Event Notification Report for May 31, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/30/2000 - 05/31/2000
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 37046
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: COVEYOU
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: COVEYOU
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/31/2000
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2000
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2000
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2000
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
PLANT ENTERED A 7 DAY LCO DUE TO HPCS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.
While performing monthly surveillance start LOS-DG-M3, for the High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) systems Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on an over-speed signal. The Diesel was being started from an idle condition while an operator was attempting to maintain speed between 400 and 500 rpm. The Diesel does not appear to have been damaged but remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure. The High-Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and corrective actions will be performed.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 2211 ON 06/01/00 BY SHANE MARIK TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The licensee investigation has determined that the cause of the event was due to operator overcompensation of the engine governor during the start that resulted in the EDG accelerating to the overspeed setpoint and tripping on overspeed. The operator performing the slow (idle) start in accordance with the monthly Technical
Specification surveillance procedure was a trainee under supervision by a qualified operator. The EDG was already inoperable for the performance of the monthly surveillance test that verifies operability of the EDG to start and carry full load for at least 60 minutes. During inspection, no mechanical or electrical malfunctions were
found associated with governor settings, the start circuitry, the engine fuel racks, or fuel injector linkages. The fuel rack and associated fuel injector linkages were then verified to have freedom of movement without binding. A subsequent fast start was performed (same as an automatic start) that verified that the EDG did not have a malfunction that would cause it to trip on overspeed. The EDG would have satisfied its intended safety function when in standby (no operator interface is required for the governor/fuel rack control. except for surveillance testing). Therefore, the overspeed trip of the High Pressure Core Spray System EDG is not reportable as a
condition that alone could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
Since the failure occurred after the EDG was inoperable due to not being lined up for standby operation (removed from service as part of a planned evolution in accordance with an approved procedure), the start was a slow start controlled by an operator and restoration of the EDG was less than 12 hours and well within the 14 day Technical Specification allowed outage time. The licensee has determined that this event is not reportable to the NRC, and desires to retract this event notification.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen.
While performing monthly surveillance start LOS-DG-M3, for the High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) systems Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on an over-speed signal. The Diesel was being started from an idle condition while an operator was attempting to maintain speed between 400 and 500 rpm. The Diesel does not appear to have been damaged but remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure. The High-Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and corrective actions will be performed.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 2211 ON 06/01/00 BY SHANE MARIK TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The licensee investigation has determined that the cause of the event was due to operator overcompensation of the engine governor during the start that resulted in the EDG accelerating to the overspeed setpoint and tripping on overspeed. The operator performing the slow (idle) start in accordance with the monthly Technical
Specification surveillance procedure was a trainee under supervision by a qualified operator. The EDG was already inoperable for the performance of the monthly surveillance test that verifies operability of the EDG to start and carry full load for at least 60 minutes. During inspection, no mechanical or electrical malfunctions were
found associated with governor settings, the start circuitry, the engine fuel racks, or fuel injector linkages. The fuel rack and associated fuel injector linkages were then verified to have freedom of movement without binding. A subsequent fast start was performed (same as an automatic start) that verified that the EDG did not have a malfunction that would cause it to trip on overspeed. The EDG would have satisfied its intended safety function when in standby (no operator interface is required for the governor/fuel rack control. except for surveillance testing). Therefore, the overspeed trip of the High Pressure Core Spray System EDG is not reportable as a
condition that alone could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
Since the failure occurred after the EDG was inoperable due to not being lined up for standby operation (removed from service as part of a planned evolution in accordance with an approved procedure), the start was a slow start controlled by an operator and restoration of the EDG was less than 12 hours and well within the 14 day Technical Specification allowed outage time. The licensee has determined that this event is not reportable to the NRC, and desires to retract this event notification.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 37047
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/01/2000
Notification Time: 09:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2000
Notification Time: 09:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
CATEGORY 1 AND CATEGORY 2 MATERIAL FOUND WITHIN 2 FEET OF EACH OTHER
NRC Bulletin 91-01 24 hour notification
On May 31, 2000, PORTS plant personnel discovered NCSA-PLANT048 non-compliance during the monthly Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) walk through. Category 1 contaminated metal was discovered in close proximity (less than 2 feet) to Category 2 contaminated metal. Category 1 contaminated metal is defined as items that have no visible uranium on them, items only contaminated with non-fissile radiological isotopes, items from a non-fissile material operation or items with hidden cavities from non-fissile material operations. Category 2 contaminated metal is defined as an item that has a hidden cavity with potential for significant uranium material in the cavity. This was a violation of NCSA-PLANT048 requirement # 2 which states, "Category 2 contaminated metal shall not be stored in a Category 1 contaminated metal storage area". This constituted the loss of one control (spacing) of the double contingency principle. The first control (that of not storing Category 2 Items with Category 1) was lost. The second control (that of categorizing the Category 1 metal Items correctly, mass control) was maintained throughout this event. This condition was corrected under NCS Engineering guidance and compliance re-established at 1205 hours.
The monthly NCS walk through also identified a NCSA-PLANT048 administrative noncompliance. NCSA-PLANT048 "Contaminated Metal" requires that a sign be posted for Category 2 contaminated metal storage areas. The converters stored outside of the X-700 building meet the requirements of Category 2 contaminated metal but the area was not posted. Temporary signs were posted to re-establish compliance with NCSA-PLANT048.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
This event has low safety significance. The six converters on the west side of X-700 contain less than a safe mass at the indicated enrichment. There were no visible uranium compounds on the Category 1 contaminated metal that was stored In close proximity to the converters. Since there was no visible uranium on the Category 1 metal, there was no additional risk of a criticality occurring. NCSE-PLANT048.E04 documents that Category 1 contaminated metal can have at most 24.2 grams 235U per 2,500 square feet of metal surface. In no case was more than 2500 square feet of Category 1 material found within 2 feet of the six converters.
