Event Notification Report for May 07, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/06/2000 - 05/07/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36982
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NICK CONICELLA
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NICK CONICELLA
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 05/08/2000
Notification Time: 01:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2000
Event Time: 22:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2000
Notification Time: 01:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2000
Event Time: 22:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION DUE TO INADVERTENT STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SIGNAL
"On 5/7/00 at 2243 hours, a Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) isolation occurred due to an inadvertent Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) initiation. At the time of the event, Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 5, Refueling, with core reload activities recently initiated and with all control rods fully inserted. SLC was not required to be operable and was removed from service (injection line check valves were closed) when the SLC initiation signal occurred. No sodium pentaborate was injected into the Reactor Coolant System. Preliminary investigation into the event determined that the SLC initiation signal resulted from activities supporting required surveillance testing of SLC along with surveillances of the Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS). The RRCS provides automatic SLC initiation. Although the RWCU isolation instrumentation was also not required to be operable at the time of the event, it was not removed from service. The RWCU isolation due to a SLC initiation signal is an ESF actuation. Both SLC pumps actuated as designed in response to the initiation signal, however, a crack was observed in a weld in the 'A' SLC injection line when the SLC pump was removed from service. Event investigation is continuing and repairs to SLC are being initiated. The RWCU isolation signal was reset and the RWCU was placed back in service. Core reload activities are continuing."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"On 5/7/00 at 2243 hours, a Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) isolation occurred due to an inadvertent Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) initiation. At the time of the event, Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 5, Refueling, with core reload activities recently initiated and with all control rods fully inserted. SLC was not required to be operable and was removed from service (injection line check valves were closed) when the SLC initiation signal occurred. No sodium pentaborate was injected into the Reactor Coolant System. Preliminary investigation into the event determined that the SLC initiation signal resulted from activities supporting required surveillance testing of SLC along with surveillances of the Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS). The RRCS provides automatic SLC initiation. Although the RWCU isolation instrumentation was also not required to be operable at the time of the event, it was not removed from service. The RWCU isolation due to a SLC initiation signal is an ESF actuation. Both SLC pumps actuated as designed in response to the initiation signal, however, a crack was observed in a weld in the 'A' SLC injection line when the SLC pump was removed from service. Event investigation is continuing and repairs to SLC are being initiated. The RWCU isolation signal was reset and the RWCU was placed back in service. Core reload activities are continuing."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36980
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY GENCIUS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY GENCIUS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/07/2000
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2000
Event Time: 11:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2000
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2000
Event Time: 11:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNEXPECTED LOAD SHED OCCURRED DURING ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE TESTING
"On May 7, 2000 at 0933, electrical testing was being performed on the emergency diesel generator A load sequencer. The diesel generator was out-of-service at the time [for annual maintenance]. An unexpected load shed signal was developed, which removed charging pump C, service water pump A2, containment fan coil A, and residual heat removal (RHR) pump A from the train A emergency safeguards bus (Bus 5). In response to the load shed, equipment was manually restarted from the control room. RHR pump A was restarted in 90 seconds, restoring shutdown cooling. The cause of the load shed was the post modification testing of the load sequencer, and is continuing to be investigated."
There was no increase in reactor coolant temperature during the 90 seconds without RHR flow. Also, the RHR B pump was available if it had been needed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/23/00 @ 1216 BY HARRINGTON TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
After further review, appears this event is NOT reportable based upon the initiation signal was invalid and the system was properly removed from service. Also the Load Shed Signal is a component of the Diesel Generator engineered safety feature (ESF) and not the actuation of the ESF train.
"NUREG 1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73" Revision I (NUREG 1022) provides guidance on what the NRC wants the industry to report. Under section 3.3.2, "Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature or the RPS" is a definition of "valid signals." Valid signals are those signals that are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ESF initiation. The actual plant condition that actuates this ESF is an undervoltage condition on Bus 5, this did not occur therefore it was an invalid signal.
"During the test for DCR 3002 initial conditions were in place to prevent the ESF from providing its intended feature. Preventive Maintenance Procedure (PMP) 42-14, "DGE-Train "A" Auto Sequencing Test with Diesel A in Pullout (Degraded Grid)" disables the ESF by placing the control switch (ES 46641) for Emergency Diesel Generator A in "PULLOUT." To start the test the control room operator places the Bus 5 Voltage Restoring Logic Test switch to the "TEST" position, this disables the rest of the ESF from actuating unless a valid signal is generated.
