Event Notification Report for March 21, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/20/2000 - 03/21/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
368273682136822368233681936820
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36827
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NDC
Region: 4
City: IRWINDALE State: CA
County:
License #: 145-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD BUNN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: NDC
Region: 4
City: IRWINDALE State: CA
County:
License #: 145-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD BUNN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/23/2000
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 06:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2000
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 06:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE YANDELL (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
MATT ROBERTS (DOT)
JOHN WILLIAMS (DOE)
LAWRENCE YANDELL (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
MATT ROBERTS (DOT)
JOHN WILLIAMS (DOE)
AGREEMENT STATE/TRANSPORTATION EVENT INVOLVING A BURNED FEDERAL EXPRESS TRUCK CARRYING A GAUGE WITH A SMALL SOURCE IN IT
On 3/21/00 at about 6:30 AM in Oxnard CA, a Federal Express truck burned due to an unknown cause. It was discovered today, 3/23/00, that a thickness gauge from NDC of Irwindale, CA was on the truck. The gauge contains a special form source of Curium-244, 100 mCi. The source is thought to be able to survive the fire and is being sought. Dr. Roy Parker, the Federal Express Safety Officer, is on the scene and following up on the incident.
The National Response Center report number is 523952.
(Call the HOO for contact numbers)
* * * UPDATE AT 1715 EST ON 3/24/00 BY DONALD BUNN TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The source has been recovered intact from the fire debris, there has been no release. Notified the NMSS EO (Larry Camper), R4DO (Lawrence Yandell), IRO (Frank Congel), DOT (Matt Robertson), and DOE (Mike Wyatt).
On 3/21/00 at about 6:30 AM in Oxnard CA, a Federal Express truck burned due to an unknown cause. It was discovered today, 3/23/00, that a thickness gauge from NDC of Irwindale, CA was on the truck. The gauge contains a special form source of Curium-244, 100 mCi. The source is thought to be able to survive the fire and is being sought. Dr. Roy Parker, the Federal Express Safety Officer, is on the scene and following up on the incident.
The National Response Center report number is 523952.
(Call the HOO for contact numbers)
* * * UPDATE AT 1715 EST ON 3/24/00 BY DONALD BUNN TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The source has been recovered intact from the fire debris, there has been no release. Notified the NMSS EO (Larry Camper), R4DO (Lawrence Yandell), IRO (Frank Congel), DOT (Matt Robertson), and DOE (Mike Wyatt).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36821
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 13:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 13:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"Valves being dispositioned as part of the transfer of material storage areas from DOE to USEC in C-331 were incorrectly handled as NCS exempt equipment in violation of NCSA GEN-20. NCSA GEN-20 requires that the equipment be characterized prior to movement/transportation. Valves located in former DMSAs were incorrectly labeled as exempt from NCS controls based on invalid assay smear results. The smears contained less than a measurable quantity of uranium and valid assay results could not be obtained. Assay smears with uranium below a measurable quantity cannot provide an accurate measurement of assay. The smear analysis results were incorrectly used to determine that the equipment assay was below 1%.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"Assay smears taken to determine the assay of the valves did not contain sufficient uranium for analysis. The smears included valve internal surfaces, but all internal surfaces were not visible. The items have been decontaminated and holdup of uranium in the internal surfaces is highly unlikely. In addition, many of the equipment items were not used in UF6 service, however, the assay exemption process is not allowed unless valid sample analysis results can be obtained.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
"In order for criticality to be possible, the accumulation of fissile material involving an unsafe mass and geometry would have to occur. A significant amount of uranium is not believed to be present but no valid quantification of mass has been made.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC.):
Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two independent controls on assay.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITCAL MASS):
"Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"No NCS controls (other than providing 10 foot buffer zone) were in place.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"All equipment which has been improperly characterized will be identified and characterized with proper independent verification of assay and mass. The issue of inadequate procedures and/or training for the performance of independent assay verification will be corrected by retraining of personnel and/or revision of the applicable procedure prior to the performance of any further independent assay verifications."
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.
