Event Notification Report for May 03, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/02/2000 - 05/03/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
36959369603696136962369643696536966369673696836969
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36959
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID GRONEK
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID GRONEK
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 11:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 09:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 11:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 09:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM AND ESF ACTUATION
Unit 3 auto scrammed from 100 percent power at 0946 CDT on 5/3/00. Reactor protection power supplies (120VAC) were being transferred at the time of the reactor scram. All rods fully inserted into the core. The exact cause of the scram is unknown at this time. Licensee investigation into the cause of the scram continues. All systems responded as expected. A Group 2 and Group 3 isolation signal also was received during the scram as expected. The unit is stable at hot shutdown conditions.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.-
Unit 3 auto scrammed from 100 percent power at 0946 CDT on 5/3/00. Reactor protection power supplies (120VAC) were being transferred at the time of the reactor scram. All rods fully inserted into the core. The exact cause of the scram is unknown at this time. Licensee investigation into the cause of the scram continues. All systems responded as expected. A Group 2 and Group 3 isolation signal also was received during the scram as expected. The unit is stable at hot shutdown conditions.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.-
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36960
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 08:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 08:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
This notification is for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 and is being made in accordance with 10CFR5072(b)(1)(ii)(B) for the condition of the Salt Water Cooling (SWC) System and the Shutdown Cooling System potentially being outside their design basis. This condition exists for both Units 2 and 3.
The SWC system consists of two separate, 100% capacity safety related cooling water trains for each unit. Each train consists of two 100% capacity pumps. The pumps aligned to the critical CCW loops are automatically started upon receipt of a safety injection actuation signal and all essential valves are aligned to their post accident positions. Although not specifically stated, the accident analyses for Unit's 2 and 3 assumes that once these valves have been placed in their safety-related positions that they would remain in that position until intentionally realigned by plant personnel. Recently, the licensee discovered that the air/trip valves for pneumatic actuators for the saltwater cooling pump discharge valves were leaking a small amount of air and questioned whether this could cause these valves to be inoperable under postulated accident conditions.
The pneumatic actuators receive their air supply from the non-safety-related instrument air system, which would not be available following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) event. The actuator vender indicated that under such conditions, the accumulators for the actuators would gradually loose pressure and would not forcibly hold these valves in their safety related positions. The licensee recognized that hydrodynamic forces inside the pipes could cause these valves to close. Because these valves do not have manual hand wheels and it may take some time for operators to diagnose this condition, restore instrument air, and reopen the valves, the licensee declared the valves inoperable until corrective actions were implemented. The valves were blocked open to ensure they will remain in their safety-related positions during postulated accident conditions.
A similar condition exists for the pneumatic actuator for the component cooling water outlet valves for the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. The licensee restored operability to these valves by engaging manual hand wheels which lock the valves open due to increased closing drag.
The Resident Inspector will be notified.
This notification is for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 and is being made in accordance with 10CFR5072(b)(1)(ii)(B) for the condition of the Salt Water Cooling (SWC) System and the Shutdown Cooling System potentially being outside their design basis. This condition exists for both Units 2 and 3.
The SWC system consists of two separate, 100% capacity safety related cooling water trains for each unit. Each train consists of two 100% capacity pumps. The pumps aligned to the critical CCW loops are automatically started upon receipt of a safety injection actuation signal and all essential valves are aligned to their post accident positions. Although not specifically stated, the accident analyses for Unit's 2 and 3 assumes that once these valves have been placed in their safety-related positions that they would remain in that position until intentionally realigned by plant personnel. Recently, the licensee discovered that the air/trip valves for pneumatic actuators for the saltwater cooling pump discharge valves were leaking a small amount of air and questioned whether this could cause these valves to be inoperable under postulated accident conditions.
The pneumatic actuators receive their air supply from the non-safety-related instrument air system, which would not be available following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) event. The actuator vender indicated that under such conditions, the accumulators for the actuators would gradually loose pressure and would not forcibly hold these valves in their safety related positions. The licensee recognized that hydrodynamic forces inside the pipes could cause these valves to close. Because these valves do not have manual hand wheels and it may take some time for operators to diagnose this condition, restore instrument air, and reopen the valves, the licensee declared the valves inoperable until corrective actions were implemented. The valves were blocked open to ensure they will remain in their safety-related positions during postulated accident conditions.
