Event Notification Report for September 13, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/12/2000 - 09/13/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37353373173731337314373153733137320
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37353
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING, LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE (EMAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING, LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE (EMAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 09/19/2000
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2000
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DETACHED FROM DRIVE ROD
"The licensee notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection (WDOH), of a mechanical failure involving a Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device. The device is specifically licensed for density process measurements and uses a Cesium 137 sealed source, Amersham Model CDC.711M not to exceed 74 gigabecquerels (2 curies). The source is normally mounted at the end of a source rod, approximately six feet long. In this particular model version, the source rod consists of two screw-together extensions (approximately two and a half feet each) which screw into the same diameter source holder (approximately half a foot long). When operating, the rod with source is lowered through the shielded storage position, into the integral and enclosed dry well tube. When not in operation, the rod with source can be raised to place the source into a safe position inside the main shielding. An authorized user realized that a problem existed when attempting to withdraw the source to the safe position. Apparently the rod did not have a normal feel when it was raised. Preliminary indication was the source had separated from the source rod and fallen to the bottom of the insertion dry well. The licensee's RSO and its health physics consultant surveyed the area and determined there wasn't a dose rate problem since the process slurry was still providing ample shielding. The slurry was maintained in-place and the area adjacent to the dry-well access point was posted as a restricted area.
"The recovery operation took place on September 18, with WDOH staff actively overseeing the operation. The health physics consultant determined the upper source rod section appeared simply to have come unscrewed from the lower sections, apparently from the vibration of the slurry separator on which the gauge was mounted. However, it was necessary to remove the device from it's bracket and up-end it to allow the source to slide back to the top of the device. Once the end was visible the parts were screwed back together and the unit re-installed. It was also determined that the source holder was partially unscrewed from the middle rod section as well. Both connections were coated with "lock-tight" and tightened.
"Radiation readings increased from background to about 50 mR/hr in the general area during the recovery operation. Contact reading on the dry well near the estimated source position was greater than 5 R per hour. Actual recovery working time was about 20 minutes. Both individuals involved received an indicated 25 millirem exposure on their pocket dosimeters.
"The health physics consultant indicated that this source rod was of an older style for this particular Ronan device. The three other devices of this model at the licensee's facility were checked and appeared not to be in
danger of separating. The licensee plans on upgrading to a newer style rod during an up-coming maintenance shutdown. The recovery operation was successfully completed."
HOO NOTE: see event #37331
"The licensee notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection (WDOH), of a mechanical failure involving a Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device. The device is specifically licensed for density process measurements and uses a Cesium 137 sealed source, Amersham Model CDC.711M not to exceed 74 gigabecquerels (2 curies). The source is normally mounted at the end of a source rod, approximately six feet long. In this particular model version, the source rod consists of two screw-together extensions (approximately two and a half feet each) which screw into the same diameter source holder (approximately half a foot long). When operating, the rod with source is lowered through the shielded storage position, into the integral and enclosed dry well tube. When not in operation, the rod with source can be raised to place the source into a safe position inside the main shielding. An authorized user realized that a problem existed when attempting to withdraw the source to the safe position. Apparently the rod did not have a normal feel when it was raised. Preliminary indication was the source had separated from the source rod and fallen to the bottom of the insertion dry well. The licensee's RSO and its health physics consultant surveyed the area and determined there wasn't a dose rate problem since the process slurry was still providing ample shielding. The slurry was maintained in-place and the area adjacent to the dry-well access point was posted as a restricted area.
"The recovery operation took place on September 18, with WDOH staff actively overseeing the operation. The health physics consultant determined the upper source rod section appeared simply to have come unscrewed from the lower sections, apparently from the vibration of the slurry separator on which the gauge was mounted. However, it was necessary to remove the device from it's bracket and up-end it to allow the source to slide back to the top of the device. Once the end was visible the parts were screwed back together and the unit re-installed. It was also determined that the source holder was partially unscrewed from the middle rod section as well. Both connections were coated with "lock-tight" and tightened.
"Radiation readings increased from background to about 50 mR/hr in the general area during the recovery operation. Contact reading on the dry well near the estimated source position was greater than 5 R per hour. Actual recovery working time was about 20 minutes. Both individuals involved received an indicated 25 millirem exposure on their pocket dosimeters.
