Event Notification Report for July 27, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/26/2000 - 07/27/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37191371923719337188
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Research Reactor
Event Number: 37191
Rep Org: UNIV OF ARIZONA
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County: PIMA
License #: R-52
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000113
NRC Notified By: J.G. WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County: PIMA
License #: R-52
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000113
NRC Notified By: J.G. WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 08:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 08:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BILL JONES (R4)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
BILL JONES (R4)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
24-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL I-131 CONTAMINATION
"FACILITY LICENSE R-52
"Report, possibly spurious, of I-131 contamination
"July 27, 2000
"Description of the Occurrence:
"On the afternoon of July 18, 2000, a routine contamination survey was performed at the Nuclear Reactor Laboratory (NRL), University of Arizona by staff of the Radiation Control Office (RCO). On July 26, at approximately 0845, the Reactor Supervisor received word that four out of 30 wipe samples showed contamination, with the highest count rate about 1100 counts per minute. Subsequently, he was told that I-131 (8-day half life) was identified by gamma spectrometry.
"Immediate surveys of the Reactor Laboratory and reviews of records showed no confirmatory evidence, which should have been found if the reported contamination was genuine.
"Contamination of the samples while in RCO custody is suspected, and this possibility is being investigated.
"On the morning of 18 July a group of 20 visitors, members of the public, was present for about one hour in the morning. One half of the visitors, mostly school children grades 6 to 9, carried pocket dosimeters, which showed no exposure. The continuous air monitor showed no indication. The area monitors showed no indication. Finally, no indication of I-131 could be found in the laboratory yesterday, even though no clean-up had been attempted.
"The report we received from RCO is at the moment considered to be spurious. This report is transmitted within 24 hours of our receiving that report, however, in case it proves to have some foundation. Investigation is in any case needed of how this occurred, and of why the report we received from RCO was not timely."
* * * UPDATE 7/27/00 FROM J. WILLIAMS TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"FACILITY LICENSE R-52
Withdrawn: previous report, dated today, entitled, "Report, possibly spurious, of I-131 contamination"
"July 27, 2000
"Investigation of information that formed the basis for my previous report, dated today, has led to the conclusion that there exists no credible evidence of any violation of 10CFR20 at this facility or of any other basis for an immediate report in accordance with our Technical Specification. In particular no exposure or contamination of any person has occurred. Therefore, the previous report is withdrawn.
"The basis for this conclusion, briefly, is as follows:
"- The Radiation Control Office has reason to believe that the gamma spectrometer used to identify I-131 may have been previously contaminated with I-131.
"- I-131 is not an isotope in use in the Reactor Laboratory. It is present in the reactor fuel elements, but could not have leaked from them without causing other indications that were not present.
"- The liquid scintillation counts were incorrectly reported by an inexperienced analyst (though experienced in operating the equipment).
"- At low counting levels, the techniques used to obtain the liquid scintillation counts may be sensitive to spurious effects such as static electricity.
"- Even if accurate, the count rates reported would not credibly lead to the possibility of exposures above 10CFR20 limits.
"- The absence of indications from Reactor Laboratory instruments, as reported previously, cannot be explained if there were any reactivity released from the reactor. Channel checks of those instruments had been performed on the day in question (7/18/00), and their calibrations were current.
"- In addition to the absence of air monitor indication and area monitor indication, the reactor pool water monitoring system showed no indication.
"- Further wipe samples of the locations occupied by visitors on 7/18/00, showed no indications of activity above background, and other wipes from areas not accessible to visitors showed no significant indications.
"As stated in the original report, the reasons for the reporting of possibly spurious data, also after an apparently undue delay, require investigation. The results will be reported in writing to the NRC within 30 days, as an 'observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls,' (Tech. Specs. 6.7.c.4)."
Notified R4DO(Jones) and NMSS(Collins).