A similar condition exists for the pneumatic actuator for the component cooling water outlet valves for the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. The licensee restored operability to these valves by engaging manual hand wheels which lock the valves open due to increased closing drag.
The Resident Inspector will be notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36961
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DON POPP
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DON POPP
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 10:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2000
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 10:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
1 HOUR SECURITY REPORT
Unescorted protected area access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Contact the Headquarters Operations Center for additional details
* * * RETRACTION ON 05/16/00 AT 1128 ET BY BRAIN KOPETSKI TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
After further review of this event and conversations with NRC Region 3 this event is being retracted. The event is being made a loggable because the person's access denial would not have in itself been enough to deny access. R3DO (John Madera) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
Unescorted protected area access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Contact the Headquarters Operations Center for additional details
* * * RETRACTION ON 05/16/00 AT 1128 ET BY BRAIN KOPETSKI TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
After further review of this event and conversations with NRC Region 3 this event is being retracted. The event is being made a loggable because the person's access denial would not have in itself been enough to deny access. R3DO (John Madera) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
Hospital
Event Number: 36962
Rep Org: VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CENTER BIRMINGHAM AL
Region: 2
City: BIRMINHAM State: AL
County:
License #: 01-00648-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CENTER BIRMINGHAM AL
Region: 2
City: BIRMINHAM State: AL
County:
License #: 01-00648-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
RECEIPT OF A PACKAGE WITH SURFACE CONTAMINATION GREATER THAN LIMIT
On May 3, 2000, at approximately 10:00 am, a box of radiopharmaceuticals containing approximately 68 mCi of Technetium-99m Sestamibi from Birmingham Central Pharmacy was received. A nuclear medicine technologist performed the procedure for incoming packages which included a wipe and survey of the box. The meter survey did not indicate any contamination, however, the wipe of the outside of the box indicated contamination of about 178 dpm/cm2. The package was emptied and surveyed again. A contaminated spot on the outside of the box was located by the meter survey. Rewipe of the area indicated 606 dpm/cm2 which exceeds the regulatory limit of 22 dpm/cm2. According to a spectrum made of the contaminated wipe sample, the radionuclide is Technetium-99m. The contamination was in an area on the side of the box away from the carrier handle. The pharmacy has been contacted. The Pharmacy wipe test data arriving with the package did not indicate contamination.
On May 3, 2000, at approximately 10:00 am, a box of radiopharmaceuticals containing approximately 68 mCi of Technetium-99m Sestamibi from Birmingham Central Pharmacy was received. A nuclear medicine technologist performed the procedure for incoming packages which included a wipe and survey of the box. The meter survey did not indicate any contamination, however, the wipe of the outside of the box indicated contamination of about 178 dpm/cm2. The package was emptied and surveyed again. A contaminated spot on the outside of the box was located by the meter survey. Rewipe of the area indicated 606 dpm/cm2 which exceeds the regulatory limit of 22 dpm/cm2. According to a spectrum made of the contaminated wipe sample, the radionuclide is Technetium-99m. The contamination was in an area on the side of the box away from the carrier handle. The pharmacy has been contacted. The Pharmacy wipe test data arriving with the package did not indicate contamination.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36964
Rep Org: GEOTECH ENVIRONMENTAL, INC
Licensee: GEOTECH ENVIRONMENTAL, INC
Region: 1
City: MAPLE SHADE State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-28286-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CARL DINICOLANTONIO
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Licensee: GEOTECH ENVIRONMENTAL, INC
Region: 1
City: MAPLE SHADE State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-28286-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CARL DINICOLANTONIO
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2000
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
On April 27, 2000, a technician was involved in an automobile accident in Philadelphia, PA. At that time, the gauge was stored in the trunk of the vehicle. When police arrived on the scene, the technician was arrested. The technician informed the police that the gauge was in the trunk and showed the gauge to the police officers. After the technician was arrested, the vehicle was stolen. The vehicle was recovered on April 29, 2000. The gauge was not in the trunk when the vehicle was recovered. The device contained 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.
* * * UPDATE AT 1402 ON 06/02/00 BY CLAIRE PANICO TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The stolen Troxler moisture density gauge was found in a waste management recycling facility in Philadelphia. The undamaged gauge has been returned to Geotech Environmental, Inc.