"The health physics consultant indicated that this source rod was of an older style for this particular Ronan device. The three other devices of this model at the licensee's facility were checked and appeared not to be in
danger of separating. The licensee plans on upgrading to a newer style rod during an up-coming maintenance shutdown. The recovery operation was successfully completed."
HOO NOTE: see event #37331
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37317
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MAY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MAY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/13/2000
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 16:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2000
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 16:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 77% POWER FOLLOWING LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM
This occurred when the plant lost condenser vacuum after the steam jet air ejector valves closed. This valve closure was the result of a blown valve indication light bulb being changed. The reactor was manually scrammed from 77% power when the vacuum reached 6.5" Hg and decreasing. After the reactor scram the reactor vessel water level dipped below 127"(as low as 121") initiating groups 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations and start of the standby gas treatment system. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS injection occurred and no relief valves lifted.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed
This occurred when the plant lost condenser vacuum after the steam jet air ejector valves closed. This valve closure was the result of a blown valve indication light bulb being changed. The reactor was manually scrammed from 77% power when the vacuum reached 6.5" Hg and decreasing. After the reactor scram the reactor vessel water level dipped below 127"(as low as 121") initiating groups 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations and start of the standby gas treatment system. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS injection occurred and no relief valves lifted.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37313
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT WALDECKER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT WALDECKER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/13/2000
Notification Time: 07:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 04:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2000
Notification Time: 07:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 04:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC START OF THE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY PUMP
The licensee reported that the high pressure core spray (HPCS) pump automatically started when the pump control switch was taken out of the "pull-to-lock" position. The HPCS system was out of service for maintenance at the time of the event and had been declared inoperable on 09/12/00 at 0520 EDT. The HPCS spray injection valve did not open, as it was deenergized closed. The divisional diesel generator did not start as it was configured in the maintenance mode.
There was no impact on the plant. The plant is in cold shutdown with the mode switch in the refuel position. The cause of the actuation is unknown and an investigation is in progress.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1650 EDT ON 9/22/00 BY THOMAS CHWALEK TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Subsequent evaluation of the system condition at the time concluded that the system was appropriately removed from service with the injection valve de-energized closed (it was known at the time that the initiation signal was invalid). In addition, removal of the system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing is generally not reportable (NUREG 1022).
"In summary, the system was properly removed from service with the injection valve de-energized closed. The event is not reportable and this retraction is notification thereof."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Bruce Barkley) has been notified.
The licensee reported that the high pressure core spray (HPCS) pump automatically started when the pump control switch was taken out of the "pull-to-lock" position. The HPCS system was out of service for maintenance at the time of the event and had been declared inoperable on 09/12/00 at 0520 EDT. The HPCS spray injection valve did not open, as it was deenergized closed. The divisional diesel generator did not start as it was configured in the maintenance mode.
There was no impact on the plant. The plant is in cold shutdown with the mode switch in the refuel position. The cause of the actuation is unknown and an investigation is in progress.
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1650 EDT ON 9/22/00 BY THOMAS CHWALEK TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Subsequent evaluation of the system condition at the time concluded that the system was appropriately removed from service with the injection valve de-energized closed (it was known at the time that the initiation signal was invalid). In addition, removal of the system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing is generally not reportable (NUREG 1022).
