed the worksite. While driving along RM620 between Texas Highway 183 and Interstate Highway 35 (Austin, Texas), he noticed his tailgate was in the down/open position and immediately stopped. The gauge was gone. It is not known if the gauge was stolen from the worksite or lost along the highway. The gauge was not found by a company search of the route taken by the driver. A police report was filed with the Austin Police Department. Texas Licensee is Raba-Kistner (L01571-002) of Austin, Texas. The gauge was unsecured and not under direct surveillance at the time of the loss The gauge has not been recovered."
"Troxler Model 3411B: Serial No. 12037, with the following sources: assayed 5.4 millicurie Cs-137; Serial No. 40-9359 and assayed 39 millicuries Am-241/Be; Serial No. 47-7153. The gauge was stolen or lost on the job site September 14, 2000. The gauge was placed in the back of a company pickup without a case and was not secured. The driver/operator remembers placing the tailgate in the up/closed position. The driver had a short conversation away from the truck and then departed the worksite. While driving along RM620 between Texas Highway 183 and Interstate Highway 35 (Austin, Texas), he noticed his tailgate was in the down/open position and immediately stopped. The gauge was gone. It is not known if the gauge was stolen from the worksite or lost along the highway. The gauge was not found by a company search of the route taken by the driver. A police report was filed with the Austin Police Department. Texas Licensee is Raba-Kistner (L01571-002) of Austin, Texas. The gauge was unsecured and not under direct surveillance at the time of the loss The gauge has not been recovered."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37319
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MATEOSZEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MATEOSZEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/14/2000
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 10:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2000
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 10:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A DEAD MANATEE FOUND IN ONE OF THE PLANT CANALS
The licensee made a call to the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Agency and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission to notify them of a dead manatee found in canal C107, directly southwest of the plant.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee made a call to the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Agency and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission to notify them of a dead manatee found in canal C107, directly southwest of the plant.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37354
Rep Org: SCIENTECH/NUSI
Licensee: SCIENTECH/NUSI
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOOSKA
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: SCIENTECH/NUSI
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOOSKA
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/20/2000
Notification Time: 07:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2000
Notification Time: 07:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
WILLIAM RULAND (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
PART 21 RELATED TO DEFECTS IN DELTA T TIME DOMAIN MODULES SUPPLIED TO GINNA STATION
SCIENTECH Inc.'s subsidiary NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) has determined that a Basic Component, supplied to Rochester Gas & Electric Ginna Station Nuclear Plant under RG&E purchase order NQ-l5877-A-JW, may contain a defect that is reportable under 10CFR21. NUSI became aware of this potential defect September 14, 2000. SCIENTECH, Inc. President was informed September 19, 2000. RG&E is aware of this problem and the affected components have been modified to remove any undesirable effects on their systems. A formal written report will be provided within 30 days of this notification. The components, DELTA T Time Domain Modules, M/N: TMD500-08/08/08/08-15-08-01/2, P/N: MBA-E062PA-l, Rev. 0 (4 ea.), were manufactured by NUSI. These components have been supplied to no other utility for use in Safety Related Systems. NUSI has opened a 10CFR21 file concerning this component and has numbered it as 21-00-01.
* * * UPDATE 1343EDT on 10/18/00 from Marty Booska to S. Sandin * * *
The licensee submitted a formal copy of the Part 21 via fax with a hard copy being sent by mail tomorrow. Notified R1DO(Cook) and NRR(Vern Hodge) via fax.
SCIENTECH Inc.'s subsidiary NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) has determined that a Basic Component, supplied to Rochester Gas & Electric Ginna Station Nuclear Plant under RG&E purchase order NQ-l5877-A-JW, may contain a defect that is reportable under 10CFR21. NUSI became aware of this potential defect September 14, 2000. SCIENTECH, Inc. President was informed September 19, 2000. RG&E is aware of this problem and the affected components have been modified to remove any undesirable effects on their systems. A formal written report will be provided within 30 days of this notification. The components, DELTA T Time Domain Modules, M/N: TMD500-08/08/08/08-15-08-01/2, P/N: MBA-E062PA-l, Rev. 0 (4 ea.), were manufactured by NUSI. These components have been supplied to no other utility for use in Safety Related Systems. NUSI has opened a 10CFR21 file concerning this component and has numbered it as 21-00-01.
* * * UPDATE 1343EDT on 10/18/00 from Marty Booska to S. Sandin * * *
The licensee submitted a formal copy of the Part 21 via fax with a hard copy being sent by mail tomorrow. Notified R1DO(Cook) and NRR(Vern Hodge) via fax.