George Pangburn, NRC Region 1 has been notified. NRC Region 1 issued PNO-I-00-013A.
The NRC Operations Officer Notified R1DO Dick Barkley and NMSS EO Brian Smith.
On April 27, 2000, a technician was involved in an automobile accident in Philadelphia, PA. At that time, the gauge was stored in the trunk of the vehicle. When police arrived on the scene, the technician was arrested. The technician informed the police that the gauge was in the trunk and showed the gauge to the police officers. After the technician was arrested, the vehicle was stolen. The vehicle was recovered on April 29, 2000. The gauge was not in the trunk when the vehicle was recovered. The device contained 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.
* * * UPDATE AT 1402 ON 06/02/00 BY CLAIRE PANICO TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The stolen Troxler moisture density gauge was found in a waste management recycling facility in Philadelphia. The undamaged gauge has been returned to Geotech Environmental, Inc.
George Pangburn, NRC Region 1 has been notified. NRC Region 1 issued PNO-I-00-013A.
The NRC Operations Officer Notified R1DO Dick Barkley and NMSS EO Brian Smith.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36965
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 12:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 12:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
4 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT - LOSS OF 1 OF 2 CONTINGENCY CONTROLS -
Annual visual inspections of the cylinder wall, valve, and plug which are credited for double contingency in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 1493-03 have not been performed for fissile 12A (MD-type) UF6 cylinders stored in Room 144 of Building C-710. Scenario 8 of NCSE 1493-03 takes credit for the annual visual inspections required by Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) GEN-03 to ensure cylinder integrity is maintained. However, NCSA GEN-03 states that the inspections are required for cylinders in "cylinder storage yards". Because the cylinders are not located In the cylinder storage yards, the annual inspections were not performed for the fissile 12A MD cylinders.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:
One of the controls relied upon for double contingency was not implemented. However, based on followup visual inspections, the process parameter. moderation, was not lost,
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:
In order for a criticality to be possible, the cylinder would have to be breached and large quantities of water would have to be introduced. Upon discovery of the problem, the cylinder was inspected and determined to be acceptable. Because the cylinder was not breached, a criticality resulting from this event is not possible.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
Double contingency for this scenario Is established by Implementing two Independent controls on moderation.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
419 pounds in the form of UF6 at an enrichment of 4.46 wt % U-235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on moderation control by prohibiting the use of water or steam to heat the fissile 12A MD cylinders. This control prevents the entry of large quantities of water into the cylinders. This control was not violated and the first leg of double contingency was maintained,
The second leg of double contingency relies on a second control on moderation by crediting an annual cylinder inspection to identify corrosion and cylinder damage in order to maintain the integrity of the cylinders and prevent the introduction of moderating material. The annual cylinder inspections were credited but not performed. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
One of the two controls on moderation credited for double contingency was not implemented, therefore double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The NCSE/A will be revised to include annual visual inspection of fissile 12A MD cylinders.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.
PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-00-2499; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-037 Responsible Division: Production Support
Annual visual inspections of the cylinder wall, valve, and plug which are credited for double contingency in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 1493-03 have not been performed for fissile 12A (MD-type) UF6 cylinders stored in Room 144 of Building C-710. Scenario 8 of NCSE 1493-03 takes credit for the annual visual inspections required by Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) GEN-03 to ensure cylinder integrity is maintained. However, NCSA GEN-03 states that the inspections are required for cylinders in "cylinder storage yards". Because the cylinders are not located In the cylinder storage yards, the annual inspections were not performed for the fissile 12A MD cylinders.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:
One of the controls relied upon for double contingency was not implemented. However, based on followup visual inspections, the process parameter. moderation, was not lost,
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:
In order for a criticality to be possible, the cylinder would have to be breached and large quantities of water would have to be introduced. Upon discovery of the problem, the cylinder was inspected and determined to be acceptable. Because the cylinder was not breached, a criticality resulting from this event is not possible.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
Double contingency for this scenario Is established by Implementing two Independent controls on moderation.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
419 pounds in the form of UF6 at an enrichment of 4.46 wt % U-235.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on moderation control by prohibiting the use of water or steam to heat the fissile 12A MD cylinders. This control prevents the entry of large quantities of water into the cylinders. This control was not violated and the first leg of double contingency was maintained,
The second leg of double contingency relies on a second control on moderation by crediting an annual cylinder inspection to identify corrosion and cylinder damage in order to maintain the integrity of the cylinders and prevent the introduction of moderating material. The annual cylinder inspections were credited but not performed. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
One of the two controls on moderation credited for double contingency was not implemented, therefore double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The NCSE/A will be revised to include annual visual inspection of fissile 12A MD cylinders.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.
PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-00-2499; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-037 Responsible Division: Production Support
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36966
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: MAYO CLINIC/MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: SCOTTSDALE State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 07-448
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL H. KUHL
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: MAYO CLINIC/MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: SCOTTSDALE State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 07-448
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL H. KUHL
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 11:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 16:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 11:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- Missing Indium-111 capsules at Mayo Clinic/Medical Center, Scottsdale, AZ
On 05/01/00, a standing order of three capsules, each capsule containing 100 microcuries of Indium-111, was misplaced at the Mayo Clinic/Medical Center, Scottsdale, AZ (AZ License #07-448). The missing capsules have not been located as of 1100 MST on 05/03/00, as reported to the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency (ARRA) by the AZ licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The RSO is planning an investigation into the events leading to the loss and will file a report with the ARRA within 30 days. This isotope has a half-life of 67 hours.
The ARRA has notified NRC Region 4, Mexico, and the states of Colorado, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico and California of this event (ARRA First Notice #00-4).
On 05/01/00, a standing order of three capsules, each capsule containing 100 microcuries of Indium-111, was misplaced at the Mayo Clinic/Medical Center, Scottsdale, AZ (AZ License #07-448). The missing capsules have not been located as of 1100 MST on 05/03/00, as reported to the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency (ARRA) by the AZ licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The RSO is planning an investigation into the events leading to the loss and will file a report with the ARRA within 30 days. This isotope has a half-life of 67 hours.
The ARRA has notified NRC Region 4, Mexico, and the states of Colorado, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico and California of this event (ARRA First Notice #00-4).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36967
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 22:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 22:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2000
Notification Time: 22:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 22:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
NIEL DELLA GRECA (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
UNIT 2 TECH SPEC REQD SHUTDOWN DUE TO 2 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES FAILING THEIR LLRT-
The licensee is shutting Unit 2 down from 100% power in accordance with Tech Spec 3.6.3.A, 12 Hour Shutdown LCO, due to containment purge valves #CPS*AOV-104 & 106 failing their local leak rate test #N2-ISP-CPS-Q001.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * *UPDATE ON 05/04/00 AT 0002 ET BY M. ERON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Licensee exited Technical Specification 3.6.3.A at 2350 ET after manual Containment Purge Supply valve, 2CPS-V6, an upstream valve to #CPS*AOV-104 & 106 was leak tested and verified closed. Lowest reactor power level reached was 92%. R1DO (Della Greca) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
The licensee is shutting Unit 2 down from 100% power in accordance with Tech Spec 3.6.3.A, 12 Hour Shutdown LCO, due to containment purge valves #CPS*AOV-104 & 106 failing their local leak rate test #N2-ISP-CPS-Q001.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * *UPDATE ON 05/04/00 AT 0002 ET BY M. ERON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Licensee exited Technical Specification 3.6.3.A at 2350 ET after manual Containment Purge Supply valve, 2CPS-V6, an upstream valve to #CPS*AOV-104 & 106 was leak tested and verified closed. Lowest reactor power level reached was 92%. R1DO (Della Greca) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36968
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
MODERATION CONTROL LOST (NO FREE LIQUIDS) WHILE MASS CONTROL WAS MAINTAINED.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
On 05/03/2000 at 0954 hours a violation of a contingency control designated in NCSA-PLANT018.A02 was identified. During dry active waste (DAW) sorting operations a Chemical Operator discovered two plastic bags containing 3M cloth saturated and dripping with oil. This is in violation of NCSA-PLANT018.A02 requirement #1a, which states the following in regards to placing items in a DAW drum: "The items shall contain no free liquid (ie., not dripping or saturated with liquid)."
This constituted the loss of one control of the double contingency principle. Moderation control was lost (no free liquids) while mass control (no visible uranium) was maintained.
