Event Notification Report for August 19, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/18/2000 - 08/19/2000
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37246
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: COLUMBIA ASPHALT & GRAVEL
Region: 4
City: YAKIMA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-10440-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: COLUMBIA ASPHALT & GRAVEL
Region: 4
City: YAKIMA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-10440-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/22/2000
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2000
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: LOST PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
This notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection. (WA Event Report #WA-00-039) Date of event: August 19, 2000
Licensee: Columbia Asphalt & Gravel
City and state: Yakima, WA
License number: WN-10440-1
Type of license: Portable Gauge
Location of Event: Toppenish, WA
ABSTRACT: Tired and exhausted after a 60 hour work week, the gauge operator packed up and headed for home. The next morning when he went out to his van, parked in a secured lot, he discovered that the van was unlocked and the gauge transport box was open. The Campbell Pacific Model MC3 was missing. He called the police to report it stolen and called the Division's emergency number. The Division provided him instructions on issuing a press release and suggested offering a reward. The gauge operator also drove back to the job site to double check that he had not inadvertently left the gauge behind. No one was working at the site on August 20, 2000, and he did not find the gauge.
On Monday, August 21, 2000, the gauge operator reported that the gauge had been returned to him by the "flaggers". One of the employees of the traffic control contractor at the site was familiar with portable gauges and realized that the gauge operator had inadvertently drove off without the gauge at the end of work on Saturday. The flagger secured the gauge and notified the gauge operator immediately at the start of the next workday. The gauge was returned safely and this case is closed for purposes of reporting to NRC.
What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-240
Activity and isotope(s) involved: 10 millicuries Cs-137; 50 millicuries Am-24 1/Be
Lost, Stolen or Damaged? Campbell Pacific, Model MC3, S/N M370803865
Disposition/recovery: Recovered Status: Closed
This notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection. (WA Event Report #WA-00-039) Date of event: August 19, 2000
Licensee: Columbia Asphalt & Gravel
City and state: Yakima, WA
License number: WN-10440-1
Type of license: Portable Gauge
Location of Event: Toppenish, WA
ABSTRACT: Tired and exhausted after a 60 hour work week, the gauge operator packed up and headed for home. The next morning when he went out to his van, parked in a secured lot, he discovered that the van was unlocked and the gauge transport box was open. The Campbell Pacific Model MC3 was missing. He called the police to report it stolen and called the Division's emergency number. The Division provided him instructions on issuing a press release and suggested offering a reward. The gauge operator also drove back to the job site to double check that he had not inadvertently left the gauge behind. No one was working at the site on August 20, 2000, and he did not find the gauge.
On Monday, August 21, 2000, the gauge operator reported that the gauge had been returned to him by the "flaggers". One of the employees of the traffic control contractor at the site was familiar with portable gauges and realized that the gauge operator had inadvertently drove off without the gauge at the end of work on Saturday. The flagger secured the gauge and notified the gauge operator immediately at the start of the next workday. The gauge was returned safely and this case is closed for purposes of reporting to NRC.
What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-240
Activity and isotope(s) involved: 10 millicuries Cs-137; 50 millicuries Am-24 1/Be
Lost, Stolen or Damaged? Campbell Pacific, Model MC3, S/N M370803865
Disposition/recovery: Recovered Status: Closed
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37240
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/19/2000
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2000
Event Time: 11:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2000
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2000
Event Time: 11:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
PHILIP TING (NMSS)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
PHILIP TING (NMSS)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
FAILURE OF A 35-CURIE IRIDIUM-192 SOURCE TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION WITHIN A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA OPERATED BY RAYTHEON PERSONNEL (48-HOUR REPORT BASED ON MANAGEMENT DISCRETION)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"CONDITION DESCRIPTION:"
"[A] radiography source would not return to shielded container of camera. On 19 August 2000, Washington Group (Raytheon) was conducting radiography on welder test coupons in the CSB Hallway, 53' elevation. The radiography was being conducted under [Radiation Work Permit (RWP)] 491 utilizing a 35-curie [Iridium]-192 source, license number L02662. The task had continuous [Health Physics (HP)] coverage assigned. The following is a synopsis of the event:"
"1. All notifications and announcements for radiography were completed."
"2. The first shot was a scheduled 45-second shot and commenced at 1105."
"3. Following the exposure period, the source was retracted. The radiographer noted that he had not heard the
characteristic 'snap' signifying full retraction."
"4. By operating guidance, the radiographer ran out the source and attempted retraction. This effort was
unsuccessful."
"5. [The] radiographer noted that the emergency procedure was with the camera, thus unavailable. [The]
radiographer obtained an additional copy of the procedure from [the] onsite office."