"FACILITY LICENSE R-52
"Report, possibly spurious, of I-131 contamination
"July 27, 2000
"Description of the Occurrence:
"On the afternoon of July 18, 2000, a routine contamination survey was performed at the Nuclear Reactor Laboratory (NRL), University of Arizona by staff of the Radiation Control Office (RCO). On July 26, at approximately 0845, the Reactor Supervisor received word that four out of 30 wipe samples showed contamination, with the highest count rate about 1100 counts per minute. Subsequently, he was told that I-131 (8-day half life) was identified by gamma spectrometry.
"Immediate surveys of the Reactor Laboratory and reviews of records showed no confirmatory evidence, which should have been found if the reported contamination was genuine.
"Contamination of the samples while in RCO custody is suspected, and this possibility is being investigated.
"On the morning of 18 July a group of 20 visitors, members of the public, was present for about one hour in the morning. One half of the visitors, mostly school children grades 6 to 9, carried pocket dosimeters, which showed no exposure. The continuous air monitor showed no indication. The area monitors showed no indication. Finally, no indication of I-131 could be found in the laboratory yesterday, even though no clean-up had been attempted.
"The report we received from RCO is at the moment considered to be spurious. This report is transmitted within 24 hours of our receiving that report, however, in case it proves to have some foundation. Investigation is in any case needed of how this occurred, and of why the report we received from RCO was not timely."
* * * UPDATE 7/27/00 FROM J. WILLIAMS TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"FACILITY LICENSE R-52
Withdrawn: previous report, dated today, entitled, "Report, possibly spurious, of I-131 contamination"
"July 27, 2000
"Investigation of information that formed the basis for my previous report, dated today, has led to the conclusion that there exists no credible evidence of any violation of 10CFR20 at this facility or of any other basis for an immediate report in accordance with our Technical Specification. In particular no exposure or contamination of any person has occurred. Therefore, the previous report is withdrawn.
"The basis for this conclusion, briefly, is as follows:
"- The Radiation Control Office has reason to believe that the gamma spectrometer used to identify I-131 may have been previously contaminated with I-131.
"- I-131 is not an isotope in use in the Reactor Laboratory. It is present in the reactor fuel elements, but could not have leaked from them without causing other indications that were not present.
"- The liquid scintillation counts were incorrectly reported by an inexperienced analyst (though experienced in operating the equipment).
"- At low counting levels, the techniques used to obtain the liquid scintillation counts may be sensitive to spurious effects such as static electricity.
"- Even if accurate, the count rates reported would not credibly lead to the possibility of exposures above 10CFR20 limits.
"- The absence of indications from Reactor Laboratory instruments, as reported previously, cannot be explained if there were any reactivity released from the reactor. Channel checks of those instruments had been performed on the day in question (7/18/00), and their calibrations were current.
"- In addition to the absence of air monitor indication and area monitor indication, the reactor pool water monitoring system showed no indication.
"- Further wipe samples of the locations occupied by visitors on 7/18/00, showed no indications of activity above background, and other wipes from areas not accessible to visitors showed no significant indications.
"As stated in the original report, the reasons for the reporting of possibly spurious data, also after an apparently undue delay, require investigation. The results will be reported in writing to the NRC within 30 days, as an 'observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls,' (Tech. Specs. 6.7.c.4)."
