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Event Notification Report for April 12, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/11/2000 - 04/12/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
36885368823688336884

Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36885
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/13/2000
Notification Time: 03:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2000
Event Time: 13:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT

The following is quoted from the licensee's report:

1-kg cylinders were discovered in the C-710 Isotopic Lab that violate the wall thickness design specification of NCSE 1493-03. The wall thickness credited in the NCSE is 0.109". Wall thicknesses of some cylinders were discovered as low as 0.065". The wall thickness is credited in the criticality safety calculations to demonstrate double contingency.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

A design feature limitation credited to ensure double contingency was exceeded. Calculations demonstrate that greater than 240 cylinders using a wall thickness of 0.065" of optimally moderated UO2F2 solution are safe. There are a total of 95 1-kg cylinders in the three storage cabinets in the Isotopic Lab.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:

In order for a criticality to be possible, the batch limitation would have to be exceeded by more than a factor of three. Additionally, the 1-kg cylinders would have to be filled with optimally moderated UO2F2 solution instead of the existing UF6.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing interaction and geometry controls.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):

There are 95 1-kg cylinders in C-710 only some of which have been determined to have inadequate wall thickness. The assay of these cylinders varies from less than 1% U235 to approximately 4.6% U235. The material contained in these cylinders is UF6.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction control through the application of batch limits. This control was not violated and the first leg of double contingency was maintained.

The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry control. This is controlled through implementation of design specifications for the 1-kg cylinder. The actual wall thickness was discovered to be less than that credited in the design features. Therefore, the geometry process parameter limit was exceeded.

The geometry process parameter was violated, therefore double contingency was not maintained.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

This area is being controlled to ensure that no fissile material is moved within two feet of this storage area. NCS is in the process of developing a remediation plan to correct this condition.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:

Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing interaction and geometry controls.

The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction control through the application of batch limits. This control was not violated and the first leg of double contingency was maintained.

The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry control, This is controlled through implementation of design specifications for the 1-kg cylinder. The actual wall thickness was discovered to be less than that credited in the design features. Therefore, the geometry process parameter limit was exceeded.

The geometry process parameter was violated therefore double contingency was not maintained.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED;

In order for a criticality to be possible, the batch limits would have to be exceeded by more than a factor of three. Additionally, the 1-kg cylinders would have to be filled with optimally moderated UO2F2 solution instead of the existing UF6.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF INCIDENT:

A design feature limitation credited to ensure double contingency was exceeded. Calculations demonstrate that greater than 240 cylinders using a wall thickness of 0.065" of optimally moderated UO2F2 solution are safe. There are a total 95 1-kg cylinders in the three storage cabinets in the Isotopic Lab.

EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:

Post the area as follows in accordance with CP2-EG-NS1031. Ensure all four sides including areas on opposite sides of adjacent walls less than 2-feet from the storage cabinets.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36882
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KONOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/12/2000
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2000
Event Time: 10:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC REBER (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 99 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
REACTOR TRIP

"At 1054, a manual reactor trip was performed due to a turbine runback due to the Valve Position Limiter (VPL) going down outside of the Operators' control. The trip was performed when a previously identified limit on turbine load was reached. An Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) card was being replaced at the time of the runback in accordance with SC.IC-GP.EHC.0002(Z), General Troubleshooting for Main Turbine EHC System as an Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE). This card was being replaced to fix a previously identified slow drift downward of the VPL. An Aux Feedwater (AFW) Autostart signal was received due to low S/G level due to normal shrinkage of S/G levels for normal post trip response. All safety systems performed as designed. Source Range Nuclear Instrument (SRNI) N-31 and 14 Service Water Pump were out of service prior to the trip, SRNI N-32 performed as designed. At this time, the unit is stable in Mode 3."

All control rods fully inserted following the trip. The main condenser remains in service with decay heat being removed via the bypass valves.

The licensee informed Lower Alloways Creek (LAC) Township and the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform the state of New Jersey.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36883
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2     State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 04/12/2000
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2000
Event Time: 14:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
LEAK IN THE HPCI TEST RETURN HEADER TO THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

On 4/12/2000, at 14:10 while performing 2-SR-3.5.1 .7, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set Developed Head and Flow Rate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure, the Unit Operator (UO)observed unstable HPCI suction pressure, followed by an auto swap of the suction from the Condensate Storage Supply to the Suppression Pool. The UO then observed annunciator, 'HPCI PUMP SUCT CONDENSATE HDR LEVEL LOW'. HPCI was tripped and declared inoperable. Subsequently a leak was discovered on the HPCI Test Return header to the CST. The leak has been isolated. Unit conditions are stable.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION 1815 4/18/2000 FROM TIM GOLDEN TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * *

"TVA is retracting this report. Subsequent investigation into the cause of this event determined that the source of the leak was a separated weld in a non-safety related portion of the test return flowpath to the condensate storage tank. Testing and engineering analyses performed after the event demonstrated that the conditions which caused the event would not have prevented HPCI from performing it's safety function if required. Specifically, if HPCI had been called upon to mitigate an actual event, automatic closure of the test return control valve would have isolated the leak, thereby establishing a safety injection flow path to the reactor vessel. Therefore, this event is not reportable with respect to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) and is hereby retracted. The senior NRC resident inspector has been informed."

Notified R2DO (Boland).


Research Reactor
Event Number: 36884
Rep Org: UNIV OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
Region: 3
City: COLUMBIA   State: MO
County: BOONE
License #: R-103
Agreement: N
Docket: 05000186
NRC Notified By: JOHN ERNST
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 04/12/2000
Notification Time: 18:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2000
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
AL ADAMS (NRR)
Event Text
POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN OVEREXPOSURE

This report is based on the potential to cause an exposure in excess of 25 REM. No actual over-exposure occurred.

The licensee moved fuel into the fuel pool. This caused a high radiation alarm to be sounded in a room adjacent to the fuel pool. The licensee investigated and determined that the cause of the alarm was that some concrete shielding had been removed from the side of the pool. The shielding had been removed so that an inspection of the fuel pool liner could be performed. A 2 foot by 2 foot piece of shielding was removed from the wall, which is four feet thick.

After verifying that the room was not occupied, the licensee moved the fuel to a safe portion of the pool The licensee reported radiation measurements of 200 R/HR in the area where the shield was removed.