NDA results indicate (with uncertainty applied) that the largest amount of 235U in one converter is 1099 grams at an enrichment of 2.3 wt% 235U in the form of UO2F2. At 3 wt% 235U, the estimated minimum critical mass is 3,077 grams 235U and the safe mass is 1180 grams of 235U. Assuming 25 additional grams of 235U due to the presence of the Category 1 metal, the total amount of 235U (1124 grams 235U) is still below a safe mass, for the converter unit with the highest loading.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
A 'dirty' metal item classified as Category 1 with the 'dirt' containing a large amount of enriched uranium stored with a Category 2 item such that the total uranium present exceeds a critical mass and is in the proper geometry for a criticality to occur
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The controlled parameters are the segregation (proper spacing) of Category 1 and 2 storage areas and the proper classification of the Category 1 contaminated metal items (mass control).
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT. FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
NDA results indicate (with uncertainty applied) that the largest amount of 235U in one converter is 1099 grams at an enrichment of 2.3 wt% 235U in the form of UO2F2. At 3 wt% 235U, the estimated minimum critical mass is 3,077 grams 235U due to the presence of the Category 1 metal, the total amount of 235U (1124 grams 235U) is still below a safe mass, for the converter unit with the highest loading.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first control that of not storing Category 2 items with Category 1 Items (spacing) was lost. The second control, that of categorizing the Category 1 metal items was done correctly (mass control). The Category 1 items were observed to have no visible uranium on them. Thus, the first control was lost but the second control of categorizing the Category 1 contaminated metal items was done correctly. This resulted in a lost on one control (spacing) relied on for double contingency.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At 1205 hours, under NCS engineering guidance, the Category 1 contaminated metal was spaced at least 2 feet from all Category 2 contaminated metal (converters). Signs were posted identifying the Category 2 contaminated metal storage area.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
NRC Bulletin 91-01 24 hour notification
On May 31, 2000, PORTS plant personnel discovered NCSA-PLANT048 non-compliance during the monthly Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) walk through. Category 1 contaminated metal was discovered in close proximity (less than 2 feet) to Category 2 contaminated metal. Category 1 contaminated metal is defined as items that have no visible uranium on them, items only contaminated with non-fissile radiological isotopes, items from a non-fissile material operation or items with hidden cavities from non-fissile material operations. Category 2 contaminated metal is defined as an item that has a hidden cavity with potential for significant uranium material in the cavity. This was a violation of NCSA-PLANT048 requirement # 2 which states, "Category 2 contaminated metal shall not be stored in a Category 1 contaminated metal storage area". This constituted the loss of one control (spacing) of the double contingency principle. The first control (that of not storing Category 2 Items with Category 1) was lost. The second control (that of categorizing the Category 1 metal Items correctly, mass control) was maintained throughout this event. This condition was corrected under NCS Engineering guidance and compliance re-established at 1205 hours.
The monthly NCS walk through also identified a NCSA-PLANT048 administrative noncompliance. NCSA-PLANT048 "Contaminated Metal" requires that a sign be posted for Category 2 contaminated metal storage areas. The converters stored outside of the X-700 building meet the requirements of Category 2 contaminated metal but the area was not posted. Temporary signs were posted to re-establish compliance with NCSA-PLANT048.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
This event has low safety significance. The six converters on the west side of X-700 contain less than a safe mass at the indicated enrichment. There were no visible uranium compounds on the Category 1 contaminated metal that was stored In close proximity to the converters. Since there was no visible uranium on the Category 1 metal, there was no additional risk of a criticality occurring. NCSE-PLANT048.E04 documents that Category 1 contaminated metal can have at most 24.2 grams 235U per 2,500 square feet of metal surface. In no case was more than 2500 square feet of Category 1 material found within 2 feet of the six converters.
NDA results indicate (with uncertainty applied) that the largest amount of 235U in one converter is 1099 grams at an enrichment of 2.3 wt% 235U in the form of UO2F2. At 3 wt% 235U, the estimated minimum critical mass is 3,077 grams 235U and the safe mass is 1180 grams of 235U. Assuming 25 additional grams of 235U due to the presence of the Category 1 metal, the total amount of 235U (1124 grams 235U) is still below a safe mass, for the converter unit with the highest loading.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
A 'dirty' metal item classified as Category 1 with the 'dirt' containing a large amount of enriched uranium stored with a Category 2 item such that the total uranium present exceeds a critical mass and is in the proper geometry for a criticality to occur
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The controlled parameters are the segregation (proper spacing) of Category 1 and 2 storage areas and the proper classification of the Category 1 contaminated metal items (mass control).
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT. FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
NDA results indicate (with uncertainty applied) that the largest amount of 235U in one converter is 1099 grams at an enrichment of 2.3 wt% 235U in the form of UO2F2. At 3 wt% 235U, the estimated minimum critical mass is 3,077 grams 235U due to the presence of the Category 1 metal, the total amount of 235U (1124 grams 235U) is still below a safe mass, for the converter unit with the highest loading.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first control that of not storing Category 2 items with Category 1 Items (spacing) was lost. The second control, that of categorizing the Category 1 metal items was done correctly (mass control). The Category 1 items were observed to have no visible uranium on them. Thus, the first control was lost but the second control of categorizing the Category 1 contaminated metal items was done correctly. This resulted in a lost on one control (spacing) relied on for double contingency.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At 1205 hours, under NCS engineering guidance, the Category 1 contaminated metal was spaced at least 2 feet from all Category 2 contaminated metal (converters). Signs were posted identifying the Category 2 contaminated metal storage area.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.