"6. The source was run out again to full exposure and again retracted. Indication on the camera was that both
the red and green [lights] were lit, indicating the source was in an intermediate reaction."
"7. At approximately 1127, the radiographer informed the HP Technician that they were entering their emergency
procedure. The HP technician notified the ConEd HP supervisor of the event."
"8. The ConEd HP supervisor reported to the scene at 1135 and notified SGR HP staff of the event."
"9. At 1140, the source was fully retracted following two more attempts."
"10. The camera was surveyed to confirm full retraction."
"11. The camera was secured in the 53' NSB source vault, and RWP 491 was placed on hold pending
investigation of the event."
"Subsequent to the event, the radiographer met with SGR HP management and [committed] that this camera [would] not be utilized and [would be] tagged as such. The radiographer stated that the camera [would] have to be transported to their home office for maintenance/repair. Written statements were obtained from the principal parties[,] and relative documentation for the event [has] been gathered [...] ."
"IMMEDIATE ACTION:"
"The following actions were taken:"
"1. ConEd Hp management [was] notified of the event."
"2. Personnel that were involved in the event were assembled, and the sequence of events [was] ascertained."
"3. The camera was locked in the 53' NSB source vault."
"4. RWP 491 was placed in an on hold status."
"5. The radiographer assured SGR HP management that the camera would not be returned to service and
would be tagged as such."
"6. SGR and SGT project management were notified."
The licensee stated the no one was exposed and that everything was properly shielded and monitored by HP personnel. The work was being performed in a hallway located in a support facility. The hallway was not used for traffic, and it was shielded with heavy concrete. The brand name of the radiography camera was not available at the time of this report.
The licensee decided to notify the state of this event, and the control room was informed of this decision at 1358. The decision to notify the NRC was made as a 48-hour report per procedure based on management discretion. At the time of the licensee's notification to the NRC, the licensee had notified the state and planned to notify the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"CONDITION DESCRIPTION:"
"[A] radiography source would not return to shielded container of camera. On 19 August 2000, Washington Group (Raytheon) was conducting radiography on welder test coupons in the CSB Hallway, 53' elevation. The radiography was being conducted under [Radiation Work Permit (RWP)] 491 utilizing a 35-curie [Iridium]-192 source, license number L02662. The task had continuous [Health Physics (HP)] coverage assigned. The following is a synopsis of the event:"
"1. All notifications and announcements for radiography were completed."
"2. The first shot was a scheduled 45-second shot and commenced at 1105."
"3. Following the exposure period, the source was retracted. The radiographer noted that he had not heard the
characteristic 'snap' signifying full retraction."
"4. By operating guidance, the radiographer ran out the source and attempted retraction. This effort was
unsuccessful."
"5. [The] radiographer noted that the emergency procedure was with the camera, thus unavailable. [The]
radiographer obtained an additional copy of the procedure from [the] onsite office."
"6. The source was run out again to full exposure and again retracted. Indication on the camera was that both
the red and green [lights] were lit, indicating the source was in an intermediate reaction."
"7. At approximately 1127, the radiographer informed the HP Technician that they were entering their emergency
procedure. The HP technician notified the ConEd HP supervisor of the event."
"8. The ConEd HP supervisor reported to the scene at 1135 and notified SGR HP staff of the event."
"9. At 1140, the source was fully retracted following two more attempts."
"10. The camera was surveyed to confirm full retraction."
"11. The camera was secured in the 53' NSB source vault, and RWP 491 was placed on hold pending
investigation of the event."
"Subsequent to the event, the radiographer met with SGR HP management and [committed] that this camera [would] not be utilized and [would be] tagged as such. The radiographer stated that the camera [would] have to be transported to their home office for maintenance/repair. Written statements were obtained from the principal parties[,] and relative documentation for the event [has] been gathered [...] ."
"IMMEDIATE ACTION:"
"The following actions were taken:"
"1. ConEd Hp management [was] notified of the event."
"2. Personnel that were involved in the event were assembled, and the sequence of events [was] ascertained."
"3. The camera was locked in the 53' NSB source vault."
"4. RWP 491 was placed in an on hold status."
"5. The radiographer assured SGR HP management that the camera would not be returned to service and
would be tagged as such."
"6. SGR and SGT project management were notified."
The licensee stated the no one was exposed and that everything was properly shielded and monitored by HP personnel. The work was being performed in a hallway located in a support facility. The hallway was not used for traffic, and it was shielded with heavy concrete. The brand name of the radiography camera was not available at the time of this report.
The licensee decided to notify the state of this event, and the control room was informed of this decision at 1358. The decision to notify the NRC was made as a 48-hour report per procedure based on management discretion. At the time of the licensee's notification to the NRC, the licensee had notified the state and planned to notify the NRC resident inspector.