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Event Notification Report for May 11, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/10/2000 - 05/11/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
369893699036991369923699337028

Power Reactor
Event Number: 36989
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1     State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: G. FIEDLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/11/2000
Notification Time: 09:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2000
Event Time: 01:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - EMERGENCY SIREN INOP
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
AN APPARENT LIGHTNING STRIKE CAUSED THE LOSS OF ALL EMERGENCY SIRENS.

An apparent lightning strike caused the loss of all Emergency Sirens. Emergency Sirens were discovered inoperable at 0815 ET. Both repeaters for the Emergency Sirens were found inoperable. Emergency Sirens were returned to service at 0840 ET when one of the repeaters was restored to service. The licensee will inform state and local officials of the loss of their Emergency Sirens.


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36990
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/11/2000
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2000
Event Time: 08:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
THE PLANT HAD A REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ( RWCU) ISOLATION WHILE THEY WERE PLACING A DEMINERALIZER FILTER IN SERVICE.

"While placing Reactor Water Cleanup Demin "B" in service following a precoat, received Division 2 isolation on sustained High Differential flow of 55 gpm for 45 seconds. The following valves received closed signals
G33-F001, RWCU PUMPS INBD SUCTION VALVE, G33-F040, RWCU RETURN INBOARD ISOL. VALVE, G33-F053, RWCU PUMPS INBD DISCH VALVE, G33-F02, RWCU INBD DRAIN VAL. The Systems responded as designed with all valves closed and the Reactor Water Cleanup Pumps tripped. Note: G33-F028 RWCU INBD DRAIN VAL was already closed.

"The isolation appears to be valid. The cause of the isolation appears to be that valves used to flush a strainer were not full closed, causing flow to the Backwash Receiving Tank where it was fully contained. The valves were locally visibly verified closed, but the valves were actually 1/2 open. Local position indications for both valves appeared to be defective. The plant is stable and plans for restoration of the RWCU system are in progress."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36991
Rep Org: WAYNE CTY ENG TESTING OFFICE
Licensee: WAYNE CTY ENG TESTING OFFICE
Region: 3
City: DETROIT   State: MI
County:
License #: 21-13687-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FAKHOURY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/11/2000
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
Event Text
WAYNE COUNTY ENGINEERING REPORTED DAMAGE TO CPN DENSITY GAUGE.

THE GAUGE WAS BEING USED IN DETROIT, MI. AT A ROAD MAINTENANCE SITE WHEN IT WAS RUN OVER BY A CAR. THERE WAS NO MAJOR DAMAGE OR CRACKS TO THE DEVICE(CPN MODEL MC3-82 PORTABLE) WHICH CONTAINED 10 MILLICURIE OF CS-137 AND 50 MILLICURIE OF AMERICIUM-241/BERYLLIUM. NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED WHEN THEY MADE A SURVEY. THE DEVICE, WHICH HAD A SLIGHT DENT AND BENT ROD WAS PLACED BACK INTO ITS BOX AND WILL BE TAKEN TO THEIR FACILITY FOR STORAGE. THE MANUFACTURER WILL BE CONTACTED TOMORROW. WAYNE COUNTY ENGINEERING CONTACTED NRC REGION 3 (SIMMONS).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36992
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: DEMONCH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/11/2000
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2000
Event Time: 16:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED A DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER BETWEEN THE 4160 C AND D VAULTS.

The licensee identified the wall protecting the C & D 4160 vaults/rooms from each other as a 3 hour rated fire barrier. It has been determined that the wall as is does not meet the requirement for a 3 hour rating. Structural steel for the wall does not have the required thickness of "Pyrocrete 102" to provide a 3 hour rating. The wall is considered functional given the low fire loading in each room and the presence of automatic fire detection and manual suppression. They have commenced an hourly watch for the effected area.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36993
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/12/2000
Notification Time: 09:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2000
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION

INSTRUMENT USED TO DETERMINE URANIUM MASSES WAS FOUND TO BE IN ERROR IN THE NON-CONSERVATIVE DIRECTION.

The calibration factor of an instrument used to determine uranium masses was discovered to be in error. This error was in the non-conservative direction (approximately 30% off) and resulted in the under reporting of uranium masses, violating NCSA GEN-010, Requirement 3.1.3. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure proper uncomplicated handling/planned expeditious handling (UH/PEH) classification to ensure safe handling of the item.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

Both of the controls relied upon for double contingency are based on determination of a uranium mass. Both of these controls were lost; therefore, double contingency was not maintained. However, based on Non-Destructive Analysis recalculation of the measured values using the correct calibration factor, an unsafe mass of uranium was not involved.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:

In order for a criticality to be possible, a critical mass of uranium would be needed to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two independent controls on mass.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):

Each item or group has been verified to be less than the always safe mass and enrichment could be as much as 100%, in the form of uranyl fluoride. The process limit of 400 grams is less than half of the worst case mass.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two controls on mass.

Since the measurements were performed with an improperly calibrated instrument, the reported masses could not be relied upon and double contingency was not maintained.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

Access to the identified items is being controlled with ropes and postings until they can be retagged with the correct uranium masses. After the uranium mass has been corrected, the ropes and postings may be removed.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 37028
Rep Org: WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ANVIL CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: BELLINGHAM   State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR031-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRAZEE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/24/2000
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
Event Text
Licensee had a source disconnect occur due to a mechanical failure of the drive cable connector.

A source disconnect attributable to mechanical failure of the drive cable connector occurred during use of a cobalt 60 radiographic exposure device on May 11. Radiography is routinely conducted by this licensee in a shielded vault (a permanent radiographic installation). An AEA Technologies Model 676 cobalt 60 camera, serial number B105, is generally left set-up between shots. The routine daily equipment check includes a visual check to confirm that the drive cable and camera are still connected. The last quarterly maintenance inspection was at the end of March 2000 and no problems with the drive cable connector were noted. However, during the first shot of the day, the radiographer noticed that the source did not go out smoothly and then failed to retract. The RSO was contacted and after several more attempts to retract the source the licensee decided to secure the area and call in the manufacturer's retrieval experts. Additional shielding, locks and posting were added and a survey of the area including the roof showed no readings above 1 mrem per hour. The state Division of Radiation Protection was notified and staff observed the retrieval on May 12. Once the source was secured, the failed equipment was inspected. No problems were noted with the source assembly or the camera. However, the ball fitting at the drive cable connector's end had become separated from the cable. AEA Technologies took the separated ball and 4 inches of the end of the drive cable back to AEA for analysis.

What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-250 Notification of incidents (equipment failure)

Activity and isotope(s) involved: 71 curies of Cobalt 60.

Overexposures? There were no overexposures (however, retrieval personnel received 130 and 65 mrem whole body exposures)