Event Notification Report for July 26, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/25/2000 - 07/26/2000
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37189
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: JIM HEATH
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: JIM HEATH
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2000
Event Time: 12:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2000
Event Time: 12:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"During a routine procedure review associated with a plant-wide procedure upgrade process, a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer noted that a procedure was not written in compliance with the documented criticality safety evaluation.
"The procedure under review was 'Filter Disassembly Process' which provides instructions for the disassembly of HEPA filters to remove non-combustible material and recover gross contamination (i.e. particles which are not imbedded in the media) prior to incineration. The procedure instructed the operator to 'Place paper filter media into a 30-gal paper bag for shredding.' The NCS engineer subsequently examined the criticality safety evaluation for the shredder system and found that mass control in the system is maintained by administrative controls which prohibit the shredding of filters surveyed to contain greater than 5g U-235/10 liters. It was determined that the procedure for shredding of the paper bags filled with un-assayed filter media failed to provide the documented double contingency protection for the system.
"Double Contingency Protection:
Double contingency protection for the shredder is based on mass control (prevent greater than 43 kg U from accumulating in the feeder hopper or the receiver drums). It was determined that less than double contingency protection remained for the system. However, at no time was greater than a safe mass involved. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5), this event meets the criteria for a 24 hour notification because it constitutes a 'nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains ...and: Less than a safe mass ... is involved...'
"Summary of Activity:
Immediately upon determining that less than double contingency protection remained, the NCS engineer directed that shredding of bags containing disassembled filter media be stopped. Thus double contingency protection was immediately restored.
"Conclusions:
* Loss of double contingency protection occurred.
* At no time was greater than a safe mass involved.
* At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
* The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A formal root cause analysis is underway.
* Notification was the result of a deficient procedure, not 'a deficient NCS analysis."
"During a routine procedure review associated with a plant-wide procedure upgrade process, a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer noted that a procedure was not written in compliance with the documented criticality safety evaluation.
"The procedure under review was 'Filter Disassembly Process' which provides instructions for the disassembly of HEPA filters to remove non-combustible material and recover gross contamination (i.e. particles which are not imbedded in the media) prior to incineration. The procedure instructed the operator to 'Place paper filter media into a 30-gal paper bag for shredding.' The NCS engineer subsequently examined the criticality safety evaluation for the shredder system and found that mass control in the system is maintained by administrative controls which prohibit the shredding of filters surveyed to contain greater than 5g U-235/10 liters. It was determined that the procedure for shredding of the paper bags filled with un-assayed filter media failed to provide the documented double contingency protection for the system.
"Double Contingency Protection:
Double contingency protection for the shredder is based on mass control (prevent greater than 43 kg U from accumulating in the feeder hopper or the receiver drums). It was determined that less than double contingency protection remained for the system. However, at no time was greater than a safe mass involved. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5), this event meets the criteria for a 24 hour notification because it constitutes a 'nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains ...and: Less than a safe mass ... is involved...'
"Summary of Activity:
Immediately upon determining that less than double contingency protection remained, the NCS engineer directed that shredding of bags containing disassembled filter media be stopped. Thus double contingency protection was immediately restored.
"Conclusions:
* Loss of double contingency protection occurred.
* At no time was greater than a safe mass involved.
* At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
* The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A formal root cause analysis is underway.
* Notification was the result of a deficient procedure, not 'a deficient NCS analysis."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37190
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: SHERI KING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: SHERI KING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2000
Event Time: 14:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2000
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2000
Event Time: 14:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITY (EOF) TELEPHONE LAND LINES CUT DURING CONSTRUCTION.
"ON 7/26/00 AT APPROXIMATELY 1427 HOURS, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ALL LAND LINKED TELEPHONES IN THE EMERGENCY OFFSITE RESPONSE FACILITY WERE INOPERATIVE. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED A MAJOR TELEPHONE TRUNK LINE HAD BEEN SEVERED AT APPROXIMATELY 1130 HOURS DURING CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES APPROXIMATELY ONE MILE FROM THE EOF. THIS SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF TELEPHONES WOULD HAVE IMPAIRED THE CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE EOF IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT OR EMERGENCY. AT THE TIME OF THE DISCOVERY, COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE CONTROL ROOM TO THE NRC AND OFFSITE AGENCIES WERE VERIFIED AS OPERATIONAL. THE PHONE LINES WERE REPAIRED BY 1700 HOURS ON 7/26/00.
"REPORTABILITY OF THE OCCURRENCE WAS DETERMINED AT 1100 HOURS ON 7/27/00."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
"ON 7/26/00 AT APPROXIMATELY 1427 HOURS, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ALL LAND LINKED TELEPHONES IN THE EMERGENCY OFFSITE RESPONSE FACILITY WERE INOPERATIVE. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED A MAJOR TELEPHONE TRUNK LINE HAD BEEN SEVERED AT APPROXIMATELY 1130 HOURS DURING CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES APPROXIMATELY ONE MILE FROM THE EOF. THIS SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF TELEPHONES WOULD HAVE IMPAIRED THE CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE EOF IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT OR EMERGENCY. AT THE TIME OF THE DISCOVERY, COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE CONTROL ROOM TO THE NRC AND OFFSITE AGENCIES WERE VERIFIED AS OPERATIONAL. THE PHONE LINES WERE REPAIRED BY 1700 HOURS ON 7/26/00.
"REPORTABILITY OF THE OCCURRENCE WAS DETERMINED AT 1100 HOURS ON 7/27/00."
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37187
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KELLY WELTY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KELLY WELTY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 07/26/2000
Notification Time: 20:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2000
Event Time: 18:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2000
Notification Time: 20:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2000
Event Time: 18:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL
The '2C' steam generator feedwater regulating valve failed closed for an unknown reason, this led to low level in the steam generator causing a reactor trip. The plant's system responded as designed and all control rods fully inserted. The steam generator power operated relief valves opened momentarily then fully shut. The plant is presently stable in Hot Standby with feed from the auxiliary feedwater pumps and heat removal via the steam dumps to the main condenser. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the main feedwater regulating valve closure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The '2C' steam generator feedwater regulating valve failed closed for an unknown reason, this led to low level in the steam generator causing a reactor trip. The plant's system responded as designed and all control rods fully inserted. The steam generator power operated relief valves opened momentarily then fully shut. The plant is presently stable in Hot Standby with feed from the auxiliary feedwater pumps and heat removal via the steam dumps to the main condenser. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the main feedwater regulating valve closure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.