Event Notification Report for April 25, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/24/2000 - 04/25/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3692736928369293693036931
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36927
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: M. JAQUIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: M. JAQUIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/25/2000
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 11:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2000
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 11:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) STEAM FLOW INSTRUMENTS DECLARED INOPERABLE
RCIC steam flow instruments for both Division 1 & 2 became inoperable. Inoperability of these trip units were based upon erratic indications on the trip units. RCIC was subsequently declared inoperable as a result of the required Technical Specification 3.3.2 action for the inoperability of the steam flow instrument which required the isolation of RCIC steam supply line. A 7 day Limiting Condition of Operation for RCIC was entered per Technical Specification 3.7.3 when RCIC steam supply line was isolated. Actions are being taken to correct RCIC steam flow instrument erratic indications. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
RCIC steam flow instruments for both Division 1 & 2 became inoperable. Inoperability of these trip units were based upon erratic indications on the trip units. RCIC was subsequently declared inoperable as a result of the required Technical Specification 3.3.2 action for the inoperability of the steam flow instrument which required the isolation of RCIC steam supply line. A 7 day Limiting Condition of Operation for RCIC was entered per Technical Specification 3.7.3 when RCIC steam supply line was isolated. Actions are being taken to correct RCIC steam flow instrument erratic indications. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36928
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: C. MOWREY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: C. MOWREY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/25/2000
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2000
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO THE STATE OF FLORIDA CONCERNING LOW LEVEL FIXED SURFACE CONTAMINATION FOUND ON SCAFFOLDING EQUIPMENT RECEIVED FROM A VENDOR.
While performing a routine survey, Turkey Point Health Physics personnel discovered low levels of radioactivity on several pieces of scaffolding knuckles and elbows received from a vendor. The knuckles never entered the site's radiologically controlled area. These items were counted in a Small Article Monitor (SAM) and indicated low level contamination was present. In total 12 out of approximately 3,000 items surveyed indicated the presence of low level fixed activity. The highest level measured was 15,833 disintegration's per minute (DPM) when counted on the SAM and 125 net (above background) counts per minute using a standard HP-210 probe. Isotopic analysis indicates Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137. No loose surface contamination was found. The items identified with low level fixed contamination are now being held inside the Turkey Point radiologically controlled area.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event notification by the licensee.
While performing a routine survey, Turkey Point Health Physics personnel discovered low levels of radioactivity on several pieces of scaffolding knuckles and elbows received from a vendor. The knuckles never entered the site's radiologically controlled area. These items were counted in a Small Article Monitor (SAM) and indicated low level contamination was present. In total 12 out of approximately 3,000 items surveyed indicated the presence of low level fixed activity. The highest level measured was 15,833 disintegration's per minute (DPM) when counted on the SAM and 125 net (above background) counts per minute using a standard HP-210 probe. Isotopic analysis indicates Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137. No loose surface contamination was found. The items identified with low level fixed contamination are now being held inside the Turkey Point radiologically controlled area.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event notification by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36929
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: W. FIEDLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: W. FIEDLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/25/2000
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 15:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2000
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 15:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE.
HPCI inverter failure alarm was received at 1545ET. An operator checked the power breakers to the inverter and found them closed. The inverter reset itself at 1551 ET. HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14 day limiting condition of operation was entered per Technical Specification 3.5. Licensee investigating HPCI inverter problem. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the licensee.
HPCI inverter failure alarm was received at 1545ET. An operator checked the power breakers to the inverter and found them closed. The inverter reset itself at 1551 ET. HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14 day limiting condition of operation was entered per Technical Specification 3.5. Licensee investigating HPCI inverter problem. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36930
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/26/2000
Notification Time: 03:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 23:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2000
Notification Time: 03:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 23:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
VARIOUS ESF ACTUATIONS DUE TO RPS BUS 3B DEENERGIZING AS A RESULT OF A FAILED RELAY
"At 2342 CDT on 04/25/00, the RPS bus 3B deenergized causing PCIS Group 2 and Group 6 isolation valves to automatically close. A burnt relay was the initiating condition. Group 2 outboard drywell equipment drain valve and drywell floor drain valve closed. Group 6 drywell radiation monitor isolation valves closed. All other expected group isolations occurred along with the automatic starts of SBGT and CREV Systems.
"Unit 3 is in Mode 5 with primary containment integrity not required.
"This event is reportable under criteria 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) : Any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)."
