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Event Notification Report for June 05, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/04/2000 - 06/05/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
37058370593705737092

Power Reactor
Event Number: 37058
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CECIL H. WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/05/2000
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2000
Event Time: 11:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING.

AT 1140 EDT the Unit One Control Room crew received a trouble alarm on Steam Generator Loop 4 Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). The operators observed no light indication on the MSIV, a decreasing level in the Steam Generator, a large decrease in indicated steam flow, and control rods began inserting. The Shift Superintendent directed that the reactor be manually tripped. The reactor was manually tripped and all systems functioned as required with the exception of a non-1E 4160 V bus (loss steam dump bypass control panel open/close indication) , which failed to auto transfer to it's startup power source. Auxiliary Feedwater System (both motor and the turbine driven pumps) actuated as expected on Steam Generator Lo-Lo levels.

The Control Room crew has exited the Emergency Operating Procedures and the unit is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure.

The 4160 V breaker which failed to close was racked out of it's cubicle, inspected and racked back into it's operating position, after which it was successfully closed by the Control room crew. This reenergized the
non-1E 4160V bus and its associated loads.

Investigation into the cause of the MSIV closure is ongoing. An Event Review Team is being formed, and a restart date will be decided upon following management review of the results of their investigation.

Steam Generator Atmospheric valve controller was reduced to its lowest setpoint and maintained the Reactor Coolant System at its Tave no load condition (Steam Generator 1 & 4 Atmospheric valves opened/closed a few times). The Steam Dump Bypass Control System was fully operable and operated properly. Approximately one hour after the event non-1E 4160V bus was re-energized.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 37059
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: K. PHILLIPS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/05/2000
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2000
Event Time: 12:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL


Automatic reactor trip from 100% power due to a feedwater transient caused by a loss of control power to 2B main feedwater pump. The feedwater transient resulted in a 2B steam generator high-high setpoint being reached which tripped both main feedwater pumps, caused a feedwater isolation signal, and tripped the main turbine which caused the reactor trip. All rods fully inserted into the core. Steam generators levels are being maintained at normal level with auxiliary feedwater at this time. The loss of control power has been attributed to water intrusion into the 2B feedwater pump control panel from extremely heavy rains and roof repairs being in progress.

All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable an Unit 1 was not affected by Unit 2's reactor trip.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37057
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEITH VANDERPOOL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/05/2000
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2000
Event Time: 09:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
Event Text
4 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING LOSS OF 2 CONTROLS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY

ON 6/5/00 AT 0927 HOURS PLANT PERSONNEL WERE REMOVING INSULATION FROM THE X-705 PROCESS PIPING WHEN THEY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF A FAILURE OF THE INTEGRITY OF SAID PIPING (material residue visible on the insulation). THIS FAILURE VIOLATES NCSA-0705_076 WHICH TAKES CREDIT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS PIPING, THUS CONSTITUTING A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL. THE FACT THAT THE ENCAPSULATING INSULATION PHYSICALLY CAPTURED THE LEAKING MATERIAL MEETS THE DEFINITION FOR AN INADVERTENT CONTAINER THUS CONSTITUTING A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL AS DESCRIBED BY NCSA-0705_076 WHICH TAKES CREDIT FOR COVERING, MODIFICATION OR ELEVATION OF ABSORBENT MATERIALS TO PREVENT THE COLLECTION OF URANIUM BEARING LIQUID IN AN INADVERTENT CONTAINER.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT THE TOTAL VOLUME OF MATERIAL INVOLVED WAS GREATER THAN THE ALLOWED SAFE VOLUME (4.8 Liters ) CREDITED IN THE EVALUATION FOR ENSURING DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. BASED ON VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE MATERIAL PRESENT IN/ON THE INSULATION, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIAL IS LESS THAN 350 GRAMS. MORE RELIABLE ANALYSIS IS CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED FOR MORE PRECISE DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL. SINCE THE FAILURE TIME OF THE PROCESS PIPING IS UNKNOWN, THE ENRICHMENT PERCENTAGE OF THE MATERIAL COULD BE (worst case) 100% wt. U-235. THE MATERIAL PROCESSED IN THE X-705 RECOVERY AREA PRIMARILY INVOLVES URANYL NITRATE, ALTHOUGH SOME URANYL FLUORIDE MAY BE PRESENT.