Notified R4DO(Jones) and NMSS(Collins).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37192
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VERNON CARLSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VERNON CARLSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 09:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2000
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 09:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BILL JONES (R4)
BILL JONES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION RELATED TO CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM
"While alternating Divisions of Control Room Chilled water to perform post maintenance testing on HVK-CHL1B the 'B' chiller tripped. When actions were taken to restart the 'A' chiller the breaker for the service water recirc valve SWP-MOV 27A tripped. The breaker was reset and the chiller was started. Due to the indeterminate nature of the breaker trip on the valve, the 'A' chiller was declared Inoperable. The 'C' & 'D' chillers were already Inoperable due to non-related existing conditions. This places the unit in Action 'B' of Tech Spec 3.7.3. We are conservatively reporting this pending the investigation of the condition and it's affect on the system response to postulated events to determine if the safety function was truly lost. System is currently operating and maintaining normal control room temperature."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0924 ON 8/9/00, REPORTED BY NORTHRUP, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The event occurred when the control building chilled water system was being shifted from Division I to Division II. The "A" chiller subsystem (Division I) had been operating normally for approximately one week, and was to be shut down to allow shut down of the "B" chiller subsystem (Division II). The "C" and "D" chillers were already inoperable for reasons unrelated to this event. During the transition to the "B" chiller, it failed to start. The "A" chiller did not immediately restart due to the configuration of its support systems at this point in the transition. Operator actions were promptly taken to restart the "A" chiller. Approximately nine minutes elapsed from the initial shutdown of the "A" chiller until it was restored to service. During the event, the "A" chiller was capable of performing its safety function with reasonable operator actions. This event had no bearing on the previous operability of the "A" chiller.
Based on the above information, this event did not result in a loss of safety function. This event notification is retracted.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The Operations Center notified the R4DO (Kennedy).
"While alternating Divisions of Control Room Chilled water to perform post maintenance testing on HVK-CHL1B the 'B' chiller tripped. When actions were taken to restart the 'A' chiller the breaker for the service water recirc valve SWP-MOV 27A tripped. The breaker was reset and the chiller was started. Due to the indeterminate nature of the breaker trip on the valve, the 'A' chiller was declared Inoperable. The 'C' & 'D' chillers were already Inoperable due to non-related existing conditions. This places the unit in Action 'B' of Tech Spec 3.7.3. We are conservatively reporting this pending the investigation of the condition and it's affect on the system response to postulated events to determine if the safety function was truly lost. System is currently operating and maintaining normal control room temperature."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0924 ON 8/9/00, REPORTED BY NORTHRUP, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The event occurred when the control building chilled water system was being shifted from Division I to Division II. The "A" chiller subsystem (Division I) had been operating normally for approximately one week, and was to be shut down to allow shut down of the "B" chiller subsystem (Division II). The "C" and "D" chillers were already inoperable for reasons unrelated to this event. During the transition to the "B" chiller, it failed to start. The "A" chiller did not immediately restart due to the configuration of its support systems at this point in the transition. Operator actions were promptly taken to restart the "A" chiller. Approximately nine minutes elapsed from the initial shutdown of the "A" chiller until it was restored to service. During the event, the "A" chiller was capable of performing its safety function with reasonable operator actions. This event had no bearing on the previous operability of the "A" chiller.
Based on the above information, this event did not result in a loss of safety function. This event notification is retracted.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The Operations Center notified the R4DO (Kennedy).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37193
Rep Org: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Licensee: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 19:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 15:55 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2000
Notification Time: 19:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 15:55 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BILL JONES (R4)
ELLIS MERSCHOFF (RA)
ELMO COLLINS (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
STEINDURF (FEMA)
BILL JONES (R4)
ELLIS MERSCHOFF (RA)
ELMO COLLINS (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
STEINDURF (FEMA)
COURTESY NOTIFICATION OF A DOE EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT AN INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) IN IDAHO
At 1555MDT, DOE INEEL declared a Site Area Emergency due to wildland fires on DOE controlled property. The ISFSI containing the TMI spent fuel is not threatened. This notification is a courtesy call only and does not involve the NRC Radiological Emergency Plan. No NRC assistance is requested.
DOE INEEL has notified the State of Idaho, all surrounding counties and DOE Headquarters.