RPS bus 3B was reenergized from its alternate power supply. Electricians are currently troubleshooting the cause of the failed relay. There was no electrical maintenance or testing ongoing at the time of the relay failure.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
***** UPDATE AT 1424 ON 04/28/00 FROM RAYMOND SWAFFORD TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"TVA is retracting this event report. TVA has reviewed the plant conditions and system alignments existing at the time of this event and has concluded that the actuation signal was invalid. Primary Containment was not required at the time of the event. The PCIS systems were either properly removed from service, were already in their ESF positions at the time of the event, or were a part of excepted systems from reporting according to NUREG-1022, Revision 1. Likewise, the control room emergency ventilation system and standby gas treatment system are excepted systems, and the actuations observed during the event are not reportable since the actuation signal was invalid. Therefore, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Fredrickson).
"At 2342 CDT on 04/25/00, the RPS bus 3B deenergized causing PCIS Group 2 and Group 6 isolation valves to automatically close. A burnt relay was the initiating condition. Group 2 outboard drywell equipment drain valve and drywell floor drain valve closed. Group 6 drywell radiation monitor isolation valves closed. All other expected group isolations occurred along with the automatic starts of SBGT and CREV Systems.
"Unit 3 is in Mode 5 with primary containment integrity not required.
"This event is reportable under criteria 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) : Any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)."
RPS bus 3B was reenergized from its alternate power supply. Electricians are currently troubleshooting the cause of the failed relay. There was no electrical maintenance or testing ongoing at the time of the relay failure.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
***** UPDATE AT 1424 ON 04/28/00 FROM RAYMOND SWAFFORD TO LEIGH TROCINE *****
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"TVA is retracting this event report. TVA has reviewed the plant conditions and system alignments existing at the time of this event and has concluded that the actuation signal was invalid. Primary Containment was not required at the time of the event. The PCIS systems were either properly removed from service, were already in their ESF positions at the time of the event, or were a part of excepted systems from reporting according to NUREG-1022, Revision 1. Likewise, the control room emergency ventilation system and standby gas treatment system are excepted systems, and the actuations observed during the event are not reportable since the actuation signal was invalid. Therefore, this event is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Fredrickson).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36931
Rep Org: DRESSER EQUIPMENT GROUP
Licensee: DRESSER VALVE DIVISION
Region: 0
City: BURLINGTON State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: L. H. WINDFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: DRESSER VALVE DIVISION
Region: 0
City: BURLINGTON State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: L. H. WINDFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/26/2000
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2000
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
DRESSER VALVES NAME PLATE AND CODE PLATE HAVE INCORRECT SET PRESSURE INFORMATION AT HATCH.
PART 21 FROM DRESSER EQUIPMENT GROUP, DRESSER VALVE DIVISION, BURLINGTON, ONTARIO, CANADA.
The following noncompliance has been determined to be reportable within the requirements of 10CFR Part 21. The noncompliance involves seven safety relief valves that were purchased for the Hatch Electric Generating Plant by the Georgia Power Company through its agent, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. The valves are for use in a safely related service.
The valves were purchased on Southern Nuclear Operating Company purchase order #6040304 and produced on Dresser Valve Division sales order #119588N and are further described as follows:
Contract Item 002 Quantity 7 Part Number 3990C-1-S4-MS-33-SC-SC-GS produced ASME Section
III Class 2 valves with the following serial numbers and
required set pressures:
SERIAL NO. SET PRESSURE REQD
B119588-2-1 250 psig
B119588-2-2 250 psig
B119588-2-3 250 psig
B119588-2-4 250 psig
B119588-2-5 250 psig
B119588-3-1 170 psig
B119588-3-2 170 psig
NONCOMPLIANCE SITUATION AND BRIEF HISTORY
On Tuesday April 25, 2000, the customer was performing receiving inspection and noticed that the set pressure information on the Code Plates and the Name Plates do not conform to the specification requirements or the history docket testing information. The customer called the Quality Assurance Department of Dresser Valve Division to discuss the finding. It appears that the set pressure information on the plates has been interchanged.
A summary of the information is as follows:
SERIAL NO SET PRESSURE REQD CODE PLATE NAME PLATE
B119588-2-1 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-2 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-3 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-4 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-5 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-3-1 170 psig 250 psig 250 psig
B119588-3-2 170 psig 250 psig 250 psig
Our investigation has begun and we have conducted a full review of our records to confirm that the valves are set correctly to the contract requirements. A notice has been given to the customer to return the affected valves to Dresser Valve Division for confirmation of the plate information and correction if required. The ANI will be involved in the investigation and corrective actions as required.
