Event Notification Report for June 06, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/05/2000 - 06/06/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
37060370613706237063
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37060
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN VAN SICKEL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN VAN SICKEL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/06/2000
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 02:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2000
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 02:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF WATER SEAL CAUSED BY PIPE CORROSION
"A 4 inch diameter floor drain outlet pipe inside the Standby Gas Treatment Sump was identified by Operating personnel to be corroded through near the wall of the sump. This piping is designed to act as a Secondary Containment boundary which is used to form a loop seal between the Reactor Building and the SBGT room. Normally, the piping would come out from the wall and make a 90 degree turn to near the bottom of the sump, and open under water. However, with the erosion occurring near the wall of the sump, a breech of secondary containment exists. Due to the amount of corrosion, the opening was estimated to be 12.57 square inches. Additionally, damaged seals on two other doors (#225 and #128) located on airlocks associated with Secondary Containment accounted for another 7 square inches, for a total of 19.57 square inches. Openings in excess of 12.7 square inches in this configuration have not been tested/evaluated. Therefore, Secondary Containment was considered inoperable. Operations entered Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, for Secondary Containment inoperable in Mode 1 at 0236[CDT]. Required action A.1 is to restore Secondary Containment to operable status in 4 hours.
"Operations took actions to prohibit access through the two seal damaged doors/airlocks by posting them to prevent access. Once administrative control of the doors was established, the known opening in secondary containment was reduced to the corroded pipe in the SBGT sump, or 12.57 square inches. This is less than the 12.7 square inches allowed. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, was exited at 0258[CDT]."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0903 ON 06/21/00 BY BOB NURRELL TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Upon further engineering review, the licensee has determined that during this event, secondary containment was operable based on the actual measured opening size (2.25 square inches). Therefore, since secondary containment was not inoperable, this event is not reportable under the specified criterion and no other criteria apply and thus, the licensee desires to retract this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Roger Lanksbury.
"A 4 inch diameter floor drain outlet pipe inside the Standby Gas Treatment Sump was identified by Operating personnel to be corroded through near the wall of the sump. This piping is designed to act as a Secondary Containment boundary which is used to form a loop seal between the Reactor Building and the SBGT room. Normally, the piping would come out from the wall and make a 90 degree turn to near the bottom of the sump, and open under water. However, with the erosion occurring near the wall of the sump, a breech of secondary containment exists. Due to the amount of corrosion, the opening was estimated to be 12.57 square inches. Additionally, damaged seals on two other doors (#225 and #128) located on airlocks associated with Secondary Containment accounted for another 7 square inches, for a total of 19.57 square inches. Openings in excess of 12.7 square inches in this configuration have not been tested/evaluated. Therefore, Secondary Containment was considered inoperable. Operations entered Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, for Secondary Containment inoperable in Mode 1 at 0236[CDT]. Required action A.1 is to restore Secondary Containment to operable status in 4 hours.
"Operations took actions to prohibit access through the two seal damaged doors/airlocks by posting them to prevent access. Once administrative control of the doors was established, the known opening in secondary containment was reduced to the corroded pipe in the SBGT sump, or 12.57 square inches. This is less than the 12.7 square inches allowed. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, was exited at 0258[CDT]."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0903 ON 06/21/00 BY BOB NURRELL TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Upon further engineering review, the licensee has determined that during this event, secondary containment was operable based on the actual measured opening size (2.25 square inches). Therefore, since secondary containment was not inoperable, this event is not reportable under the specified criterion and no other criteria apply and thus, the licensee desires to retract this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Roger Lanksbury.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37061
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/06/2000
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 10:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2000
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 10:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
After completion of HPCI pump surveillance testing, a check for freedom of movement and proper reset action of the overspeed trip tappet was performed. As a result of this check, an adjustment was found to be necessary for the turbine stop valve reset time. Attempts to make this adjustment resulted in inoperability of the reset function of the overspeed trip. HPCI was declared inoperable and Technical Specification limiting condition for operation 3.5E(3) was entered. HPCI will still start if called upon but if it trips on overspeed HPCI will become inoperable.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Emergency Diesel Generators, and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1252EDT ON 6/27/00 FROM DAVID HALLONQUIST TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"This notification serves as retraction of a prior 10 CFR 50.72 notification regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) operability. The original notification is NRC event report number 37061 and was reported on 6/6/00.
"At that time, during routine surveillance testing, it was discovered that the HPCI over-speed trip did not reset without additional operator action. The event was reported because the cause for the failure to reset had not been determined and, therefore, it was not known whether the condition could have challenged HPCI ability to perform its intended function.
"Subsequent engineering review identified that the failure to automatically reset had been caused by inappropriate test methods. It was also determined that the over-speed trip reset concern would not have affected HPCI system ability to meet its design function for high pressure injection.
"In addition, the HPCI over-speed reset is NOT a safety function of the VY safety system. As addressed in the VY licensing basis, the reset is required if the HPCI system had already malfunctioned. The identified condition, therefore, would not have impacted system operability.
"Based on the above, the 50.72 notification is retracted."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Morris).
