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Event Notification Report for April 13, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/12/2000 - 04/13/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
368873688836889

Power Reactor
Event Number: 36887
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GLENN KRAUSE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/13/2000
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2000
Event Time: 10:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES PAULK (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 78 Power Operation 78 Power Operation
Event Text
UNEXPECTED REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ISOLATION DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING

"At 1004 on 04/13/00 during the performance of I&C STP 207-4539 (RCIC Isolation - RCIC steam supply pressure low channel functional test on E31 N685B) received a Division II isolation of the RCIC system. The isolation appears to be invalid. E51-F063 (RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve) and RCIC Trip and Throttle Valve went from open to closed as designed. Investigation is ongoing to determine the cause."

RCIC was declared inoperable placing the unit in a 14-day LCO A/S.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36888
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: E. LEMKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/13/2000
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2000
Event Time: 15:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CHARLES PAULK (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES MAY CLOSE FASTER THAN 1.5-SECOND DESIGN BASIS LIMIT.

On March 21, 2000, Waterford Unit 3 determined that, based on a new calculation methodology and the latest stroke time data, the Feedwater Isolation Valves (FWIVs) FW-184 A (B) may close faster than the 1.5-second design basis limit.

The physical plant was determined to be operable and the FWIVs would have performed their intended safety function at the time the condition was identified. An initial operability evaluation was made in accordance with procedure W4.101, which determined that the valves were operable at the time the evaluation was conducted. This was based on an engineering evaluation that determined that the faster closure of the FWIVs would not result in water hammer loads that would prevent the FWIVs and their associated penetrations from performing their required safety function. The engineering evaluation determined that the analyzed increase in fast valve closure (FVC) load is 57% for FW-184A and 52.9% for FW-184B.

A subsequent evaluation was performed for FW-184A (B) to determine if at any time in the last two years the increase in FVC load may have exceeded the allowable loads determined by the engineering evaluation for W4.101. That evaluation determined on one occasion for FW-184A and six occasions for FW-184B, the percent increases for the FWIVs and subsequent stroke times exceeded the values provided in the operability determination

On these occasions in question, closure of FW-184A (B) in response to the most adverse accident scenario could have potentially produced water hammer that may have exceeded the capability of piping supports in the FW system between the SGs and FW-184A (B). This may have resulted in the subsequent loss of containment isolation function of FW-184A (B).

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/25/00 AT 1630 ET BY CHRIS PICKERING TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

Entergy is revising this event notification. The event was initially reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) as a condition that alone could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. Based upon further review of the condition, Entergy has determined the condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

Evaluation of the event determined that the potential impact on containment integrity as a result of this condition does not affect the results of the currently analyzed MSLB event's radiological consequences. Further, the possibility of containment integrity loss due to excessive waterhammer loads during a FWLB remains bounded by the MSLB with respect to dose consequences. The FWLB event radiological consequences are bounded by the MSLB event, which is predicted to be within 10CFR100 limits.

This event posed a containment integrity condition that was outside the design basis of the plant. An evaluation determined that the FWIVs could have potentially closed faster than their design basis minimum limit on seven occasions, six instances for FW-184A and one instance for FW-184B. The original event notification (above) incorrectly noted that there was one instance for FW-184A and six instances for FW-184B. The faster valve closure times could have placed increased loads on the piping and piping supports in the FW system between the steam generators (inside containment) and the FWIVs (outside containment). These increased loads were not accounted for in the design basis of the system. Based on this information, the event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event revision by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36889
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3     State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY HASTINGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/13/2000
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2000
Event Time: 16:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
BOTH STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF A POSTULATED FIRE.


It was discovered that the 2A Steam Generator pressure transmitter 2PT-469 would not be available as a result of a postulated fire event in the North Section of the Primary Auxiliary Building, 26 foot elevation. 2PT-469 is a redundant Appendix R instrument to 2PT-483, 2B Steam Generator pressure transmitter. 2PT-483 was already known to be lost due to this postulated fire event. The loss of both pressure transmitters places the plant outside the design basis for Appendix R.

This was discovered during the Appendix R Rebaselining Project review. Compensatory actions include a fire watch in the appropriate fire zone within one hour of discovery and twice per shift thereafter. As a long term corrective action Point Beach is already pursuing a plant modification to re-route pressure transmitter 2PT-483 cables.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.