This condition was corrected under Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineering guidance when the material was removed from the DAW drum and handled per the applicable NCSA.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance of this event is low. Two bags of 3M cloth contaminated with lube oil were found DAW drum during sorting operation. The NCSE evaluates a DAW material saturated with liquid. The drum of DAW material did not have any items in it that had visible amounts of uranium beyond fixed stains/films. Also NCSA-PLANT054.A03 has controls on lube oil and data used in the NCSE for this NCSA shows that the uranium concentration in lube oil (even lube oil spills) is less than 50ppm uranium-235.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
For criticality to occur with DAW material there would have to be visible uranium on the items placed in the DAW drum.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The controlled parameters in this NCSA are moderation (no free liquids) and mass (no visible uranium).
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The highest enrichment for DAW material in the X-326 building is 100%. The form of the material in DAW is uranyl fluoride and uranyl tetrafluoride contamination. The amount of mass involved is less than 350 grams which is the safe mass value of 100% enriched uranyl tetrafluoride solution.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The failure in this case is moderation. The NCSA requires that material that is saturated or dripping is to be disposed of in favorable geometry containers or under other specific NCSAs.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The oil saturated 3M cloth was transferred to an NCSA-PLANT054.A03 approved storage container, at which time compliance with NCSA-PLANT018.A02 was restored.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
On 05/03/2000 at 0954 hours a violation of a contingency control designated in NCSA-PLANT018.A02 was identified. During dry active waste (DAW) sorting operations a Chemical Operator discovered two plastic bags containing 3M cloth saturated and dripping with oil. This is in violation of NCSA-PLANT018.A02 requirement #1a, which states the following in regards to placing items in a DAW drum: "The items shall contain no free liquid (ie., not dripping or saturated with liquid)."
This constituted the loss of one control of the double contingency principle. Moderation control was lost (no free liquids) while mass control (no visible uranium) was maintained.
This condition was corrected under Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineering guidance when the material was removed from the DAW drum and handled per the applicable NCSA.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance of this event is low. Two bags of 3M cloth contaminated with lube oil were found DAW drum during sorting operation. The NCSE evaluates a DAW material saturated with liquid. The drum of DAW material did not have any items in it that had visible amounts of uranium beyond fixed stains/films. Also NCSA-PLANT054.A03 has controls on lube oil and data used in the NCSE for this NCSA shows that the uranium concentration in lube oil (even lube oil spills) is less than 50ppm uranium-235.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
For criticality to occur with DAW material there would have to be visible uranium on the items placed in the DAW drum.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The controlled parameters in this NCSA are moderation (no free liquids) and mass (no visible uranium).
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The highest enrichment for DAW material in the X-326 building is 100%. The form of the material in DAW is uranyl fluoride and uranyl tetrafluoride contamination. The amount of mass involved is less than 350 grams which is the safe mass value of 100% enriched uranyl tetrafluoride solution.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The failure in this case is moderation. The NCSA requires that material that is saturated or dripping is to be disposed of in favorable geometry containers or under other specific NCSAs.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The oil saturated 3M cloth was transferred to an NCSA-PLANT054.A03 approved storage container, at which time compliance with NCSA-PLANT018.A02 was restored.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36969
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/04/2000
Notification Time: 05:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2000
Notification Time: 05:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2000
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
POTENTIAL FOR ACCUMULATION OF SLUDGE CONTAINING HEAVY METALS ON/IN THE LID OF TUB
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 hour notification
On 5/3/00 at 0800 hours it was discovered that a NCSA-0705_027.A003 control was not in place. The sludge tub used for accumulating heavy metal (including uranium) sludge had an unsafe/unfavorable geometry molded into the design. The unfavorable dimensions created by the raised lip is 7.75" by 37" by 2". This could have resulted in the potential accumulation, of an unsafe volume on the sludge tub lid had a leak developed In a nearby system containing uranium-bearing solution.
NCSA-705_027.A003 requirement #17 states "Geometrically unfavorable containers shall not be left uncovered while unattended in the heavy metals precipitation process area or on the mezzanine in the area of the heavy metals precipitation raffinate storage (HMPRS)". This was a loss of one control (geometry/volume) in the double contingency principle for the afore mentioned NCSA. The second control (physical integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained throughout the event.