THE PSS HAS SUSPENDED ALL WORK/PROCESS EVOLUTIONS IN THE AFFECTED AREA PENDING INVESTIGATION. CONTROLS WERE RE-ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY STAFF AT 1156 HOURS THIS DATE.

Safety Significance of Events:

On June 5, 2000, it was discovered that the insulation around the A loop density pot was contaminated by uranium-bearing material. This insulation was approximately 1 to 3 inches in thickness and constructed out of an absorbent material. The density pot is 4-inch schedule 40 piping located below the A loop evaporator and is approximately
24-inches in length. Clamp-on density transmitters are used for density control in the uranium-bearing feed solution to the extractor/strippers. After removal from the density pot, the insulation was observed to be coated with a yellowish material, which, based on high count readings, appears to be uranium-bearing. The material appeared dry in nature. It is not clear when the material accumulated on/in the insulation or how much was present during that accumulation. This insulation represents a violation of NCSA-0705_076 in that the absorbent material (i.e., the insulation) was not covered or modified properly.

In addition, there is a potential loss of control in the failure of the nearby system integrity. It is not clear when or exactly how the uranium-bearing material was transported such that it accumulated on/in the insulation. It should be noted that it is not clear whether or not the total volume of material involved (i.e., which could /did accumulate on/in the insulation) was greater than the allowed (i.e., safe) volume credited in the evaluation for ensuring double contingency. Thus, while the anomalous condition is being treated as a loss of both controls the most likely scenario is that the material involved less than a safe amount of material and so the safety significance of this event is low.

2. Potential Criticality Pathways Involved;

If a sufficient amount of uranium-bearing material had accumulated on/in the insulation, an unsafe geometry could have resulted and if the leaking solution had contained a sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting configuration could have been sufficient for a criticality to occur. It should be noted that the allowed safe geometry and volume limits established in NCSA-0705_076 are based on optimally moderated, UO2F2 and water solution which contains uranium enriched to 100 wt%.

3. Controlled Parameters:

The parameter which was violated during this upset was the geometry of potential accumulation present on/in the insulation. In addition, the physical integrity of nearby piping was violated at some point in the past. As stated previously, the total amount of solution involved (i.e., the volume of solution which leaked onto the insulation and resulted in the uranium-bearing material being deposited on/in the insulation) is unknown, so it is conservatively being evaluated as though the volume was greater than the safe volume allowed. This represents the failure of both controls relied upon for ensuring double contingency.

4 Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material:

Based on visual inspection of the material present on/in the insulation, it is estimated that the total amount of uranium-bearing material is less than 350 grams. More reliable analysis is currently being performed for a more precise determination of the amount of material. Since the failure time is unknown, the enrichment of the material could be up to 100 wt% U-235. The material processed in the X-705 recovery primarily involves uranyl nitrates (U02(N03)2) , although some uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) may also be present.

5. Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or control system(s) and description of the failures or deficiencies:

NCSA-0705_076.A00 takes credit for the physical integrity of systems which contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe volume/geometry containers (including absorbent materials like the insulation) are either modified, covered, or oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration from resulting in the event of a leak. The absorbent material was not modified, covered, or oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration. In addition, there is evidence that at some time in the past a loss of nearby system integrity occurred such that the insulation was exposed to an uranium-bearing solution.

6. Corrective Actions to Restore Safety System and when each was Implemented:

Under the direction of the nuclear criticality safety staff NCSA controls were re-established at 1156 hours, with all maintenance work and process evolutions suspended pending the ongoing investigation by facility management and nuclear criticality safety staff personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 37092
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: LOGAN   State: UT
County:
License #: UT0300159
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE FELICE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/16/2000
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2000
Event Time: 15:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A LEAKING NI-63 SOURCE

While performing a routine wipe test on 3/9/2000 of a Varian Gas Chromatograph Detector Cell at the Utah State University in Logan, UT, leakage from the 8 mCi Ni-63 source was detected. Accelerated leakage tests were ordered to monitor the source. On 6/5/2000 the test results indicated 0.02 µCi which exceeded the reportability criteria of >0.005 µCi. The room and surrounding area was surveyed, with the results indicating no contamination. The source was removed from service and will be returned to the vendor for repair or replacement. The instrument is model # 02001972-00, serial # A8615. Utah has assigned incident # UT-00-0003.