*** UPDATE AT 0304 EDT ON 07/28/00 FROM JOE GARCIA AND FOREST HOLMS TO LEIGH TROCINE ***
This event status update was provided as a courtesy notification. The Site Area Emergency remains in progress. There is a site-wide emergency action level in effect because of a wildland fire. The TMI-2 ISFSI is located at the Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), but the Site Area Emergency does not impact the TMI-2 ISFSI. However, INEEL has been directed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to notify the NRC when emergency action levels of this nature are in place. The Site Area Emergency will remain in effect until the fire is extinguished.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the INEEL:
"Description of Incident: Wildland fire on the INEEL. Fire suppression efforts continue. Emergency response centers [are] operational at RWMC, CFA, INTEC, TRA, EOC with reduced staffing. INTEC and TRA [are] continuing to monitor facilities."
The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Jones), R4RA (Merschoff), NMSS EO (Collins), IRO (Miller), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Storer). DOE, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Transportation (DOT) (via the National Response Center) were also notified via facsimile.
* * * UPDATE 1709EDT 7/29/00 FROM GREG BYBEE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The Site Area Emergency was terminated at 1500MST.
The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Jones), R4RA (Merschoff), NMSS EO (Collins), IRO (Miller), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Eaches). DOE, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Transportation (DOT) (via the National Response Center) were also notified via facsimile.
At 1555MDT, DOE INEEL declared a Site Area Emergency due to wildland fires on DOE controlled property. The ISFSI containing the TMI spent fuel is not threatened. This notification is a courtesy call only and does not involve the NRC Radiological Emergency Plan. No NRC assistance is requested.
DOE INEEL has notified the State of Idaho, all surrounding counties and DOE Headquarters.
*** UPDATE AT 0304 EDT ON 07/28/00 FROM JOE GARCIA AND FOREST HOLMS TO LEIGH TROCINE ***
This event status update was provided as a courtesy notification. The Site Area Emergency remains in progress. There is a site-wide emergency action level in effect because of a wildland fire. The TMI-2 ISFSI is located at the Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), but the Site Area Emergency does not impact the TMI-2 ISFSI. However, INEEL has been directed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to notify the NRC when emergency action levels of this nature are in place. The Site Area Emergency will remain in effect until the fire is extinguished.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the INEEL:
"Description of Incident: Wildland fire on the INEEL. Fire suppression efforts continue. Emergency response centers [are] operational at RWMC, CFA, INTEC, TRA, EOC with reduced staffing. INTEC and TRA [are] continuing to monitor facilities."
The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Jones), R4RA (Merschoff), NMSS EO (Collins), IRO (Miller), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Storer). DOE, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Transportation (DOT) (via the National Response Center) were also notified via facsimile.
* * * UPDATE 1709EDT 7/29/00 FROM GREG BYBEE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The Site Area Emergency was terminated at 1500MST.
The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Jones), R4RA (Merschoff), NMSS EO (Collins), IRO (Miller), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Eaches). DOE, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Transportation (DOT) (via the National Response Center) were also notified via facsimile.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 37188
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: QORE, INC. d/b/a ATLANTA TESTING & ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 2
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 1646-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLEY ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: QORE, INC. d/b/a ATLANTA TESTING & ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 2
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 1646-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLEY ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2005
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2000
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE OWNED BY QORE, INC. d/b/a ATLANTA TESTING & ENGINEERING, INC. LOCATED IN TAMPA, FLORIDA
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control:
"Licensee: Qore, Inc., d/b/a Atlanta Testing & Engineering, Inc."
"City, State, and Zip Code: Tampa, FL 33313"
"License #: 1646-1"
"License Type; Category: Specific; 3L(1)"
"Isotope(s): Cs-137; Am-241:Be"
"Activity(s): 8 mCi, 40.2 mCi"
"Material Form; Chemical Form; Physical Form: By-product: Special Form"
"Probable Disposition of Material: Unknown"
"Exposure? No"
"Number: N/A"
"Type of Individual(s): N/A"
"Exposure Source: N/A"
"Dose Delivered to: N/A"
"Maximum Dose Received: N/A"
"Incident Category: Loss of Control - Lost, Abandoned, or Stolen Materials"
"Incident Location: 2306 Isabel St., Tampa, FL"
"Location Classification: Unrestricted Area"
"Incident Description: [The] licensee reported that a gauge was stolen from a technician's home between 8 p.m. on 26 July and 8 a.m. on 27 July. The technician had worked late at a job and went home for the evening. When he checked the container the next morning[,] the gauge was missing. The gauge is locked[,] but the container had not been locked. The keys to the gauge were not stolen. The Tampa PD and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control are investigating. The licensee is considering [offering] a $500 reward for the gauge's return."