After completion of HPCI pump surveillance testing, a check for freedom of movement and proper reset action of the overspeed trip tappet was performed. As a result of this check, an adjustment was found to be necessary for the turbine stop valve reset time. Attempts to make this adjustment resulted in inoperability of the reset function of the overspeed trip. HPCI was declared inoperable and Technical Specification limiting condition for operation 3.5E(3) was entered. HPCI will still start if called upon but if it trips on overspeed HPCI will become inoperable.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Emergency Diesel Generators, and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 1252EDT ON 6/27/00 FROM DAVID HALLONQUIST TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"This notification serves as retraction of a prior 10 CFR 50.72 notification regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) operability. The original notification is NRC event report number 37061 and was reported on 6/6/00.
"At that time, during routine surveillance testing, it was discovered that the HPCI over-speed trip did not reset without additional operator action. The event was reported because the cause for the failure to reset had not been determined and, therefore, it was not known whether the condition could have challenged HPCI ability to perform its intended function.
"Subsequent engineering review identified that the failure to automatically reset had been caused by inappropriate test methods. It was also determined that the over-speed trip reset concern would not have affected HPCI system ability to meet its design function for high pressure injection.
"In addition, the HPCI over-speed reset is NOT a safety function of the VY safety system. As addressed in the VY licensing basis, the reset is required if the HPCI system had already malfunctioned. The identified condition, therefore, would not have impacted system operability.
"Based on the above, the 50.72 notification is retracted."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Morris).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37062
Rep Org: SOUTH COAST MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: SOUTH COAST MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: LAGUNA BEACH State: CA
County:
License #: 0920-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSE BRUNO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: SOUTH COAST MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: LAGUNA BEACH State: CA
County:
License #: 0920-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSE BRUNO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/06/2000
Notification Time: 19:04 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2000
Notification Time: 19:04 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
WIPE TEST OF PACKAGE EXTERIOR RESULTED IN A COUNT LEVEL OF 4442 DPM
A package containing technetium - 99m (NaTcO4) delivered by NYCOMED Amersham to South Coast Medical Center was found to have surface contamination level above the 2.2 DPM per square centimeter limit. The wipe of the outer surface of the package (metal canister) was placed in a well counter and the counter indicated the that total count on the wipe was 4442 +/-149 DPM. The outer dimensions of the metal canister are 15 centimeters by 25 centimeters by 29 centimeters. The licensee will contact NYCOMED Amersham located in Anaheim, CA, and ask them to pickup the package. The package was not opened. Activity of the technetium-99m (NaTcO4) was originally 25 millicuries and the quantity is 2.4838 milliliters.
* * * RETRACTION ON 06/07/00 AT 1152 ET BY JOSE BRUNO TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
The licensee is retracting this event because the surface contamination of the metal container in DPM per square centimeter is below the reportable limit of 2.2 DPM per square centimeter. The surface area of the metal container was 2990 square centimeters and the count of the wipe was 4442 DPM. Therefore the average surface contamination per square centimeter is 1.49 DPM which is below the reportable limit of 2.2 DPM per square centimeter. NMSS EO (Josie Piccone) & R4DO (John Pellet) notified.
A package containing technetium - 99m (NaTcO4) delivered by NYCOMED Amersham to South Coast Medical Center was found to have surface contamination level above the 2.2 DPM per square centimeter limit. The wipe of the outer surface of the package (metal canister) was placed in a well counter and the counter indicated the that total count on the wipe was 4442 +/-149 DPM. The outer dimensions of the metal canister are 15 centimeters by 25 centimeters by 29 centimeters. The licensee will contact NYCOMED Amersham located in Anaheim, CA, and ask them to pickup the package. The package was not opened. Activity of the technetium-99m (NaTcO4) was originally 25 millicuries and the quantity is 2.4838 milliliters.
* * * RETRACTION ON 06/07/00 AT 1152 ET BY JOSE BRUNO TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
The licensee is retracting this event because the surface contamination of the metal container in DPM per square centimeter is below the reportable limit of 2.2 DPM per square centimeter. The surface area of the metal container was 2990 square centimeters and the count of the wipe was 4442 DPM. Therefore the average surface contamination per square centimeter is 1.49 DPM which is below the reportable limit of 2.2 DPM per square centimeter. NMSS EO (Josie Piccone) & R4DO (John Pellet) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37063
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RUITER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RUITER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/07/2000
Notification Time: 01:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 23:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2000
Notification Time: 01:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2000
Event Time: 23:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 35 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
PLANT HAD A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM 35% POWER.
At 2243 on 06/06/2000 an alarm for high reactor coolant pump "A" bearing water temperature came in on the plant process computer. At 2310 the reactor coolant pump "A" bearing water temperature exceeded 225°F and a manual reactor trip was initiated and the "A" reactor coolant pump was secured. Following the reactor trip all three auxiliary feed water pumps started and equipment response was as expected. All rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. Currently the turbine driven aux feed is secured, but the motor driven aux feed is still operating. They are investigating if the cause was a temperature indicating problem or a bearing failure.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
At 2243 on 06/06/2000 an alarm for high reactor coolant pump "A" bearing water temperature came in on the plant process computer. At 2310 the reactor coolant pump "A" bearing water temperature exceeded 225°F and a manual reactor trip was initiated and the "A" reactor coolant pump was secured. Following the reactor trip all three auxiliary feed water pumps started and equipment response was as expected. All rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. Currently the turbine driven aux feed is secured, but the motor driven aux feed is still operating. They are investigating if the cause was a temperature indicating problem or a bearing failure.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.