Event Notification Report for April 27, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/26/2000 - 04/27/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3694036938369353693636937
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36940
Rep Org: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County:
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County:
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/28/2000
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2000
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
URANIUM SOLUTION MINE SHALLOW MONITOR WELL PLACED INTO EXCURSION STATUS -
Crow Butte Resources shallow monitor well #SM-723 in uranium solution mine unit #7 in Crawford, NE, was placed into excursion status due to the sulfates concentration of water sample measuring at 82 PPM (upper control limit is 62 PPM). This was caused by nearby drilling activities. The well is located within the licensee controlled area. The nearest active mining well is 800 feet away. There are no public land use areas nearby.
The licensee determined that there is no adverse impact or risk to people, livestock, or wildlife. The NRC Uranium Mining Expert concurred with this assessment.
The licensee plans to sample the well more frequently than weekly and submit a written report to the NRC within 7 days.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
Crow Butte Resources shallow monitor well #SM-723 in uranium solution mine unit #7 in Crawford, NE, was placed into excursion status due to the sulfates concentration of water sample measuring at 82 PPM (upper control limit is 62 PPM). This was caused by nearby drilling activities. The well is located within the licensee controlled area. The nearest active mining well is 800 feet away. There are no public land use areas nearby.
The licensee determined that there is no adverse impact or risk to people, livestock, or wildlife. The NRC Uranium Mining Expert concurred with this assessment.
The licensee plans to sample the well more frequently than weekly and submit a written report to the NRC within 7 days.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36938
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/28/2000
Notification Time: 08:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2000
Notification Time: 08:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF ONE OF TWO CONTINGENCY CONTROLS
"At 1030 hrs April 27, 2000, Chemical Operations personnel while performing decontamination operations on three forklifts in the high bay discovered slits in the seat cushion. Since these cushions are geometrically unfavorable, this was a loss of one control (geometrically) of the double contingency program for NCSA-0705__076.A00 'INADVERTENT CONTAINERS,' the second control, physical integrity of overhead piping, was maintained throughout.
"At the direction of the PSS the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1130 hrs compliance was regained by repairing the seats.
"1) Safety Significance of Events:
"The safety significance of this event is very low. The seat cushions had dimensions of approximately 18 x 19 x 5 [inches] which is over 7 gallons of volume. The seats were damaged such that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry and the forklifts were parked directly under the overhead storage system. Although the overhead storage system can contain high concentrations of uranium at high enrichments, the current status is 69 ppm uranium. (Although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235.
"2) Potential Criticality Pathways Involved (Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur):
"If the overhead storage system contained sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 ppm U-235) uranium and if the solution leaked out of the overhead storage piping and landed on the forklift seat, the solution could achieve a critical configuration due to the volume of the cushion (>7 gallons) and the depth of the cushion (>1.5 inches).
"3) Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration, Etc.):
"Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead storage piping to protect against a large, uncontrolled leak.
"4) Estimated Amount. Enrichment Form of Licensed Material (include process limit and % worst case of critical mass):
"No uranium was involved in this event. The overhead storage system, however, can contain fully enriched uranium bearing solution at concentrations above minimum critical at volumes up to 6000 gallons. Current status of the overhead storage system is 69 ppm uranium and, although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235.
"5) Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or control system(s) and description of failures or deficiencies:
"Nuclear criticality safety controls include geometry of the fissile material processing equipment in X-705, the design of those systems to contain the material and the prohibition against inadvertent containers in the high bay. The forklift seats have holes which can allow for the collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry."
Operations staff informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the site DOE Representative.
