Event Notification Report for August 21, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/20/2000 - 08/21/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3724137242372433724437245
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37241
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE SCHAEFER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE SCHAEFER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 06:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 06:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LARRY YANDELL (R4)
LARRY YANDELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- 2 OF 3 TRAINS OF ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE; TECH SPEC 3.0.3 ENTERED -
At 0645 CDT on 08/21/00 with the 'C' train Essential Chilled Water System inoperable for maintenance activities, the 'A' train Essential Chilled Water System became inoperable due to an oil leak. This condition of two trains of the Essential Chilled Water System being inoperable is not allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.14 and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. No maintenance work had yet been performed on the 'C' train Essential Chilled Water System. At 0754 CDT on 02/21/00, the licensee released the equipment clearance tags and restored the 'C' train Essential Chilled Water System to operable status and exited Technical Specification 3.0.3.
This event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 2G of the South Texas Project's Operating License to notify the NRC within 24 hours of any violation of Technical Specifications.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0645 CDT on 08/21/00 with the 'C' train Essential Chilled Water System inoperable for maintenance activities, the 'A' train Essential Chilled Water System became inoperable due to an oil leak. This condition of two trains of the Essential Chilled Water System being inoperable is not allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.14 and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. No maintenance work had yet been performed on the 'C' train Essential Chilled Water System. At 0754 CDT on 02/21/00, the licensee released the equipment clearance tags and restored the 'C' train Essential Chilled Water System to operable status and exited Technical Specification 3.0.3.
This event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 2G of the South Texas Project's Operating License to notify the NRC within 24 hours of any violation of Technical Specifications.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37242
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL MATHER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL MATHER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSIS OF UNBORATED SFP NOT WITHIN NRC APPROVED DESIGN CRITERIA -
Westinghouse has notified the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant that the analysis for the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) with zero boron concentration is not within the NRC approved design criteria. The current NRC approved analysis for unborated water in the SFP states that the Keff should be less than 1.0. The Westinghouse analysis assumed a nominal fuel pellet density lower than the as-fabricated density. This results in a Keff of 1.00086 in an unborated SFP.
Westinghouse reanalyzed the condition using a methodology that takes credit for the effect of spacer grids and spacer sleeves. With this factor, the analysis concludes that Keff in an unborated SFP would be less than 1.01; however, this change to the methodology has not been approved by the NRC.
The approved analysis includes a case that takes credit for 750 ppm borated water. Westinghouse has reevaluated this case using higher density fuel pellets and concluded the acceptance criteria (Keff < 0.95) is still met.
Prairie Island Plant Technical Specifications require the SFP boron concentration to be greater than 1800 ppm. Current SFP boron concentration is 3210 ppm. Additional compensatory measures are being evaluated.
Reference: Tech Specs 3.8.E.2.a and 5.6.A.1.b.
The licensee notified state and local officials and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Westinghouse has notified the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant that the analysis for the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) with zero boron concentration is not within the NRC approved design criteria. The current NRC approved analysis for unborated water in the SFP states that the Keff should be less than 1.0. The Westinghouse analysis assumed a nominal fuel pellet density lower than the as-fabricated density. This results in a Keff of 1.00086 in an unborated SFP.
Westinghouse reanalyzed the condition using a methodology that takes credit for the effect of spacer grids and spacer sleeves. With this factor, the analysis concludes that Keff in an unborated SFP would be less than 1.01; however, this change to the methodology has not been approved by the NRC.
The approved analysis includes a case that takes credit for 750 ppm borated water. Westinghouse has reevaluated this case using higher density fuel pellets and concluded the acceptance criteria (Keff < 0.95) is still met.
Prairie Island Plant Technical Specifications require the SFP boron concentration to be greater than 1800 ppm. Current SFP boron concentration is 3210 ppm. Additional compensatory measures are being evaluated.
Reference: Tech Specs 3.8.E.2.a and 5.6.A.1.b.
The licensee notified state and local officials and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37243
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ROY SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ROY SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) - UNANALYZED COND OP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) - UNANALYZED COND OP
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
- 3 OF 3 AFW PUMPS INOPERABLE DUE TO UNDERSIZED PUMP SUCTION STRAINERS -
During an inspection of the 'A' Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump, the licensee observed that the length and hole size of the pump suction strainer were different than those assumed in a previous operability determination. The installed pump strainer is approximately 10 inches long and has 1/16 inch diameter holes. The operability determination assumed a 6 inch long strainer with 1/8 inch diameter holes. The licensee could not determine whether the smaller strainer would plug and therefore, declared the 'A' AFW pump inoperable. The licensee inspected the suction strainers of the 'B' and 'C' AFW pumps and determined that their suction strainers may be identical to the 'A' AFW pump strainer and therefore, declared the 'B' and 'C' AFW pumps inoperable. With 3 of 3 AFW pumps inoperable, plant tech specs prohibit the licensee from changing plant operating modes.
The licensee plans to remove the suction strainers from all 3 AFW pumps. With the 'A' AFW pump strainer removed and the 'A' AFW pump declared operable, the plant will be in a 4-hour shutdown LCO with the other AFW pumps inoperable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
During an inspection of the 'A' Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump, the licensee observed that the length and hole size of the pump suction strainer were different than those assumed in a previous operability determination. The installed pump strainer is approximately 10 inches long and has 1/16 inch diameter holes. The operability determination assumed a 6 inch long strainer with 1/8 inch diameter holes. The licensee could not determine whether the smaller strainer would plug and therefore, declared the 'A' AFW pump inoperable. The licensee inspected the suction strainers of the 'B' and 'C' AFW pumps and determined that their suction strainers may be identical to the 'A' AFW pump strainer and therefore, declared the 'B' and 'C' AFW pumps inoperable. With 3 of 3 AFW pumps inoperable, plant tech specs prohibit the licensee from changing plant operating modes.
The licensee plans to remove the suction strainers from all 3 AFW pumps. With the 'A' AFW pump strainer removed and the 'A' AFW pump declared operable, the plant will be in a 4-hour shutdown LCO with the other AFW pumps inoperable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37244
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARK BROWNING
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARK BROWNING
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 17:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 15:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 17:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 15:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
- MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 100% POWER DUE TO REDUCED MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM -
At 1531(CDT) on 08/21/00 with the plant in Operational Condition 1 at 100% power, the operating crew inserted a manual reactor scram signal due to the inability to maintain main condenser vacuum greater than 25 inches Hg. Prior to this condition, the operating crew was responding to a low flow condition in the in-service offgas system train in accordance with alarm response procedures. While admitting air to the offgas system train as directed, a low main condenser vacuum condition occurred, requiring the operators to insert a manual reactor scram signal. All control rods inserted completely. No safety/relief valves lifted. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser.
Subsequent to the reactor scram, a reactor vessel low water level 3 signal was received, as expected, which resulted in an ESF isolation of the suppression pool cooling system. The suppression pool cooling system was in the suppression pool cooling mode at the time of the isolation. The reactor vessel water level has been restored to its normal level. Following the reactor scram, all systems functioned as expected. The plant is stable in Operational Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1531(CDT) on 08/21/00 with the plant in Operational Condition 1 at 100% power, the operating crew inserted a manual reactor scram signal due to the inability to maintain main condenser vacuum greater than 25 inches Hg. Prior to this condition, the operating crew was responding to a low flow condition in the in-service offgas system train in accordance with alarm response procedures. While admitting air to the offgas system train as directed, a low main condenser vacuum condition occurred, requiring the operators to insert a manual reactor scram signal. All control rods inserted completely. No safety/relief valves lifted. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser.
Subsequent to the reactor scram, a reactor vessel low water level 3 signal was received, as expected, which resulted in an ESF isolation of the suppression pool cooling system. The suppression pool cooling system was in the suppression pool cooling mode at the time of the isolation. The reactor vessel water level has been restored to its normal level. Following the reactor scram, all systems functioned as expected. The plant is stable in Operational Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37245
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KERRY ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KERRY ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/21/2000
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2000
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2000
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING OIL SPILL ONSITE
"Oil was discovered covering the gravel over an approximate 1 meter diameter area. The area was located under vent pipe for the main turbine generator air detraining tank on the turbine building roof."
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.
"Oil was discovered covering the gravel over an approximate 1 meter diameter area. The area was located under vent pipe for the main turbine generator air detraining tank on the turbine building roof."
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.