"Valves being dispositioned as part of the transfer of material storage areas from DOE to USEC in C-331 were incorrectly handled as NCS exempt equipment in violation of NCSA GEN-20. NCSA GEN-20 requires that the equipment be characterized prior to movement/transportation. Valves located in former DMSAs were incorrectly labeled as exempt from NCS controls based on invalid assay smear results. The smears contained less than a measurable quantity of uranium and valid assay results could not be obtained. Assay smears with uranium below a measurable quantity cannot provide an accurate measurement of assay. The smear analysis results were incorrectly used to determine that the equipment assay was below 1%.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"Assay smears taken to determine the assay of the valves did not contain sufficient uranium for analysis. The smears included valve internal surfaces, but all internal surfaces were not visible. The items have been decontaminated and holdup of uranium in the internal surfaces is highly unlikely. In addition, many of the equipment items were not used in UF6 service, however, the assay exemption process is not allowed unless valid sample analysis results can be obtained.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
"In order for criticality to be possible, the accumulation of fissile material involving an unsafe mass and geometry would have to occur. A significant amount of uranium is not believed to be present but no valid quantification of mass has been made.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC.):
Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two independent controls on assay.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITCAL MASS):
"Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"No NCS controls (other than providing 10 foot buffer zone) were in place.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"All equipment which has been improperly characterized will be identified and characterized with proper independent verification of assay and mass. The issue of inadequate procedures and/or training for the performance of independent assay verification will be corrected by retraining of personnel and/or revision of the applicable procedure prior to the performance of any further independent assay verifications."
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36822
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GUNDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GUNDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 23:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 18:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 23:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 18:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"During performance of Unit One HPCI System Logic Functional Test, the HPCI Auxiliary oil pump would not stay running and the turbine stop valve did not open on receipt of a simulated auto initiation signal. The Auxiliary oil pump was subsequently taken to manual, at which time the pump stayed running and the turbine stop valve opened. HPCI is inoperable with Engineering and Maintenance troubleshooting possible pressure switch problems."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"During performance of Unit One HPCI System Logic Functional Test, the HPCI Auxiliary oil pump would not stay running and the turbine stop valve did not open on receipt of a simulated auto initiation signal. The Auxiliary oil pump was subsequently taken to manual, at which time the pump stayed running and the turbine stop valve opened. HPCI is inoperable with Engineering and Maintenance troubleshooting possible pressure switch problems."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36823
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEVE FREGEAU
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEVE FREGEAU
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/22/2000
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 21:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2000
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 21:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LOUIS MANNING (R1)
LOUIS MANNING (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
- SERVICE WATER SYSTEM NONESSENTIAL VALVES ISOLATED DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES -
During performance of preplanned Division I Service Water System (SWS) logic circuitry relay replacement activities, an installed electrical jumper failed to maintain contact within the circuit causing a fuse to blow and the subsequent automatic isolation of the Division II SWS nonessential valves. This potential failure had been discussed in preevaluation briefings as a distinct possibility and a contingency was in place.
Maintenance technicians replaced the fuse and restored flow to the nonessential headers.
During performance of preplanned Division I Service Water System (SWS) logic circuitry relay replacement activities, an installed electrical jumper failed to maintain contact within the circuit causing a fuse to blow and the subsequent automatic isolation of the Division II SWS nonessential valves. This potential failure had been discussed in preevaluation briefings as a distinct possibility and a contingency was in place.
Maintenance technicians replaced the fuse and restored flow to the nonessential headers.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36819
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 06:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 04:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 06:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 04:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
AL BELISLE (R2)
AL BELISLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 75 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
TURBINE TRIP - REACTOR TRIP
An electrical fault on the main generator caused a turbine trip and an anticipatory reactor trip. All rods fully inserted and the plant response to the trip was as expected. Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the main condenser. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. Reactor coolant pumps are running. Offsite power and the emergency diesel generators are operable.
The licensee is investigating the cause of the turbine trip. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
An electrical fault on the main generator caused a turbine trip and an anticipatory reactor trip. All rods fully inserted and the plant response to the trip was as expected. Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the main condenser. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. Reactor coolant pumps are running. Offsite power and the emergency diesel generators are operable.
The licensee is investigating the cause of the turbine trip. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36820
Facility: HADDAM NECK
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JON BOWER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JON BOWER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 09:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 08:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Notification Time: 09:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2000
Event Time: 08:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
LOUIS MANNING (R1)
LOUIS MANNING (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MINOR OIL RELEASE TO DISCHARGE CANAL
During demolition of a building, a hydraulic line was severed causing an approximate 1-2 gallon spill of oil. A small portion of the spill reached the discharge canal creating a sheen on the water. The licensee notified the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the USCG and the National Response Center (NRC).
During demolition of a building, a hydraulic line was severed causing an approximate 1-2 gallon spill of oil. A small portion of the spill reached the discharge canal creating a sheen on the water. The licensee notified the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the USCG and the National Response Center (NRC).