***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1423 ON 04/28/00 FROM KURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
This update was given to provide a clarification to the initial event report. There was only one fork lift involved that did not meet the NCSA requirement. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Portsmouth personnel:
"On 04/27/00 at 1030 hours, X-705 Chemical Operation personnel discovered an NCSA-705_076A00 noncompliance while decontaminating three forklifts in the X-705 high bay area. One forklift seat cushion had a slit/crack failing to meet NCSA-705 076.A00 requirement #4 which states, 'Absorbent materials shall be covered so that they cannot absorb uranium-bearing liquids or modified such that any uranium-bearing liquid could be collected is geometrically favorable. Absorbent materials, which are controlled by covering, shall be elevated at least one inch so that they cannot absorb spilled uranium-bearing liquids. This requirement includes absorbent materials within containers having openings within one inch of the bottom of the container.' Since the forklift seat cushion is geometrically unfavorable, a loss of one control (geometry) occurred with the double contingency principle. The second control, physical integrity of the overhead piping, was maintained throughout the event."
"At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements for a NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1130 hours, compliance was regained by repairing the seat."
"The safety significance of this event is low. The seat cushion had dimensions of approximately 18" x 19" x 5" which is over 7 gallons of volume. The seat was damaged such that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was parked directly under the overhead storage system. The overhead storage system contained 69 ppm uranium during the event. Although the enrichment was not measured, it is likely less than 10 wt% uranium-235."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this report is very low. Only one seat cushion had unfavorable dimensions of approximately 18" x 19" x 5" which is over 7 gallons of volume. The seat was damaged such that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was parked directly under the overhead storage system. Although the overhead storage system can contain high concentrations of uranium at high enrichments the current status is 69 ppm uranium. (Although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% 235U)."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If the overhead storage system contained sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 ppm 235U) uranium and if the solution leaked out of the overhead storage piping and landed on the forklift seat, the solution could achieve a critical configuration due to the volume of the cushion (>7 gallons) and the depth of the cushion (>1.5")."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead storage piping to protect against a large uncontrolled leak."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL. (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): No uranium was involved in this event. The overhead storage system, however, can contain fully enriched uranium-bearing solution at concentrations above minimum critical at volumes up to 6,000 gallons. Current status of the overhead storage system is 69 ppm uranium, and although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% 235U."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM (S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Nuclear criticality safety controls include geometry of the fissile material processing equipment in the X-705, the design of those systems to contain the material, and the prohibition against inadvertent containers in the high bay. A forklift seat had holes which can allow for the collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: At 1030 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated. At 1130 hours, compliance was re-established by repairing the forklift seat."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Shear) and NMSS EO (Moore).
"At 1030 hrs April 27, 2000, Chemical Operations personnel while performing decontamination operations on three forklifts in the high bay discovered slits in the seat cushion. Since these cushions are geometrically unfavorable, this was a loss of one control (geometrically) of the double contingency program for NCSA-0705__076.A00 'INADVERTENT CONTAINERS,' the second control, physical integrity of overhead piping, was maintained throughout.
"At the direction of the PSS the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1130 hrs compliance was regained by repairing the seats.
"1) Safety Significance of Events:
"The safety significance of this event is very low. The seat cushions had dimensions of approximately 18 x 19 x 5 [inches] which is over 7 gallons of volume. The seats were damaged such that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry and the forklifts were parked directly under the overhead storage system. Although the overhead storage system can contain high concentrations of uranium at high enrichments, the current status is 69 ppm uranium. (Although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235.
"2) Potential Criticality Pathways Involved (Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur):
"If the overhead storage system contained sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 ppm U-235) uranium and if the solution leaked out of the overhead storage piping and landed on the forklift seat, the solution could achieve a critical configuration due to the volume of the cushion (>7 gallons) and the depth of the cushion (>1.5 inches).
"3) Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration, Etc.):
"Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead storage piping to protect against a large, uncontrolled leak.
"4) Estimated Amount. Enrichment Form of Licensed Material (include process limit and % worst case of critical mass):
"No uranium was involved in this event. The overhead storage system, however, can contain fully enriched uranium bearing solution at concentrations above minimum critical at volumes up to 6000 gallons. Current status of the overhead storage system is 69 ppm uranium and, although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% U-235.
