Event Notification Report for May 13, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/12/2000 - 05/13/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
36999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36999
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/13/2000
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2000
Event Time: 13:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2000
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2000
Event Time: 13:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
At 1325 on 05/13/00, a Reactor Protection System scram signal was received due to a high Scram Discharge Volume level condition.
The high Scram Discharge Volume level condition occurred as a result of an Alternate Rod Insertion test signal that was initiated from the Redundant Reactivity Control System during a planned valve testing activity. The Alternate Rod Insertion test signal depressurized the scram air header, causing all control rod scram inlet and outlet valves to open and Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to close as designed. Control room personnel involved in the valve testing activity incorrectly believed that manipulation of the Alternate Rod Insertion test switches for one second would allow an Alternate Rod Insertion valve to be tested following planned maintenance, without depressurizing the scram air header. Control Room personnel reset the Redundant Reactivity Control and Reactor Protection Scram signals in accordance with plant procedures at 1343, after initial validation of the sequence of events.
At the time of the event, reactor core reload was in progress in Operational Condition 5. All control rods were previously verified to be fully inserted in support of core alterations. 'B' and 'D' channel equipment are considered protected for defense in depth, and planned maintenance is in progress on 'A' and 'C' channel equipment. The 'B' Residual Heat Removal pump remained in service in shutdown cooling throughout the event, and reactor cavity level and temperature were unaffected. There was no impact to overall plant safety as a result of this event.
The response of the Alternate Rod Insertion valve that was to be tested is currently being evaluated. A root cause investigation team has been assembled, and evaluation of system and personnel performance is in progress.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed.
The high Scram Discharge Volume level condition occurred as a result of an Alternate Rod Insertion test signal that was initiated from the Redundant Reactivity Control System during a planned valve testing activity. The Alternate Rod Insertion test signal depressurized the scram air header, causing all control rod scram inlet and outlet valves to open and Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to close as designed. Control room personnel involved in the valve testing activity incorrectly believed that manipulation of the Alternate Rod Insertion test switches for one second would allow an Alternate Rod Insertion valve to be tested following planned maintenance, without depressurizing the scram air header. Control Room personnel reset the Redundant Reactivity Control and Reactor Protection Scram signals in accordance with plant procedures at 1343, after initial validation of the sequence of events.
At the time of the event, reactor core reload was in progress in Operational Condition 5. All control rods were previously verified to be fully inserted in support of core alterations. 'B' and 'D' channel equipment are considered protected for defense in depth, and planned maintenance is in progress on 'A' and 'C' channel equipment. The 'B' Residual Heat Removal pump remained in service in shutdown cooling throughout the event, and reactor cavity level and temperature were unaffected. There was no impact to overall plant safety as a result of this event.
The response of the Alternate Rod Insertion valve that was to be tested is currently being evaluated. A root cause investigation team has been assembled, and evaluation of system and personnel performance is in progress.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed.