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Event Notification Report for April 23, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/22/2000 - 04/23/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
36925369203692137003

Power Reactor
Event Number: 36925
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2     State: AL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOE BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/24/2000
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2000
Event Time: 22:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANN BOLAND (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR "3ED" RECEIVED AND AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL.

On 04/21/00 at 2208, the "3ED" Emergency Diesel Generator received an automatic start signal due to degraded voltage as a result of testing activities associated with the "3ED" 4 kv Shutdown Board. At the time the start was received, the Diesel Generator and the 4 kv Shutdown Board were considered inoperable for their Technical Specification functions, therefore the event was not deemed reportable as an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. Further review of the event by the plant staff along with the Senior Resident Inspector concluded that this event should have been considered an ESF actuation, since the automatic start was not preplanned, and the Diesel Generator started as the result of a valid initiation signal.

The NRC Resident will be notified of this event notification by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36920
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/23/2000
Notification Time: 00:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2000
Event Time: 00:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2000
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
M. DAPAS (R3)
DAVID MATTHEWS (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
CEGIELSKI (FEMA)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

During preparation for a bus transfer test, the wrong relay was energized which caused the loss of offsite power to the 'A' and 'B' 13.8 Kv busses. An Unusual Event was declared with the loss of offsite power. Only one of the offsite sources was energized at the time and the relay tripped during test setup causing the loss of that source. The 4160 volt essential busses were reenergized by their respective emergency diesel generators. The plant was defueled at the time and spent fuel pool cooling was restarted.

There was no release of radioactivity and no recommended protective actions necessary.

The licensee is conducting a review of the event and all testing activities are suspended until completed.

The Unusual Event was terminated at 0054 EDT with the restoration of normal power configuration.

The licensee notified the State of Ohio and the local counties, Ottawa and Lucas, as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36921
Facility: COOK
Region: 3     State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MOTZ
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/23/2000
Notification Time: 06:49 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2000
Event Time: 03:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
UNIT 1 TRAIN 'B' ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP STARTED AUTOMATICALLY

While setting up for testing the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) on Unit 2, the clearance permit did not anticipate the start of the Unit 1 train 'B' Essential Service Water (ESW) Pump.

"To perform maintenance on the SSPS, a clearance to deenergize the SSPS cabinets in Unit 2 was written. The Unit 2 SSPS was in inhibit at this time. During the deenergization per this clearance, an automatic start of the Unit 1 East ESW Pump occurred. The ESW Pump autostart was not anticipated or described in the clearance.

"A Safety Injection (SI) signal through SSPS in either Unit 1 or Unit 2 will cause the ESW Pumps in both units to autostart for the train effected. Similarly, the removal of power from the control room instrumentation distribution circuit, which is what occurred here, will cause the autostart of the ESW pumps.

"There were no adverse consequences as a result of the auto pump start and the actuation was per the system design. No SI signal was generated."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1822 ON 5/10/00 BY WOODS RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

"The original report was made regarding an automatic start of the Unit 1 East Essential Service Water (ESW) Pump during maintenance, and was conservatively reported as an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). Subsequent reviews of the pump start event and the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 have confirmed that this event is not reportable.

"In the case of the start of the 1 E ESW Pump, the ESF actuation slave relay never was actuated, but was deenergized and would not have actuated. No other portion of the associated ESF actuation circuitry was completed. Additionally, the ESW pump was not manually started in an emergency response to plant conditions that would have required the pump to be operating.

"NUREG-1022, Revision 1, Event Reporting Guidelines: 10CFR50.72 and 50.73, Part 3.3.2, Actuation Of An Engineered Safety Feature Or The RPS, provides guidance for the reporting requirements of an ESF actuation event as listed in 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The NUREG states that actuation of certain single ESF components of complex systems need not be reported. Single components of complex systems, by themselves, usually do not mitigate the consequences of significant events.

"Based on the facts that this event was an inadvertent start of a single component that would not mitigate the consequences of a significant event, and that the minimum amount of ESF actuation logic, i.e., the slave relay, did not actuate, the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. Therefore, the 4 hour non-emergency report, event number 36921, is being retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector of this report. The Operations Center notified the R3DO (CLAYTON).


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 37003
Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT, INC.
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT, INC.
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS   State: MO
County: ST. LOUIS
License #: 240420601
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM SCHUH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/15/2000
Notification Time: 13:12 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOSIE PICCCONE (NMSS)
DAVID LEW (R1)
Event Text
LOST DEPLETED URANIUM SHIELD WITH USED TECHNETIUM-99 GENERATOR

On April 23, 2000, a depleted uranium (DU) shield was declared lost in accordance with Mallinckrodt, Inc. (Ml) site procedures for tracking and accountability of this material.

This shield was shipped as part of a Mo-99/Tc-99m Generator from the Maryland Heights facility on March 12, 1999. It was shipped to a Mallinckrodt, Inc pharmacy in North Attleboro, MA. The pharmacy received the generator and it was offered for return shipment to our site on March 31, 1999. At the time it was offered for shipment, the safe also contained a generator column with approximately 440 mCi of Mo-99. The generator was shipped via Del Med, Inc. The generator went to a Del Med warehouse in South Plainfield, NJ and was stored until April 8, 1999. Del Med records indicate the package was then shipped to the Maryland Heights facility via Associated Courier. Associated Courier has indicated the generator was returned to the Maryland heights facility.

Return generator packages are not tracked by the couriers with an individual package number. The packages are generally collected on a pallet in the courier's warehouse and transported to Maryland Heights when a pallet is full. They generally arrive at Maryland Heights with a single bill of Lading. We do not become aware of a particular generators serial number until the package is inspected, opened, and the generator bar code is scanned into our system. We have no record of this generator being scanned back into our system. This indicates to us that it never arrived on our site. We have no record of this DU shield returning to the Maryland Heights facility. If the safe was reused without check-in, it would have shown up on subsequent scanning when shipped from our facility or upon arrival after it's subsequent use. Mallinckrodt believes the package was not delivered to the Maryland Heights facility and was lost in the transportation cycle. The location of this safe is unknown to Mallinckrodt and the carriers involved in it's transportation.

Our site procedures allow a one year time frame for a depleted uranium shield to be returned to our site after the expected return date. This allows time for customers to utilize the generator and make necessary transportation arrangements, couriers to search their warehouses, and time for the shields to cycle through Mallinckrodt's systems. This package had an expected return date of April 23, 1999. The one year time frame for this missing safe expired on April 23, 2000.

As part of our investigation, we contacted the original pharmacy and the two couriers who handled this package. The pharmacy has provided a copy of a bill of lading indicating they offered the DU safe for shipment. The couriers have indicated they have conducted a search of their warehouses and do not have the DU safe in their possession.

The safe itself contains approximately 8000 µCi of U-238 metal encapsulated in stainless steel. The safe is stamped with the legend "Caution-Radioactive Shielding-Uranium" in accordance with 10CFR40.13(c)(6). The dose rate on contact with the DU safe is approximately 3 to 4 mrad/hr. As a result of the construction of the safe, and the low dose rates exhibited by this material, no significant exposures would be expected to members of the public.

MI has been in contact with NRC Region 3 (James Cameron).