"In summary, the system was properly removed from service with the injection valve de-energized closed. The event is not reportable and this retraction is notification thereof."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Bruce Barkley) has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37314
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: OKOPNY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: OKOPNY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/13/2000
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 09:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2000
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 09:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE "2A" DIESEL GENERATOR WAS INADVERTENTLY STARTED BY THE UNIT OPERATOR
Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. A Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Surveillance was in progress, which required the "2A" Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump to be started. The Unit Operator inadvertently placed the Control Switch for the "2A" Diesel Generator to START. The Unit Operator recognized the error and the Diesel Generator Control Switch was immediately placed in STOP. The "2A" Diesel Generator and
Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump switches are side by side on the panel. The Diesel Generator reached at Least 150 RPM as indicated by the Auto Start of the "2A" Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump. The Diesel Generator was returned to a Standby Operable condition.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. A Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Surveillance was in progress, which required the "2A" Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump to be started. The Unit Operator inadvertently placed the Control Switch for the "2A" Diesel Generator to START. The Unit Operator recognized the error and the Diesel Generator Control Switch was immediately placed in STOP. The "2A" Diesel Generator and
Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump switches are side by side on the panel. The Diesel Generator reached at Least 150 RPM as indicated by the Auto Start of the "2A" Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump. The Diesel Generator was returned to a Standby Operable condition.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37315
Facility: WNP-2
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ARBUCKLE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ARBUCKLE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/13/2000
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 11:19 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2000
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 11:19 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS FOR CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM UNFILTERED INLEAKAGE BASED UPON TRACER GAS TESTING - IMPACT ON CONTROL ROOM DOSE CONSIDERATIONS
"During September 8 through 11, 2000, a series of special tests, using a tracer gas decay methodology, were performed to determine the total inleakage into the control room and the associated impact on control room dose. These tests were performed in support of a proposed Technical Specification amendment request that is in the process of being developed for removal of main steam leakage control system test requirements and resolution of a long-standing issue pertaining to secondary containment/standby gas treatment system performance, using alternative source term methodology. The testing was also performed in response to NRC-industry initiative efforts to resolve the generic issue of the validity of control room unfiltered air infiltration rate assumed by licensees in control room habitability assessments.
"On September 13, 2000, test results were evaluated and a preliminary assessment shows the highest train measured unfiltered inleakage for the control room emergency filtration system, as determined by the tracer gas testing, to be 83 ± 37 cfm. This is in excess of the current licensing and design basis limit of 10.55 cfm. The impact of this unfiltered inleakage increase on control room dose was evaluated and it was determined that the design basis thyroid dose of 30 rem to the control room operators would be exceeded during post-accident conditions.
"A Follow-Up Assessment of Operability (similar to a Justification for Continued Operation) was prepared to allow continued plant operation in this condition. The operability determination, which was based upon an evaluation of control room dose for several accident scenarios, concluded that the as-found inleakage did not render the control room emergency filtration system inoperable (based upon 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19). In addition, a follow-up interim compensatory measure to reduce the calculated control room thyroid dose below the 30 rem limit includes administration of potassium iodide in accordance with requirements contained in abnormal operating procedures. Final resolution of this issue will be addressed by implementation of alternative source term methodology at WNP-2 and as part of the proposed Technical Specification amendment request. A feasibility study, using alternative source term methodology, has shown that inleakage rates well in excess of 83 ± 37 cfm (approximately 300 cfm) would result in control room doses below the regulatory limit. This is a design basis analysis issue and no plant hardware changes are required in the resolution of the problem. We are continuing to follow the NRC-industry initiative efforts to resolve generic issues related to control room habitability."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"During September 8 through 11, 2000, a series of special tests, using a tracer gas decay methodology, were performed to determine the total inleakage into the control room and the associated impact on control room dose. These tests were performed in support of a proposed Technical Specification amendment request that is in the process of being developed for removal of main steam leakage control system test requirements and resolution of a long-standing issue pertaining to secondary containment/standby gas treatment system performance, using alternative source term methodology. The testing was also performed in response to NRC-industry initiative efforts to resolve the generic issue of the validity of control room unfiltered air infiltration rate assumed by licensees in control room habitability assessments.
"On September 13, 2000, test results were evaluated and a preliminary assessment shows the highest train measured unfiltered inleakage for the control room emergency filtration system, as determined by the tracer gas testing, to be 83 ± 37 cfm. This is in excess of the current licensing and design basis limit of 10.55 cfm. The impact of this unfiltered inleakage increase on control room dose was evaluated and it was determined that the design basis thyroid dose of 30 rem to the control room operators would be exceeded during post-accident conditions.
