Event Notification Report for June 28, 2000

PLANT FOUND TO BE IN A CONDITION OUTSIDE OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

"On June 28, 2000, at 1653 hours, it was determined that Containment Penetration M-85 was not properly isolated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.

"On December 25, 1999, the 2A RCS Hot Leg Primary Sampling system Inside Containment Isolation Valve FV-4454 was declared inoperable and was deenergized in the closed position to comply with Technical Specification 3.6.3 Action b.

"In order to perform a stroke test on valve FV-4454, on June 12, 2000, at 1246 hours, the associated Outside
Containment Isolation Valve FV-4456 was deenergized in the closed position to comply with Technical
Specification 3.6.3 Action b, and subsequently on June 13, 2000, at 1012 hours, the equipment clearance order for FV-4454 was lifted and the valve was energized. However, the associated Post Accident Sampling System Outside Containment Isolation Valve FV-2455/2455A for Penetration M-85 was not deactivated in the closed position as required.

"This condition was discovered on June 28, 2000, at 1653 hours, during testing and valve line-up verification on the Post Accident Sampling System. Although not deenergized, valve FV-2455/2455A is a normally closed valve and flow through the penetration has occurred briefly during Post Accident Sampling System testing.

"On June 28, 2000, at 1700 hours, Inside Containment Isolation Valve FV-4454 was deenergized in the closed
position in order to restore compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.3 Action b.

"This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-80 Condition 2.G for operation or condition
prohibited by Technical Specifications."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

SOURCE RECEIVED WITH SURFACE CONTAMINATION

The licensee reported that a gauge containing a 40 mCi Fe-55 source (S/N 6674LG) was received with surface contamination (based upon wipe samples) calculated to be 1.37 µCi. The licensee reported that no contamination was detected on the outside of the shipping package. The source had been shipped to the licensee from AK Steel in Ashland, KY. The licensee has contacted the shipper.

UNIT 2 COMMENCED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AFTER TWO IRPIs IN THE SAME GROUP WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE

The following information was received by fax:

Notification time: 2231 hrs EDT 6-28-00
Event Notification No.: 37129
NRC Contact: Steve Sandin
Cook Caller: SJ Cherba
Power Level Prior to event: 79.6%

Notification Script:

This is Steve Cherba at the Cook Unit 2 Nuclear Plant making a one hour, non-emergency notification for initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A). The shutdown was initiated to comply with TS 3.0.3 @ 2224 hrs EDT on 6-28-00. The TS 3.0.3 one hour limit for initiating a shutdown would have expired @ 2228 hrs EDT on 6-28-00. TS 3.0.3 was entered when it was discovered that the unit had two Individual Rod Position Indicators (IRPIs ) in one group that were INOPERABLE, exceeding the allowable actions of TS 3.1.3.2 a., which only allows a maximum of one INOPERABLE IRPI per rod group. These IRPIs became INOPERABLE when, without any associated rod movement, the indicated rod position drifted above the allowable rod deviation limit. Instrument technicians are in the process of calibrating these IRPIs and we expect to exit this situation within two hours without completing the shutdown.

The control rod IRPIs were H12 & M8, both associated with Control Bank D, Group 2.

Post Script to this notification:

The two IRPIs were calibrated for drift caused by the RCS temperature increase associated with the unit power increase following the outage and are within allowable limits and OPERABLE @ 2250 hrs EDT 6-28-00. The shutdown was halted and power stabilized @ 2250 hrs EDT 6-28-00. NRC resident personnel were informed of the condition and shutdown at 2230 hrs EDT ( J Maynen) & 2240 hrs EDT ( B Bartlett). Power Level when shutdown stopped: 78.9%.

ALERT DECLARED - OFFSITE FIRE

RANGE FIRE ON AND ADJACENT TO THE HANFORD NUCLEAR RESERVATION HAS PROMPTED BENTON COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, TO REQUIRE A PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF THE HORN RAPIDS TRIANGLE INDUSTRIAL AREA IN WHICH THE SIEMENS FUEL FABRICATION PLANT IS LOCATED. THE PLANT PRODUCTION HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN. ESSENTIAL PLANT PERSONNEL ARE ONSITE. BASED ON DISTANCE AND CURRENT WIND DIRECTION, THE PLANT IS NOT THREATENED.

* * * UPDATE AT 0451 ON 6/29/00 BY PROBASCO, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

THE ALERT WAS TERMINATED AT 0150 PDT BECAUSE THE FIRE HAS MOVED FURTHER AWAY FROM THE SITE AND IS CONTINUING TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION.

NRC NOTIFIED RDO (GOOD); EO (HICKEY); IRO (MILLER); FEMA (STEINDURF); DOE (STAMBAUGH); NRC (TURMAN)

BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT

Loss of one of two criticality controls was lost in Drum Room of the C-331 building. The controlled parameter is moderation. The temperature control was lost when the door to the room was left open, this allowed the room temperature to drop below the NCSA specified limit of 105 F (the lowest temperature reached was 103 F). The other controlled parameter, pressure, was maintained throughout this event.

The cause of the door being left open is under investigation. The plant notified the NRC resident inspector.

MONTHLY SIREN TEST FAILED

On 6/26/00 at 0915 EDT, the offsite emergency siren silent test failed at both the Wayne County EOC and the 911 actuation center. Upon arrival of maintenance personnel, the test was completed satisfactorily. Root cause for the test failure has not been determined.

The licensee was not notified until 1250 EDT on 6/28/00. There is an investigation in progress to determine the root cause of the test failure.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local authorities.

SECURITY REPORT

SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO PERIMETER MONITORING. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY THE SECURITY PLAN. COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOW ARE FULLY IMPLEMENTED.

THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. CONTACT THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.