At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements for the NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1015 hours compliance was regained by covering the molded design
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
On May 3, 2000, it was discovered that the sludge tub used for accumulating sludge containing heavy metals (including uranium) contains an accumulation point on/in the lid. That accumulation point is created by a raised lip and has unfavorable geometric dimensions (7.75" by 37" by 2"). This is a violation of NCSA-0705_027 and NCSA-0705_076. This could have resulted in the potential accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution on/in the sludge tub lid had a leak developed in a nearby system which contain uranium-bearing solution. No uranium-bearing material was involved in the violation, since the remaining barrier to criticality (i.e., the physical integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is low.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
If a leak had developed in a nearby uranium-bearing system such that the solution could have accumulated on/in the sludge tub lid, an unsafe geometry of solution could have resulted. If the leaking solution had contained a sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting configuration could have been sufficient for a criticality to occur. It should be noted that the allowed safe geometry and volume limits established In NCSA-0705_076 are based on potentially moderated, UO2F2 and water solution which contains uranium enriched to 100 wt%.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The parameter which was violated during this upset was the geometry of potential accumulation present in the sludge tub lid (i.e., the volume in which uranium-bearing solution could have accumulated in the event of a leak). The physical integrity of the nearby systems containing uranium-bearing material was maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
No uranium bearing material was actually introduced into the lid of the sludge tub.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
NCSA-0705_076.A00 and NCSA-0705_027 take credit for the physical integrity of Systems which contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe volume/geometry containers are either modified, covered, or oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration from resulting In the event of a leak. The lid of the sludge tub observed was not protected from a potential accumulation and it had been left unattended.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At 0800 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated.
At 1015 hours compliance was re-established
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 hour notification
On 5/3/00 at 0800 hours it was discovered that a NCSA-0705_027.A003 control was not in place. The sludge tub used for accumulating heavy metal (including uranium) sludge had an unsafe/unfavorable geometry molded into the design. The unfavorable dimensions created by the raised lip is 7.75" by 37" by 2". This could have resulted in the potential accumulation, of an unsafe volume on the sludge tub lid had a leak developed In a nearby system containing uranium-bearing solution.
NCSA-705_027.A003 requirement #17 states "Geometrically unfavorable containers shall not be left uncovered while unattended in the heavy metals precipitation process area or on the mezzanine in the area of the heavy metals precipitation raffinate storage (HMPRS)". This was a loss of one control (geometry/volume) in the double contingency principle for the afore mentioned NCSA. The second control (physical integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained throughout the event.
At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements for the NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1015 hours compliance was regained by covering the molded design
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
On May 3, 2000, it was discovered that the sludge tub used for accumulating sludge containing heavy metals (including uranium) contains an accumulation point on/in the lid. That accumulation point is created by a raised lip and has unfavorable geometric dimensions (7.75" by 37" by 2"). This is a violation of NCSA-0705_027 and NCSA-0705_076. This could have resulted in the potential accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution on/in the sludge tub lid had a leak developed in a nearby system which contain uranium-bearing solution. No uranium-bearing material was involved in the violation, since the remaining barrier to criticality (i.e., the physical integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is low.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
If a leak had developed in a nearby uranium-bearing system such that the solution could have accumulated on/in the sludge tub lid, an unsafe geometry of solution could have resulted. If the leaking solution had contained a sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting configuration could have been sufficient for a criticality to occur. It should be noted that the allowed safe geometry and volume limits established In NCSA-0705_076 are based on potentially moderated, UO2F2 and water solution which contains uranium enriched to 100 wt%.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The parameter which was violated during this upset was the geometry of potential accumulation present in the sludge tub lid (i.e., the volume in which uranium-bearing solution could have accumulated in the event of a leak). The physical integrity of the nearby systems containing uranium-bearing material was maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
No uranium bearing material was actually introduced into the lid of the sludge tub.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
NCSA-0705_076.A00 and NCSA-0705_027 take credit for the physical integrity of Systems which contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe volume/geometry containers are either modified, covered, or oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration from resulting In the event of a leak. The lid of the sludge tub observed was not protected from a potential accumulation and it had been left unattended.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At 0800 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated.
At 1015 hours compliance was re-established
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.