"A Follow-Up Assessment of Operability (similar to a Justification for Continued Operation) was prepared to allow continued plant operation in this condition. The operability determination, which was based upon an evaluation of control room dose for several accident scenarios, concluded that the as-found inleakage did not render the control room emergency filtration system inoperable (based upon 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19). In addition, a follow-up interim compensatory measure to reduce the calculated control room thyroid dose below the 30 rem limit includes administration of potassium iodide in accordance with requirements contained in abnormal operating procedures. Final resolution of this issue will be addressed by implementation of alternative source term methodology at WNP-2 and as part of the proposed Technical Specification amendment request. A feasibility study, using alternative source term methodology, has shown that inleakage rates well in excess of 83 ± 37 cfm (approximately 300 cfm) would result in control room doses below the regulatory limit. This is a design basis analysis issue and no plant hardware changes are required in the resolution of the problem. We are continuing to follow the NRC-industry initiative efforts to resolve generic issues related to control room habitability."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37331
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: TRANSALTA CENTRALIA MINING LLC
Region: 4
City: CENTRALIA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0241-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
MECHANICAL FAILURE OF A RONAN MODEL SA-4 GAUGING DEVICE
THE FOLLOWING EVENT WAS E-MAILED TO THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATION CENTER
Transalta Centralia Mining LLC notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection, of a mechanical failure involving a Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device. The device is specifically licensed for density process measurements and uses a Cesium-137 sealed source, Amersham Model CDC.711M not to exceed 74 gigabecquerels (2 curies). The source is normally mounted at the end of a source rod and secured by pins. When not in operation, the rod with source can be withdrawn into a safe position inside the shielding device. When operating, the rod with source is inserted into the process area through a dry well. An authorized user realized that a problem existed when attempting to return the source to the safe position. Apparently the rod did not have normal feel when it was withdrawn. The licensee's RSO and their health physics consultant surveyed the area and stated there wasn't a dose rate problem since the process mixture was still providing ample shielding. The mixture will remain in-place until the source can be returned to the device's normal shielded position. The area adjacent to the dry-well access point has been marked as a restricted area.
Preliminary indications are the source has separated from the source rod and fallen to the bottom of the insertion well. The consultant indicated that this type Ronan device (but not this particular device) has suffered similar failures in the past.
The consultant has contacted Ronan Engineering requesting they send procedures and special equipment. The recovery operation is anticipated to take place on September 18. The Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection will be on-site during the recovery operation.
Type of License: Fixed Gauge
Washington Event Report: WA-00-046.
HOO NOTES: see event #37353
THE FOLLOWING EVENT WAS E-MAILED TO THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATION CENTER
Transalta Centralia Mining LLC notified the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection, of a mechanical failure involving a Ronan Engineering Company Model SA-4 gauging device. The device is specifically licensed for density process measurements and uses a Cesium-137 sealed source, Amersham Model CDC.711M not to exceed 74 gigabecquerels (2 curies). The source is normally mounted at the end of a source rod and secured by pins. When not in operation, the rod with source can be withdrawn into a safe position inside the shielding device. When operating, the rod with source is inserted into the process area through a dry well. An authorized user realized that a problem existed when attempting to return the source to the safe position. Apparently the rod did not have normal feel when it was withdrawn. The licensee's RSO and their health physics consultant surveyed the area and stated there wasn't a dose rate problem since the process mixture was still providing ample shielding. The mixture will remain in-place until the source can be returned to the device's normal shielded position. The area adjacent to the dry-well access point has been marked as a restricted area.
Preliminary indications are the source has separated from the source rod and fallen to the bottom of the insertion well. The consultant indicated that this type Ronan device (but not this particular device) has suffered similar failures in the past.
The consultant has contacted Ronan Engineering requesting they send procedures and special equipment. The recovery operation is anticipated to take place on September 18. The Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection will be on-site during the recovery operation.
Type of License: Fixed Gauge
Washington Event Report: WA-00-046.
HOO NOTES: see event #37353
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37320
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: HUGH ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 09/14/2000
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2000
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2000
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
MARK RING (R3)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
10 CFR 40.60 24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO FAILURE OF EDG TO START
The licensee reported that a Cummins model V12-500GS failed to start when tested. The licensee is investigating the cause of the failure to start. The EDG was repaired as of 2045 CDT.
The licensee reported that a Cummins model V12-500GS failed to start when tested. The licensee is investigating the cause of the failure to start. The EDG was repaired as of 2045 CDT.