"By looking at the actions required to mitigate the consequences of a significant event, the load shed is only one component of the safety feature. The shedding of loads from bus 5 does not, of itself, mitigate the consequences of any significant event.
"In addition, during the test sequence the load shed relays are in a state which, if not blocked, would cause the same equipment to trip. This event occurred because the block was removed prior to the load shed relays resetting to their normal state.
"Therefore, one component, Load Shed, of the Diesel Generator ESF actuated due to an invalid signal while the ESF was properly removed from service. Thus the event is not reportable."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Reg 3 RDO (Hiland) was informed.
"On May 7, 2000 at 0933, electrical testing was being performed on the emergency diesel generator A load sequencer. The diesel generator was out-of-service at the time [for annual maintenance]. An unexpected load shed signal was developed, which removed charging pump C, service water pump A2, containment fan coil A, and residual heat removal (RHR) pump A from the train A emergency safeguards bus (Bus 5). In response to the load shed, equipment was manually restarted from the control room. RHR pump A was restarted in 90 seconds, restoring shutdown cooling. The cause of the load shed was the post modification testing of the load sequencer, and is continuing to be investigated."
There was no increase in reactor coolant temperature during the 90 seconds without RHR flow. Also, the RHR B pump was available if it had been needed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/23/00 @ 1216 BY HARRINGTON TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
After further review, appears this event is NOT reportable based upon the initiation signal was invalid and the system was properly removed from service. Also the Load Shed Signal is a component of the Diesel Generator engineered safety feature (ESF) and not the actuation of the ESF train.
"NUREG 1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73" Revision I (NUREG 1022) provides guidance on what the NRC wants the industry to report. Under section 3.3.2, "Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature or the RPS" is a definition of "valid signals." Valid signals are those signals that are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ESF initiation. The actual plant condition that actuates this ESF is an undervoltage condition on Bus 5, this did not occur therefore it was an invalid signal.
"During the test for DCR 3002 initial conditions were in place to prevent the ESF from providing its intended feature. Preventive Maintenance Procedure (PMP) 42-14, "DGE-Train "A" Auto Sequencing Test with Diesel A in Pullout (Degraded Grid)" disables the ESF by placing the control switch (ES 46641) for Emergency Diesel Generator A in "PULLOUT." To start the test the control room operator places the Bus 5 Voltage Restoring Logic Test switch to the "TEST" position, this disables the rest of the ESF from actuating unless a valid signal is generated.
"By looking at the actions required to mitigate the consequences of a significant event, the load shed is only one component of the safety feature. The shedding of loads from bus 5 does not, of itself, mitigate the consequences of any significant event.
"In addition, during the test sequence the load shed relays are in a state which, if not blocked, would cause the same equipment to trip. This event occurred because the block was removed prior to the load shed relays resetting to their normal state.
"Therefore, one component, Load Shed, of the Diesel Generator ESF actuated due to an invalid signal while the ESF was properly removed from service. Thus the event is not reportable."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Reg 3 RDO (Hiland) was informed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36978
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM BLANKENSHIP
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM BLANKENSHIP
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 05/07/2000
Notification Time: 09:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2000
Event Time: 07:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2000
Notification Time: 09:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2000
Event Time: 07:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAULT OF GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER
"Unit 1 generator output breaker malfunction (G12) causing Unit 1 Reactor Trip and AFW pump actuation."
A generator lockout occurred after the generator output breaker (G12) faulted. The generator lockout caused an automatic turbine trip/reactor trip. All control rods inserted completely following the trip. The unit is currently stable in Hot Standby with steam generators being fed by the auxiliary feedwater system and decay heat being removed by the main condenser.
The licensee reported that smoke and flames were observed in the area of the G12 breaker. The site fire brigade responded, and the fire and smoke subsided within 10 minutes. The licensee plans to investigate the cause of the breaker fault and any necessary repairs. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.
"Unit 1 generator output breaker malfunction (G12) causing Unit 1 Reactor Trip and AFW pump actuation."
A generator lockout occurred after the generator output breaker (G12) faulted. The generator lockout caused an automatic turbine trip/reactor trip. All control rods inserted completely following the trip. The unit is currently stable in Hot Standby with steam generators being fed by the auxiliary feedwater system and decay heat being removed by the main condenser.
The licensee reported that smoke and flames were observed in the area of the G12 breaker. The site fire brigade responded, and the fire and smoke subsided within 10 minutes. The licensee plans to investigate the cause of the breaker fault and any necessary repairs. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.