Event Notification Report for August 18, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/17/2000 - 08/18/2000
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37238
Rep Org: KEEGAN TECHNOLOGY AND TESTING
Licensee: KEEGAN TECHNOLOGY AND TESTING
Region: 1
City: KEYPORT State: NJ
County: MONMOUTH
License #: 29-19282-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL BOEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: KEEGAN TECHNOLOGY AND TESTING
Region: 1
City: KEYPORT State: NJ
County: MONMOUTH
License #: 29-19282-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL BOEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/18/2000
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2000
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2000
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2000
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
HUMBOLT NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM A JOBSITE LOCATED IN HILLSIDE, NEW JERSEY.
At approximately 1300 on 08/18/00, a Humbolt soil moisture density gauge (model #5001C, serial number 1852) was stolen from a jobsite located in Hillside, New Jersey. Apparently, the gauge was locked inside its case, and the case was located inside an unlocked truck. It was reported that the gauge user entered and exited a trailer and discovered the gauge to be missing after exiting the trailer.
The gauge contained cesium-137 and americium-241/beryllium sources. The activity levels of the sources were not known at the time of this notification.
The licensee notified both the Hillside New Jersey Police Department and the NRC Region 3 office (John McGrath).
(Contact the NRC operations officer for the licensee's contact telephone number and address as well as the contact name, telephone number, and case number for the Hillside New Jersey Police Department.)
At approximately 1300 on 08/18/00, a Humbolt soil moisture density gauge (model #5001C, serial number 1852) was stolen from a jobsite located in Hillside, New Jersey. Apparently, the gauge was locked inside its case, and the case was located inside an unlocked truck. It was reported that the gauge user entered and exited a trailer and discovered the gauge to be missing after exiting the trailer.
The gauge contained cesium-137 and americium-241/beryllium sources. The activity levels of the sources were not known at the time of this notification.
The licensee notified both the Hillside New Jersey Police Department and the NRC Region 3 office (John McGrath).
(Contact the NRC operations officer for the licensee's contact telephone number and address as well as the contact name, telephone number, and case number for the Hillside New Jersey Police Department.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37239
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/19/2000
Notification Time: 00:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2000
Event Time: 19:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2000
Notification Time: 00:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2000
Event Time: 19:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - EMERGENCY SIREN INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - EMERGENCY SIREN INOP
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT HAD GREATER THAN 20% OF THEIR WARNING SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE.
More than 17 of the 81 warning sirens became out of service due to power outages. This represents greater than 20% of the warning sirens, therefore making it reportable. The number of warning sirens available was back within acceptable limits at 2035 on 8/18/00. Currently only 8 warning sirens are out of service. This information was obtained at 2320 and determined reportable at 2327.
The NRC Resident Inspector, the State and local agencies will be informed.
More than 17 of the 81 warning sirens became out of service due to power outages. This represents greater than 20% of the warning sirens, therefore making it reportable. The number of warning sirens available was back within acceptable limits at 2035 on 8/18/00. Currently only 8 warning sirens are out of service. This information was obtained at 2320 and determined reportable at 2327.
The NRC Resident Inspector, the State and local agencies will be informed.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37427
Rep Org: ITT INDUSTRIES
Licensee: ITT INDUSTRIES
Region: 2
City: ST. GEORGE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATTON (BY FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: ITT INDUSTRIES
Region: 2
City: ST. GEORGE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATTON (BY FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/13/2000
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
KEN BARR (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
KEN BARR (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
DAVE LOVELESS (R4)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
PART 21 INVOLVING POSSIBLE ITT INDUSTRIES TRANSDUCER FAILURES
Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated. The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in nature. ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of their investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units would be available by 2/15/01.
Advice to Customers
Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential for failure with regard to this notification. In the absence of a seismic event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, they do not believe this unit will cause an operational problem.
Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10) year design life. Those units with a service life of ten, (10) years or more should not be considered qualified.
Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P transducers are available.
Nature of the Deviation
The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer. This process change began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the transducer to perform its intended safety function.
Product Models involved
GT25CA1826 GT65CA1826 GT45CA1826
GT25FA1826 GT45FA1826 GT65FA1826
Identification of the Company
ITT Conoflow
ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Grinnell Valve Company
ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Fluid Technology Corporation
ITT Conoflow, ITT Industries
Location of Components in Use
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION, CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
FORT CALHOUN STATION
KOREA ELECTRIC POWER CORPORATION, KANONAM
ERGYTECH INCORPORATED, HOUSTON, TEXAS
PONTON INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, SANTA FE SPRINGS, CALIFORNIA
ONTARIO POWER GENERATION, DNGD, BOWMANVILLE, ONTARIO LIC 3Z8 CANADA
COMMONWEALTH EDISON, MAY WOOD, ILLINOIS
COPES-VULCAN, INCORPORATED, LAKE CITY, PENNSYLVANIA
PETRO-CHEM EQUIPMENT COMPANY, BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA
ASIAM INTERNATIONAL (TAIWAN) INCORPORATED, TAIPEI 105 TAIWAN, R.O.C.
NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, JA FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR PLANT
CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC., RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA, CALIFORNIA
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
These companies were also informed.
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, FORT CALHOUN STATION
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY
GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION, C/O GPU SERVICE CORPORATION
* * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1425 BY FAX(PATTON) TO GOULD * * *
This deviation to IEEE 323 and IEEE 344 was discovered during a design change history review. Their records indicate that in September, 1986, a change was made to the magnet assembly which was not properly documented for compliance to the IEEE standards. This change was to the adhesive used to bond the magnet assembly together. Upon researching the new adhesive, there is no test data, either in ITT Conoflow records or the adhesive supplier adhesive properties data, which assures that the bond will withstand the rigors of thermal shock, radiation or high temperature/steam exposure. These facts are what prompted the Part 21 NRC notification.