"5) Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or control system(s) and description of failures or deficiencies:
"Nuclear criticality safety controls include geometry of the fissile material processing equipment in X-705, the design of those systems to contain the material and the prohibition against inadvertent containers in the high bay. The forklift seats have holes which can allow for the collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry."
Operations staff informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the site DOE Representative.
***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1423 ON 04/28/00 FROM KURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
This update was given to provide a clarification to the initial event report. There was only one fork lift involved that did not meet the NCSA requirement. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Portsmouth personnel:
"On 04/27/00 at 1030 hours, X-705 Chemical Operation personnel discovered an NCSA-705_076A00 noncompliance while decontaminating three forklifts in the X-705 high bay area. One forklift seat cushion had a slit/crack failing to meet NCSA-705 076.A00 requirement #4 which states, 'Absorbent materials shall be covered so that they cannot absorb uranium-bearing liquids or modified such that any uranium-bearing liquid could be collected is geometrically favorable. Absorbent materials, which are controlled by covering, shall be elevated at least one inch so that they cannot absorb spilled uranium-bearing liquids. This requirement includes absorbent materials within containers having openings within one inch of the bottom of the container.' Since the forklift seat cushion is geometrically unfavorable, a loss of one control (geometry) occurred with the double contingency principle. The second control, physical integrity of the overhead piping, was maintained throughout the event."
"At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements for a NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1130 hours, compliance was regained by repairing the seat."
"The safety significance of this event is low. The seat cushion had dimensions of approximately 18" x 19" x 5" which is over 7 gallons of volume. The seat was damaged such that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was parked directly under the overhead storage system. The overhead storage system contained 69 ppm uranium during the event. Although the enrichment was not measured, it is likely less than 10 wt% uranium-235."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this report is very low. Only one seat cushion had unfavorable dimensions of approximately 18" x 19" x 5" which is over 7 gallons of volume. The seat was damaged such that leakage of solution could readily absorb into the padding in an unfavorable geometry, and the forklift was parked directly under the overhead storage system. Although the overhead storage system can contain high concentrations of uranium at high enrichments the current status is 69 ppm uranium. (Although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% 235U)."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If the overhead storage system contained sufficiently concentrated (>11,000 ppm 235U) uranium and if the solution leaked out of the overhead storage piping and landed on the forklift seat, the solution could achieve a critical configuration due to the volume of the cushion (>7 gallons) and the depth of the cushion (>1.5")."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Controlled parameters include geometry and the design of the overhead storage piping to protect against a large uncontrolled leak."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL. (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): No uranium was involved in this event. The overhead storage system, however, can contain fully enriched uranium-bearing solution at concentrations above minimum critical at volumes up to 6,000 gallons. Current status of the overhead storage system is 69 ppm uranium, and although enrichment is not measured, it is likely <10 wt% 235U."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM (S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Nuclear criticality safety controls include geometry of the fissile material processing equipment in the X-705, the design of those systems to contain the material, and the prohibition against inadvertent containers in the high bay. A forklift seat had holes which can allow for the collection of solution in an unfavorable geometry."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: At 1030 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated. At 1130 hours, compliance was re-established by repairing the forklift seat."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Shear) and NMSS EO (Moore).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36935
Rep Org: NRC REGION 1 OFFICE
Licensee: DAVID BLACKMORE & ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: POTTSTOWN State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: DAVID BLACKMORE & ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: POTTSTOWN State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/27/2000
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2000
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
DAVID BLACKMORE & ASSOCIATES REPORT TO NRC REGION 1 REGARDING A CRUSHED SOIL DENSITY GAUGE IN POTTSTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA
At 1345 on 04/27/00, Joe Hughes (the radiation safety officer at David Blackmore & Associates) notified the NRC Region 1 office that a soil density gauge was crushed at a construction site in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, near Porter Road. Mr. Hughes was informed of the event and was en route to the job site at the time of this notification to the NRC Region 1 office. Mr. Hughes called the NRC Region 1 Office to ask advice and was not aware of the event specifics. The NRC Region 1 office (Noggle) subsequently notified the NRC operations center.
