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Event Notification Report for July 11, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/10/2000 - 07/11/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
37163371643716137162

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37163
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/11/2000
Notification Time: 21:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2000
Event Time: 19:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/24/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNIT OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS DUE TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE

"At approximately 1610 on 7/11/2000, it was identified by plant walkdown that in electrical switchgear Bus 142Y (1AP06B) cubicle 4 (for the Unit 1 B Residual Heat Removal pump) that an unsealed borehole of approximately three (3) inches in diameter existed. This borehole is located in the floor separating the Unit 1 Division 2 Switchgear room from the Unit 1 Division 1 switchgear room. The borehole is located in a three (3) hour rated fire barrier that is required by Administrative Technical Requirement 3/4.7.6 (Fire Rated Assemblies). This has been considered an event that is outside the design basis due to required design basis protective features for safe shutdown trains as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and Final Safety Analysis Report [being] lacking. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been established per Administrative Technical Specifications and plans for repairs are in progress."

The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE 1155 7/12/00 FROM ROCKY HASTY TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *

"Additionally, on 7/7/2000, another unsealed borehole of 2.75 inches in diameter was identified in non-safety Switchgear bus 152 (1AP02B) cubicle 4. Both boreholes are located in the floor separating the Unit 1 Division 1 switchgear room from the Unit 1 Division 2 Switchgear room. Both boreholes are in a three (3) hour rated fire barrier that is required by Administrative Technical Requirement 3/4.7.6 (Fire Rated Assemblies). This has been considered an event that is outside the design basis due to required design basis protective features for safe shutdown trains as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [being] lacking."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO (Jorgensen).

* * * RETRACTED ON 7/24/00 AT 1617 EDT BY JOHN REIS TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"...The preliminary evaluation could not determine whether or not the two unsealed penetrations in the three-hour fire barrier between the Unit 1 Division 1 switchgear room and the Unit 1 Division 2 switchgear room would cause failure of both electrical divisions during a fire in either division switchgear room. Should such a fire cause division failure in both switchgear rooms, the station would be outside the safe shutdown analysis performed to meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix R as described in the LaSalle County Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The NRC event number was 37163.

"The investigation has determined that LaSalle County Station Unit 1 was operating within the plant design basis while operating Unit 1 with two unsealed openings in the fire barrier assembly separating the Division 1 and Division 2 Switchgear Rooms.

"A fire evaluation has been performed that concludes that Unit 1 could have been safely shutdown following a design basis fire in either Switchgear Room based on the fire loading in the rooms, the design of the switchgear, the type of electrical cables, fire detection and the fire brigade. Therefore, LaSalle County Station was operating within plant design basis when operating Unit 1 with the condition described above. Extent of condition evaluation/walkdowns have not identified any 10 CFR 50 Appendix R deficiencies. Unit 2 remains unaffected.

"Therefore it has been determined that this event is not reportable to the NRC, and this event notification is being
retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Michael Parker).


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37164
Rep Org: LAW ENG. AND ENV. SERVICES
Licensee: LAW ENG. AND ENV. SERVICES
Region: 2
City: ALPHERETTA   State: GA
County:
License #: 45-21498-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID RUMWILL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/12/2000
Notification Time: 12:39 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
DONALD COOL (NMSS)
Event Text
MISSING MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

The licensee reported that a Troxler Model 3411 nuclear moisture/density gauge containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be (S/N 18561) was missing from the Sterling, VA area. A company employee, who resides in West Virginia, was scheduled to bring the gauge to a job site in the northern VA area on 7/11/2000, but failed to show up. Neither the individual, the company vehicle that he was using, nor the gauge can be located. The company last had contact with the employee on 7/7/2000. The licensee did not believe that the individual was a disgruntled employee. The licensee has contacted local law enforcement agencies regarding the missing individual and gauge.

***** UPDATE AT 1820 ON 08/19/00 BY LEIGH TROCINE *****

The following text is a portion of Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence PNO-II-00-027A dated 08/18/00:

"On July 12, 2000, the licensee informed the [NRC] Region II office of a missing Troxler Electronic Laboratories Model 3411 portable gauge. The licensee recovered the portable gauge, vehicle[,] and other stolen equipment on August 15, 2000. The radioactive sources in the gauge have been tested for potential leakage and contamination of radioactive material. There was no evidence of leakage or contamination."

"This information is current as of 1045 on August 18, 2000."

"The Commonwealth of Virginia and State of West Virginia have been notified [by Region II personnel.]

The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Fredrickson) and NMSS EO (Ting).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 37161
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2     State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRANFORD STANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/11/2000
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2000
Event Time: 16:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

A licensed operator tested positive for illegal drug use during a random test administered on 6/29/00. The individual's site access has been suspended. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37162
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/11/2000
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2000
Event Time: 09:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
FREDRICK STURZ (NMSS)
Event Text
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT

"NCSA-PLANT-012 (Favorable Geometry Vacuum Cleaner) Control number 3 requires a steel liner to be used in an F-can when enrichment is known or expected to exceed >80%. At 0945 on 7/11/00, it was discovered that the steel liner was constructed of expanded metal (grating), therefore the liner would not perform its intended function as described in the associated NCSE. The intended function is to reduce the internal diameter of the F-can to less than five inches. The affected F-cans were verified to contain less than the safe mass of U-235. The NCSA is deficient since it references a drawing of a liner that cannot perform its intended function.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

Safety significance is low because the highest mass in any F-can on site with greater than 80% enrichment material is 304 grams U-235 and the USEC site limit for >20% enrichment material is 1000 grams U-235. The mass in the F-cans and the site limit are well below the contingency limit for not using an F-can liner(2500 grams U-235 at 80% enrichment) and current NCSA-PLANT-012 operations are below 80% enrichment, in the unlikely event that 2500 grams of high enriched U-235 was present in the F can, an additional event, such as the presence of full reflection or spacing violation would be required before obtaining a critical configuration

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):

"A critical configuration would require an F-can to be used to collect 80% or greater enriched material that exceeded 2500 grams. In the unlikely event of exceeding 2500 grams of 80% enriched material in the F-can, an additional unlikely event, such as the F-can being exposed to full water reflection or a spacing violation would have [been] necessary before a critical configuration existed. The probability of all of these conditions existing simultaneously is very low.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

"Volume, geometry, moderation and interaction are controlled. Geometry control could have been lost since the referenced drawing for the liner does not meet the geometry requirements of the NCSE. Full reflection or an interaction violation is required before a criticality configuration could exist.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):

"The highest mass in any F-can with greater than 80% enriched material on site is 304 grams U-235. Since this is 87% of safe mass, the safety significance is low.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

"The NCS control system is deficient since the NCSA references a steel liner in a drawing that does not perform its intended function of reducing the F-can liner diameter to 5 inches or less. The safety significance is low since the mass in F-cans is low and an additional event such as full reflection or a spacing violation would have to accompany an excessive F-can mass before a criticality would be possible.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

"A stop work notice was issued for favorable geometry vacuum cleaners when enrichment is known or suspected to exceed 80%."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.