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Event Notification Report for July 17, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/16/2000 - 07/17/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
37170371713717237173

Power Reactor
Event Number: 37170
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KERRY ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/17/2000
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2000
Event Time: 13:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GREGORY CRANSTON (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- LICENSEE NOTIFIED NY STATE DEC OF FAILURE OF PLANT FISH DETERRENT SYSTEM -

AT 1310 ON 07/17/00, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LICENSEE'S STATE POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE PLANT INTAKE STRUCTURE FISH DETERRENT SYSTEM. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE AND DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 37171
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1     State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOE GIOFFRE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/17/2000
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2000
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GREGORY CRANSTON (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- LICENSEE NOTIFIED MD DOE OF COLIFORM FOUND IN PLANT DOMESTIC WATER SAMPLES -

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT (DOE) THAT THE LICENSEE HAD OBTAINED POSITIVE COLIFORM RESULTS IN PLANT DOMESTIC WATER SAMPLES DRAWN ON 07/10/00. THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING THE SOURCE OF THE COLIFORM AND TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37172
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/17/2000
Notification Time: 23:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2000
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -

At 1320 on 07/17/00, it was discovered that an NCSA spacing control was lost in a compressor seal can storage area in the X-330 building. It was identified that two groups of seal cans were not spaced in accordance with control #8 of NCSA-0330_003.A02. The NCSA requires that groups of up to 50 seal cans be spaced a minimum of 48 inches edge-to-edge. One group of 48 and one group of 11 seal cans were discovered spaced 38 inches edge-to-edge in the X-330 building cold recovery seal storage area,

This event resulted in a loss of one control (interaction/spacing) of the double criticality control principle. NCS mass control was maintained for the affected seal groups throughout this event.

NCSA-0330_003.A02 compliance was restored at 1705 at which time the seal can groups were properly spaced under NCS Engineering guidance.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:

The safety significance of this even is low. NCSE-0330_003.101 states: "If two groups of fifty seals are not spaced as required, the mass of uranium is estimated to be 3500 grams uranium or 525 grams of U-235. This amount of uranium is a factor of 2.2 less than the minimum critical mass and is therefore subcritical. Also since the seal sets are placed in cylindrical cans approximately 19 inches in diameter and 9.5 inches tall and limited to a stack not greater than six high, the material is not in its optimum geometry. Therefore, even if two groups of fifty seals are placed together or if spacing is not maintained while placing the seal groups in place, criticality will not result since greater than the allowable mass would have to be present also."

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:

For a criticality to occur, the spacing would have to be violated and the controls on mass would also need to be violated.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):

The controlled parameters in this case are interaction and mass.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):

The maximum amount of uranium in the 59 seal cans involved is estimated to be 2055 grams uranium or 309.7 grams of U-235. The maximum enrichment assumed in the analysis is 15% U-235 and the form of the material is dry UO2F2.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

The NCS interaction control was lost in this case. The seal can group was required to be spaced 48 inches edge-to-edge and was found to be spaced only 38 inches edge-to-edge.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

The NCS interaction control was reestablished at 1705 when the proper spacing for the seal can groups was restored.

The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative were notified of this event.

PTS-2000-03533 PR-PTS-00-065


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37173
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/17/2000
Notification Time: 23:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2000
Event Time: 13:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -

At 1335 on 07/17/00, it was discovered that an NCSA mass control was lost in a compressor seal can storage area in the X-330 building. Two seal cans were identified to contain more items than specifically permitted by NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 which states: "Only one seal set shall be in each seal can." One seal can was discovered to contain two seal sets and a second seal can was discovered to contain one seal with several (3 or 4) additional seal parts. This deficiency was discovered during recovery activities for NCS event report PTS-00-065 (NRC Event Number #37172) involving a spacing violation of NCSA-0330_003.A02, requirement #8.

This event resulted in the loss of one control (mass) of the double criticality control principle. NCS interaction and enrichment control was maintained throughout this event.

NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 compliance was restored at 1415 when the extra seal and seal parts were stored individually in seal cans under NCS Engineering guidance. Complete compliance with NCSA-0330_003.A02 (refer to NCS event #PTS-00-065) was established at 1705.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:

The safety significance of this event is low. NCSE-0330_003.101 analyzes greater than safe mass in a group of seal cans. In this analysis it states that with an enrichment limit of 15% U-235, the amount of uranium in a seal can would have to be exceeded by 4.6 times the normal amount to reach the minimum critical mass. In this event two seal cans were found to be double loaded. Assuming that both overloaded seal cans were next to each other, the mass in the cans is less than the minimum critical mass. Note: these cans were found because the group they were in was being moved to correct a spacing violation between two other seal can groups. The overloaded seal cans were not directly involved in the spacing violation.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:

For a criticality to occur, the seal cans would have to have more than a double batch and the enrichment exceed 15% U-235.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, (GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):

The controlled parameters in this case are mass, enrichment and interaction.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):

The total amount of uranium in the 47 seal cans involved (including the two overloaded cans) is estimated to be 1715 grams uranium or 257.3 grams of U-235. The maximum enrichment for this NCSA is limited to 15% U-235 and the form of the material is dry UO2F2.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

The NCS mass control was lost in this case. Only one seal is allowed to be placed In a seal can.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

At 1415, NCSA-0330_ 003.A02 compliance was restored. The extra seal parts were removed and stored individually in separate seal storage cans.

The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative were notified of this event.

PTS-2000-03534 PR-PTS-00-066

* * * UPDATE AT 1252 ON 8/2/00, BY SISLER RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

On 8/2/00 at 0035 hours maintenance personnel performing walkdown verifications for NRC Event PTS-00-066 discovered a seal can containing several pieces of seals that were more than volume of one seal. Compliance was re-established at 0250hrs under NCS Engineering guidance. The various seal parts were separated into three seal cans and properly stored per the NCSA. At the time of this Update, a 100% Walkdown of all Seal Cans in storage is in progress.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The operations center notified the RDO(Creed); EO (Hickey)

* * * UPDATE ON 8/16/00 @ 0756 BY VANDERPOOL TO GOULD * * *

On 8/15/00 @ 2150 hours maintenance personnel performing walkdown verification for NRC Event PTS.00-066 discovered a seal can containing several pieces of seals that involved more volume than that of one seal. Compliance was re-established at 0032 hours on 08/16/00 under NCS Engineering guidance. The various seal parts were separated into the appropriate seal cans and properly stored per the NCSA. At the time of this update, a 100% walkdown of all seal cans In storage Is in progress.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with the DOE Representative.

The Reg 3 RDO(Jacobson) and NMSS EO(Piccone) were notified.