The R1DO (James Noggle) stated that the NRC Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (George Pangburn and Judith Joustra) had been informed.
(Call the NRC operations office for licensee contact information.)
At 1345 on 04/27/00, Joe Hughes (the radiation safety officer at David Blackmore & Associates) notified the NRC Region 1 office that a soil density gauge was crushed at a construction site in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, near Porter Road. Mr. Hughes was informed of the event and was en route to the job site at the time of this notification to the NRC Region 1 office. Mr. Hughes called the NRC Region 1 Office to ask advice and was not aware of the event specifics. The NRC Region 1 office (Noggle) subsequently notified the NRC operations center.
The R1DO (James Noggle) stated that the NRC Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (George Pangburn and Judith Joustra) had been informed.
(Call the NRC operations office for licensee contact information.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36936
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB STEIGERWALD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB STEIGERWALD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/27/2000
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 10:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2000
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 10:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS (FAX)
EPA, DOT (via NRC) (FAX)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS (FAX)
EPA, DOT (via NRC) (FAX)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
- STATE DEC AND U.S. COAST GUARD NOTIFIED OF SMALL OIL DISCHARGE INTO LAKE ONTARIO -
The licensee notified the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the NRC Resident Inspector that approximately two ounces of oil had discharged from the plant storm drains into Lake Ontario. The oil has dispersed. The cause is unknown and being investigated by the licensee.
The licensee notified the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the NRC Resident Inspector that approximately two ounces of oil had discharged from the plant storm drains into Lake Ontario. The oil has dispersed. The cause is unknown and being investigated by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36937
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/27/2000
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 16:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2000
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2000
Event Time: 16:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF POWER TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
At 1505 on 04/27/00, power was lost to the Peach Bottom Technical Support Center (TSC) as a result of breaker malfunctions during planned electrical switching. As of 1605, power had been out for greater than 1 hour constituting a loss of emergency assessment capability at the TSC.
Assessment capability remains in the main control room and the Emergency Operations Facilities, and communication is still in tact between the control room and the TSC. Troubleshooting and restoration activities by maintenance and operations personnel are currently in progress, and this condition does not affect either of the operating plants.
The licensee stated that power to the TSC was lost when two breakers failed to operate during performance of activities to restore power to a normal lineup following maintenance work on lines that do not normally affect the TSC. (However, when this particular lineup change is made, it realigns the power going to the TSC.) When the two breakers failed to operate, power at the TSC was lost. The licensee stated that the loss of power affected the TSC only and that no other systems of facilities were affected.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE AT 1729 ON 04/27/00 FROM JIM KOVALCHICK TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
Power was restored to the TSC at 1710 on 04/27/00.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations center notified the R1DO (Noggle).
At 1505 on 04/27/00, power was lost to the Peach Bottom Technical Support Center (TSC) as a result of breaker malfunctions during planned electrical switching. As of 1605, power had been out for greater than 1 hour constituting a loss of emergency assessment capability at the TSC.
Assessment capability remains in the main control room and the Emergency Operations Facilities, and communication is still in tact between the control room and the TSC. Troubleshooting and restoration activities by maintenance and operations personnel are currently in progress, and this condition does not affect either of the operating plants.
The licensee stated that power to the TSC was lost when two breakers failed to operate during performance of activities to restore power to a normal lineup following maintenance work on lines that do not normally affect the TSC. (However, when this particular lineup change is made, it realigns the power going to the TSC.) When the two breakers failed to operate, power at the TSC was lost. The licensee stated that the loss of power affected the TSC only and that no other systems of facilities were affected.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
***** UPDATE AT 1729 ON 04/27/00 FROM JIM KOVALCHICK TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
Power was restored to the TSC at 1710 on 04/27/00.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations center notified the R1DO (Noggle).