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Event Notification Report for April 17, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/16/2000 - 04/17/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
36910369013690236897

Power Reactor
Event Number: 36910
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE MERRILL
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/20/2000
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2000
Event Time: 10:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANN BOLAND (R2)
DAVID MATTHEWS (NRR)
CHUCK DePUY (FEMA)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
- RCS LEAKAGE CRITERIA FOR DECLARING AN UNUSUAL EVENT EXISTED ON 04/17/00 -

At 1020 on 04/17/00, St. Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 4 in a refueling outage preparing to go on shutdown cooling.
A pre-job brief was conducted and included a discussion of the potential for pressurizer level change, relief valve lifting and the need to monitor the telltale on containment spray isolation valve #MV-07-3 to determine valve leakage. The expectation was established that the operating crew would terminate the evolution if unexpected leakage was observed with the primary focus on the telltale tubing monitoring containment spray isolation valve #MV-07-3.

The control room operator observed a sudden drop in pressurizer level once the last shutdown cooling isolation valve was opened (6% drop on the hot calibration indication). The valve was immediately closed and pressurizer level stabilized; the evolution duration was approximately 3 minutes. As the valve was closing, the field operator stated he was seeing leakage through the tygon tubing, which he estimated to be about 1 to 2 gpm. There was no increase in sump level and no abnormal interfacing system behavior. Operations department personnel believed the behavior observed was consistent with filling shutdown cooling lines.

Subsequently, the on-shift engineer performed an inventory balance and, without adjusting for changing temperatures and pressures, estimated a 100 gpm leak had occurred. The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) did not feel the inventory balance was valid in that he knew the accuracy of the calculation was biased because of the effect of temperature and pressure and the short duration of the event. Based on the discrepancy between the calculation and field observation, the NPS had a condition report issued to determine the RCS leak rate.

The NPS rationale for not entering the Emergency Plan and that RCS leakage was not greater than 10 gpm was based on the following:

- his field operator's observations showed a 1-2 gpm leak,
- a lack of any increase in sump level,
- a lack of any abnormal plant interfacing systems behavior, and
- the evolution was consistent with his understanding of the pressurizer level behavior when filling shutdown cooling piping based on his observation in the past.

A subsequent activity of placing shutdown cooling on line later that same day resulted in a similar event,
with significantly less inventory loss. Shutdown cooling train A was placed on line the afternoon of 04/17/00.

However, based on the results of the engineering review, the pressurizer level drop was not solely due to the fill and vent evolution of the shutdown cooling system, as originally concluded. Two hundred (200) gallons of RCS inventory was transferred inter-system during this event. FPL has concluded that this short duration, operator-terminated event met the procedural requirements for entering the emergency plan. However, it is clear upon review of the context and intent of the emergency plan that at no time did an actual emergency or threat thereof exist.

As provided for in NUREG 1022, "a licensee may discover that an event or condition had existed which met the emergency plan criteria, but that no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of discovery". Based on an engineering review, FPL concludes that while initiating shutdown cooling on the A train on 04/17/00, an RCS inventory transfer occurred to interfacing systems in the 2-3 minute periods associated with starting shutdown cooling. The initial attempt to place shutdown cooling on line, and possibly a second attempt later the same day, resulted in leakage exceeding the Technical Specification threshold and would constitute entry into a Notification of Unusual Event. Although the criteria was met, FPL is not declaring an emergency for the following reasons:

1. The event was the result of a planned activity and the greater than expected pressurizer level drop was quickly compensated for by operator actions.

2. The event was of very short duration and at no time challenged the ability for decay heat removal or posed a threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

3. The circumstances associated with determining the appropriate classification of the event required three days of engineering evaluation.

State and local county officials and the Senior NRC Resident Inspector are being informed of the event.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36901
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COTTER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 04/17/2000
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2000
Event Time: 13:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM

"At 13:04 on 4/17/00, BVFS Unit 1 experienced a loss of the turbine auxiliary steam header pressure. The loss of auxiliary steam pressure resulted in a decrease in condenser vacuum, rapidly approaching the low-low vacuum turbine trip setpoint. At 1309, the reactor was tripped manually. Steam Generator 1C feed valve FCV-1FW-498 was isolated during recovery due to minor leakby. Auxiliary Feedwater and all other equipment responded as expected. The initial problem was caused by a failure of the auxiliary steam supply pressure control valve air diaphragm packing. This valve is air to open and spring operated to close. Air pressure was lost through the failed packing causing the valve to fail in the closed position. Auxiliary steam was restored during plant stabilization. The plant is in Hot Standby and all systems are functioning properly. Heat removal is via the normal condenser steam dump system."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36902
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3     State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SELL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 04/17/2000
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2000
Event Time: 14:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON MONITOR COULD BE AFFECTED BY 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE

"The cabling for Unit 2 source range monitor 2N-32 was found to be impacted by a postulated fire in either the CCW pump room or the Unit 2 MCC room in the 8' PAB. Per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R at least one nuclear instrument (2N-31, 2N-32 or 2N-40) must be available to monitor source range flux while shutting down the unit. [Monitor] 2N-32 is relied upon for a fire in [fire zone] FZ 142 and 166 due to cable losses on the 2N-31 and 2N-40 instruments. Loss of 2N-32 will cause a total loss of SR monitoring capability which places the plant outside the Appendix R design basis."

The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36897
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3     State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/17/2000
Notification Time: 04:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2000
Event Time: 02:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
CLOSURE OF A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE RESULTING IN LOSS OF AN RHR PUMP AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING FOR 21 MINUTES

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"At 0251 on 04/17/00, the E1150-F008 'RHR Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Outboard Isolation Valve' closed causing the RHR 'B' pump to trip due to loss of suction flow path. At the time of the trip, the RHR 'B' pump was in operation for [SDC]."

"[SDC] was restored at 0312. During the event, Unit 2 was in Mode 5 -- Refueling -- with the vessel cavity flooded up to greater than 20' 6" above the vessel flange with the fuel pool gates removed. No temperature rise in the vessel was noted during the time SDC was out of service. No core alterations were in progress at the time."

"Prior to the closure of the E1150-F008 valve, [the] Division 2 core spray system was being tagged out of service for [refueling] outage maintenance. Part of the tag-out was to remove fuses for the core spray AC/DC inverter. Upon removing power to the inverter, a reactor high pressure signal caused a trip system B, group 4 -- Shutdown Cooling/Head Spray Isolation, which closes the E1150-F008 valve. After the isolation, the core spray AC/DC inverter was returned to service, the E1150-F008 valve opened, and RHR 'B' pump was placed back into [the] SDC mode."

"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), any event or condition that results in the manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.