Event Notification Report for May 08, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/07/2000 - 05/08/2000
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36983
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY HAISLET
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY HAISLET
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 05/08/2000
Notification Time: 05:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2000
Event Time: 03:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2000
Notification Time: 05:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2000
Event Time: 03:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM ISOLATION DURING TAGOUT
While performing a tagout on the 'A' train of the post-accident sampling system (PASS) H2/O2 sampling system, solenoid isolation valve SV-5065-20B, which is a 'B' train valve, closed unexpectedly. The licensee restored the 'A' train of PASS H2/O2 monitoring to service and closed the redundant solenoid isolation valve in the 'B' train. The licensee declared valve SV-5065-20B inoperable.
After review of system electrical diagrams, the licensee determined that the closure of valve SV-5065-20B was appropriate, although its closure was not anticipated in the tagout procedure. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION 1653 5/18/2000 FROM ERIC OLSON TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *
The licensee is retracting this notification in accordance with NUREG-1022, Section 3.3.2, Paragraph 5. The licensee has determined that this event did not constitute an ESF actuation because only a portion of the system logic tripped. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Lew).
While performing a tagout on the 'A' train of the post-accident sampling system (PASS) H2/O2 sampling system, solenoid isolation valve SV-5065-20B, which is a 'B' train valve, closed unexpectedly. The licensee restored the 'A' train of PASS H2/O2 monitoring to service and closed the redundant solenoid isolation valve in the 'B' train. The licensee declared valve SV-5065-20B inoperable.
After review of system electrical diagrams, the licensee determined that the closure of valve SV-5065-20B was appropriate, although its closure was not anticipated in the tagout procedure. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION 1653 5/18/2000 FROM ERIC OLSON TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *
The licensee is retracting this notification in accordance with NUREG-1022, Section 3.3.2, Paragraph 5. The licensee has determined that this event did not constitute an ESF actuation because only a portion of the system logic tripped. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Lew).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36986
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH GIAR
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH GIAR
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/08/2000
Notification Time: 20:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2000
Event Time: 20:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2000
Notification Time: 20:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2000
Event Time: 20:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - FOULING OF THE REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER (RBCCW HX).
Surveillance testing has identified fouling of the Salt Service Water (SSW) side of the RBCCW HX. The extent of the fouling on one of the two heat exchangers would prevent design basis containment heat removal post-accident at maximum design basis ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature (75°F). Engineering evaluation has determined that design basis heat removal can be achieved with UHS temperature less than 70°F. Periodic evaluation will be performed to ensure that additional fouling has not further degraded the heat exchangers heat transfer capability.
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 1653 5/18/2000 FROM ERIC OLSON TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *
The licensee has determined that the unit was not operated outside of the design basis. At the time of the report, the seawater temperature was 50°F. Therefore, the licensee is retracting this notification in accordance with NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.4. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Lew).
Surveillance testing has identified fouling of the Salt Service Water (SSW) side of the RBCCW HX. The extent of the fouling on one of the two heat exchangers would prevent design basis containment heat removal post-accident at maximum design basis ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature (75°F). Engineering evaluation has determined that design basis heat removal can be achieved with UHS temperature less than 70°F. Periodic evaluation will be performed to ensure that additional fouling has not further degraded the heat exchangers heat transfer capability.
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 1653 5/18/2000 FROM ERIC OLSON TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *
The licensee has determined that the unit was not operated outside of the design basis. At the time of the report, the seawater temperature was 50°F. Therefore, the licensee is retracting this notification in accordance with NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.4. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Lew).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36981
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 05/08/2000
Notification Time: 00:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2000
Event Time: 00:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2000
Notification Time: 00:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2000
Event Time: 00:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED DURING TESTING
The 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG ) automatically started due to a bus undervoltage signal that was inadvertently caused when a procedural step was misinterpreted. The EDG was secured. The licensee has informed the NRC resident inspector of this event.
The 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG ) automatically started due to a bus undervoltage signal that was inadvertently caused when a procedural step was misinterpreted. The EDG was secured. The licensee has informed the NRC resident inspector of this event.