Event Notification Report for March 30, 2000

CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM FAILURE DURING A TEST

At 1845 on 03-30-2000, during functional testing of C-746Q Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS), it was discovered that temperature control system on cluster "AD" was unable to perform the ability to maintain the system above the manufacturer's fourteen degree Fahrenheit recommendation due to failure of a temperature switch. The system was last tested on 12-30-99 and was determined to be functional at that time. In January of this year there were several days were outside ambient temperature dropped below fourteen degrees Fahrenheit and operability of system at those times cannot be reasonably determined. Even though the failure was discovered during testing, it is possible that the system would not have performed its intended safety function if it had been required to since the last surveillance on 12-30-99.

This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

* * * Update 1155EDT on 4/3/00 from Underwood to S.Sandin * * *

Corrected event date and time. Operations informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak).

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS

"At approximately 0850 hours on March 30th, 2000, it was determined that one loop of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system piping located in the Spent Fuel Storage Building (FSB) was not in compliance with FSAR design criteria. The FSAR says that CCW is protected from tornadoes and tornado generated missiles by structures designed to withstand such loading. The CCW piping located in the FSB is not protected by the structure. This was identified as an issue and addressed as part of the 10CFR50.54(f) program at Indian Point 3. The issue was not considered reportable when first identified because tornado protection from the effects of missiles can be provided by redundancy. An evaluation has shown that the CCW piping can sustain limited damage from a tornado missile and that the design function of the system can be performed with this damage. Operator action is depended upon to initiate makeup water to the CCW system, a current design basis. When a 10CFR50.59 evaluation determined that the criteria for the CCW tornado protection could not be changed without prior NRC approval, the issue was determined to be reportable because the CCW system could not be shown to be in accordance with FSAR design basis. No corrective actions were immediately required because current administrative controls are sufficient to assure system operability."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this report by the licensee.

LOST SOURCE

The licensee reported the loss of a 15 mCi nickel-63 source from their Washington, WV facility. Ni-63 is a low energy beta emitter and has no gamma. The source is used in an electron capture device and was last seen in July of 1999 in the licensee's laboratory. Contact information is available from the Operations Center.

ESF ACTUATION

"At 1204 on March 30, 2000, an 18 month automatic-load sequencing operational surveillance test was being conducted on the No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) during a refueling at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 1. The power to the 4KV 1AE Emergency Bus was being supplied by the operating No. 1 EDG and the Emergency Bus 4KV-1AE was separated from offsite power sources. The EDG output breaker E9 unexpectedly opened and re-closed three times before the breaker remained open, deenergizing the 4KV-1AE Emergency Bus. The cause of this event is not currently known and is being investigated. Power was restored to the 4KV 1 AE Emergency Bus at 1228 from the offsite power source. The No.1 EDG was subsequently shutdown and remains out of service. The redundant train reactor decay heat cooling and spent fuel pool cooling remained in service throughout this event. Reactor coolant temperature and spent fuel pool temperature remained constant. The redundant 4KV 1DF Emergency Bus and No. 2 EDG remained unaffected by this event.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) as an event that resulted in an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature. De-energizing the 1 AE Emergency Bus actuated an automatic EDO signal and output breaker E9 closure. The EDG had been running, however, and the output breaker opened and re-closed three times before remaining open."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT

A 100 mCi Cs-137 source was found at the Southern Scrap Yard in Baton Rouge, LA. The source was part of a level gauge used by Formosa Plastics. The source was unopened and there was no spread of contamination. The manufacturer of the source, Texas Nuclear Technologies, will recover the source. The source is currently in a roped off area at the scrap yard. The State is investigating how the source ended up in the scrap yard.

* * *UPDATE 0928EDT ON 4/3/00 FROM PAT LARKINS TO S.SANDIN * * *

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS FAXED TO THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER ON 4/3/00 BY THE NRC OFFICE OF STATE PROGRAMS:

"APPROXIMATELY 1220 [HOURS] THURSDAY 3/30/00 LDEQ RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE NATIONAL
RESPONSE CENTER DIRECTING US TO SOUTHERN SCRAP LOCATED ON SCENIC HWY IN BATON
ROUGE, LA, CONCERNING A SOURCE DISCOVERED ON THEIR YARD. THE ATTACHMENT PLATE ON
THE Cs-137 LEVEL GAUGE WAS DAMAGED BY A SHREDDER AT SOUTHERN SCRAP. THIS ACTION
EXPOSED THE SOURCE LEADING TO ITS DISCOVERY. SOUTHERN SCRAP WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE
FROM LABELING THAT THE SOURCE WAS A 100 mCi Cs-137 SOURCE MANUFACTURED IN 1991 BY TN
TECHNOLOGY AND BELONGED TO FORMOSA PLASTIC. THE SOURCE WAS A MODEL 5200 LEVEL
GAUGE, S/N B2209. AT 1430 [HOURS] A MEETING WAS HELD WITH FORMOSA PLASTIC TO TRY TO
DETERMINE HOW THE SOURCE ESCAPED THEIR POSSESSION. AT THIS TIME NO MEANS COULD BE
DETERMINED. AT 2000 [HOURS] 3/30/00 A TN TECHNOLOGY REPRESENTATIVE RECOVERED THE
SOURCE. FOUR WIPE TEST[S] WERE PERFORMED ON THE SOURCE, ALL RESULTING IN THE SOURCE
NOT LEAKING. THERE WAS NO CONTAMINATION OF THE AREA. ON 3/31/00, JIM ALDREDGE
CONTACTED LDEQ STATING THAT THE SHUTTER WAS NOT SHEERED OFF AND THE GAUGE WAS
RETURNED TO THE LOCKED POSITION. MR ALDREDGE ALSO STATED THAT THE GAUGE WAS TO BE RETURNED TO FORMOSA PLASTIC ON 3/31/00."

THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED R4DO (JONES) AND NMSS (HICKEY).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

A DEAD LOGGERHEAD SEA TURTLE WAS RECOVERED FROM THE INTAKE CANAL AT APPROXIMATELY 1600. THE FLORIDA FISH AND WILD LIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION WAS NOTIFIED AT 1620. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.