The potential failure of the adhesive bonds within the I/P transducer magnet assembly could, under seismic loading, cause the magnet to shift laterally and bind the floating coil which drives the pilot nozzle flapper valve. If that were to occur, the transducer would fail in the last operating output pressure. A change in electrical signal to the transducer may not cause the corresponding change in output pressure.
To date, no units have failed. The potential failure mode will require two conditions to occur:
1. The thermal/steam or radiation conditions must exist for the adhesive bond to fail.
2. There must be sufficient seismic energy (vibration/shock) to move the magnet in a lateral direction.
Nature of the Deviation
The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer. This process change began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the transducer to perform its intended safety function.
Corrective Action
Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated. The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in nature. ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of our investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units would be available by 2/15/01
Advice to Customers
Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential for failure with regard to this notification. In the absence of a seismic event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, we do not believe this unit will cause an operational problem.
Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10) year design life. Those units with a service life often, (10) years or more should not be considered qualified.
Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P transducers are available.
Two more models have been added to the list:
GT25CD1826
GT25FD1826
NRR(Hodge), RDOs(Silk, Boland, Vegel, and Pick) were notified.
Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated. The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in nature. ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of their investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units would be available by 2/15/01.
Advice to Customers
Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential for failure with regard to this notification. In the absence of a seismic event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, they do not believe this unit will cause an operational problem.
Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10) year design life. Those units with a service life of ten, (10) years or more should not be considered qualified.
Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P transducers are available.
Nature of the Deviation
The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer. This process change began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the transducer to perform its intended safety function.
Product Models involved
GT25CA1826 GT65CA1826 GT45CA1826
GT25FA1826 GT45FA1826 GT65FA1826
Identification of the Company
ITT Conoflow
ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Grinnell Valve Company
ITT Conoflow, Division of ITT Fluid Technology Corporation
ITT Conoflow, ITT Industries
Location of Components in Use
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION, CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
FORT CALHOUN STATION
KOREA ELECTRIC POWER CORPORATION, KANONAM
ERGYTECH INCORPORATED, HOUSTON, TEXAS
PONTON INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, SANTA FE SPRINGS, CALIFORNIA
ONTARIO POWER GENERATION, DNGD, BOWMANVILLE, ONTARIO LIC 3Z8 CANADA
COMMONWEALTH EDISON, MAY WOOD, ILLINOIS
COPES-VULCAN, INCORPORATED, LAKE CITY, PENNSYLVANIA
PETRO-CHEM EQUIPMENT COMPANY, BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA
ASIAM INTERNATIONAL (TAIWAN) INCORPORATED, TAIPEI 105 TAIWAN, R.O.C.
NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, JA FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR PLANT
CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC., RANCHO SANTA MARGARITA, CALIFORNIA
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
These companies were also informed.
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, FORT CALHOUN STATION
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY
GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION, C/O GPU SERVICE CORPORATION
* * * UPDATE ON 10/25/00 @ 1425 BY FAX(PATTON) TO GOULD * * *
This deviation to IEEE 323 and IEEE 344 was discovered during a design change history review. Their records indicate that in September, 1986, a change was made to the magnet assembly which was not properly documented for compliance to the IEEE standards. This change was to the adhesive used to bond the magnet assembly together. Upon researching the new adhesive, there is no test data, either in ITT Conoflow records or the adhesive supplier adhesive properties data, which assures that the bond will withstand the rigors of thermal shock, radiation or high temperature/steam exposure. These facts are what prompted the Part 21 NRC notification.
The potential failure of the adhesive bonds within the I/P transducer magnet assembly could, under seismic loading, cause the magnet to shift laterally and bind the floating coil which drives the pilot nozzle flapper valve. If that were to occur, the transducer would fail in the last operating output pressure. A change in electrical signal to the transducer may not cause the corresponding change in output pressure.
To date, no units have failed. The potential failure mode will require two conditions to occur:
1. The thermal/steam or radiation conditions must exist for the adhesive bond to fail.
2. There must be sufficient seismic energy (vibration/shock) to move the magnet in a lateral direction.
Nature of the Deviation
The nature of the deviation is to the test and performance requirements associated with IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. An inappropriate bonding process was utilized in the manufacture of the IEEE I/P Transducer. This process change began in 1986 and could, during a seismic event involving high radiation and/or high temperature steam, result in the potential failure of the transducer to perform its intended safety function.
Corrective Action
Since the date of discovery, design alternatives continue to be evaluated. The methods under investigation for corrective action will be mechanical in nature. ITT Conoflow expects to conclude the analysis phase of our investigation by 12/15/00 and currently estimate that replacement units would be available by 2/15/01
Advice to Customers
Each site location should analyze their system and corresponding potential for failure with regard to this notification. In the absence of a seismic event resulting in radiation and/or a steam line break, we do not believe this unit will cause an operational problem.
Please note that the product qualification was simulated for a ten, (10) year design life. Those units with a service life often, (10) years or more should not be considered qualified.
Individual customers will be advised by letter when replacement IEEE I/P transducers are available.
Two more models have been added to the list:
GT25CD1826
GT25FD1826
NRR(Hodge), RDOs(Silk, Boland, Vegel, and Pick) were notified.