We have conducted a full review of our records and confirmed that these are the only valves involved. A full review of our procedures regarding plate preparation, inspection and installation will be completed. Corrective actions will be initiated to address the internal issues, if warranted, and details will be provided in our closure reports at the completion of our investigation into the cause of this situation.
* * * UPDATE 1415EDT ON 6/16/00 FROM WINFIELD TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"This is a summary of the event dealing with the cause and the corrective actions implemented to prevent recurrence.
"The customer returned the valves and the set pressures were confirmed to be correct to the General Arrangement Drawing (GA Dwg) requirements. New nameplates were produced, verified to the approved GA Dwg., and installed on the valves as witnessed by the ANI.
"It was confirmed that the incorrect nameplate information was derived from internal work order data. The approved GA Dwg was not used as required.
"Revised internal operating procedures are being implemented to ensure that engineering personnel complete nameplate forms, from data appearing only on the approved GA Dwg. Only the approved GA Dwg will be used to verify the correctness of the data."
Notified R2DO(Bernhard) and NRR(Hodge).
PART 21 FROM DRESSER EQUIPMENT GROUP, DRESSER VALVE DIVISION, BURLINGTON, ONTARIO, CANADA.
The following noncompliance has been determined to be reportable within the requirements of 10CFR Part 21. The noncompliance involves seven safety relief valves that were purchased for the Hatch Electric Generating Plant by the Georgia Power Company through its agent, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. The valves are for use in a safely related service.
The valves were purchased on Southern Nuclear Operating Company purchase order #6040304 and produced on Dresser Valve Division sales order #119588N and are further described as follows:
Contract Item 002 Quantity 7 Part Number 3990C-1-S4-MS-33-SC-SC-GS produced ASME Section
III Class 2 valves with the following serial numbers and
required set pressures:
SERIAL NO. SET PRESSURE REQD
B119588-2-1 250 psig
B119588-2-2 250 psig
B119588-2-3 250 psig
B119588-2-4 250 psig
B119588-2-5 250 psig
B119588-3-1 170 psig
B119588-3-2 170 psig
NONCOMPLIANCE SITUATION AND BRIEF HISTORY
On Tuesday April 25, 2000, the customer was performing receiving inspection and noticed that the set pressure information on the Code Plates and the Name Plates do not conform to the specification requirements or the history docket testing information. The customer called the Quality Assurance Department of Dresser Valve Division to discuss the finding. It appears that the set pressure information on the plates has been interchanged.
A summary of the information is as follows:
SERIAL NO SET PRESSURE REQD CODE PLATE NAME PLATE
B119588-2-1 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-2 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-3 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-4 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-2-5 250 psig 170 psig 170 psig
B119588-3-1 170 psig 250 psig 250 psig
B119588-3-2 170 psig 250 psig 250 psig
Our investigation has begun and we have conducted a full review of our records to confirm that the valves are set correctly to the contract requirements. A notice has been given to the customer to return the affected valves to Dresser Valve Division for confirmation of the plate information and correction if required. The ANI will be involved in the investigation and corrective actions as required.
We have conducted a full review of our records and confirmed that these are the only valves involved. A full review of our procedures regarding plate preparation, inspection and installation will be completed. Corrective actions will be initiated to address the internal issues, if warranted, and details will be provided in our closure reports at the completion of our investigation into the cause of this situation.
* * * UPDATE 1415EDT ON 6/16/00 FROM WINFIELD TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"This is a summary of the event dealing with the cause and the corrective actions implemented to prevent recurrence.
"The customer returned the valves and the set pressures were confirmed to be correct to the General Arrangement Drawing (GA Dwg) requirements. New nameplates were produced, verified to the approved GA Dwg., and installed on the valves as witnessed by the ANI.
"It was confirmed that the incorrect nameplate information was derived from internal work order data. The approved GA Dwg was not used as required.
"Revised internal operating procedures are being implemented to ensure that engineering personnel complete nameplate forms, from data appearing only on the approved GA Dwg. Only the approved GA Dwg will be used to verify the correctness of the data."
Notified R2DO(Bernhard) and NRR(Hodge).