"Device Type (Quantity): Soil Moisture/Density Gauge (1)"
"Manufacturer: Troxler"
"Model Number: 3430"
"Serial Number: 23299"
"Emergency Groups at Scene: None"
"Organizations Notified: NRC, Tampa PD"
"Media Contacted: None"
"Investigator's Name; Title: Charles Adams, Environmental Specialist II"
"Office: Environmental Radiation Control"
"Date; Time Investigated: 27-Jul-00; 0830"
"[NRC] Region II has been notified."
Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.
* * * UPDATE FROM STATE OF FLORIDA (ADAMS) TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1633 EDT ON 08/26/05 * * *
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"[State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] was contacted by a [customer] concerning a Troxler gauge for sale on E-Bay. The seller [located in Florida] indicated that he had bought the gauge at a flea market. Tampa PD retrieved gauge 8/25/05. Investigator inspected gauge and it was undamaged. Licensee will pick it up from Tampa PD on 8/29/05. [State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] will take no further action on this incident."
FL Incident Number: FL05-116
Notified R1DO (Cook) and NMSS EO (Brach)
This is less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.
Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control:
"Licensee: Qore, Inc., d/b/a Atlanta Testing & Engineering, Inc."
"City, State, and Zip Code: Tampa, FL 33313"
"License #: 1646-1"
"License Type; Category: Specific; 3L(1)"
"Isotope(s): Cs-137; Am-241:Be"
"Activity(s): 8 mCi, 40.2 mCi"
"Material Form; Chemical Form; Physical Form: By-product: Special Form"
"Probable Disposition of Material: Unknown"
"Exposure? No"
"Number: N/A"
"Type of Individual(s): N/A"
"Exposure Source: N/A"
"Dose Delivered to: N/A"
"Maximum Dose Received: N/A"
"Incident Category: Loss of Control - Lost, Abandoned, or Stolen Materials"
"Incident Location: 2306 Isabel St., Tampa, FL"
"Location Classification: Unrestricted Area"
"Incident Description: [The] licensee reported that a gauge was stolen from a technician's home between 8 p.m. on 26 July and 8 a.m. on 27 July. The technician had worked late at a job and went home for the evening. When he checked the container the next morning[,] the gauge was missing. The gauge is locked[,] but the container had not been locked. The keys to the gauge were not stolen. The Tampa PD and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control are investigating. The licensee is considering [offering] a $500 reward for the gauge's return."
"Device Type (Quantity): Soil Moisture/Density Gauge (1)"
"Manufacturer: Troxler"
"Model Number: 3430"
"Serial Number: 23299"
"Emergency Groups at Scene: None"
"Organizations Notified: NRC, Tampa PD"
"Media Contacted: None"
"Investigator's Name; Title: Charles Adams, Environmental Specialist II"
"Office: Environmental Radiation Control"
"Date; Time Investigated: 27-Jul-00; 0830"
"[NRC] Region II has been notified."
Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.
* * * UPDATE FROM STATE OF FLORIDA (ADAMS) TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1633 EDT ON 08/26/05 * * *
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"[State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] was contacted by a [customer] concerning a Troxler gauge for sale on E-Bay. The seller [located in Florida] indicated that he had bought the gauge at a flea market. Tampa PD retrieved gauge 8/25/05. Investigator inspected gauge and it was undamaged. Licensee will pick it up from Tampa PD on 8/29/05. [State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] will take no further action on this incident."
FL Incident Number: FL05-116
Notified R1DO (Cook) and NMSS EO (Brach)
This is less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.
Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.