Event Notification Report for March 14, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/13/2000 - 03/14/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3679536796367913679236802
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36795
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 13:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 13:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
AL BELISLE (R2)
AL BELISLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
THE PLANT HAD AN ESF ACTUATION WHILE PERFORMING A LEAK RATE TEST.
While performing leak rate testing on 2E11-F041D, Drywell Pressure Sensing Line Isolation Valve, a High Drywell Pressure Signal was received resulting in the following actuations:
Reactor Scram Signal (RPS),(no rod motion)
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment System actuation,
Unit 1 Reactor Building Ventilation isolation.
Group 2 Isolation of:
Drywell Sump Isolation Valve (2G11-F004),
Post Accident Sampling Valve (2E41-F121),
Fission Product Monitor Valve (2D1 l-F072), and
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Refueling Ventilation Isolation.
Other valves did not activate on the Group 2 Isolation signal from High Drywell Pressure because they were out of service for refueling outage maintenance activities.
Investigation is ongoing as to the cause of this event.
All systems have been returned to normal status.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Refer to related event #36796.
While performing leak rate testing on 2E11-F041D, Drywell Pressure Sensing Line Isolation Valve, a High Drywell Pressure Signal was received resulting in the following actuations:
Reactor Scram Signal (RPS),(no rod motion)
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment System actuation,
Unit 1 Reactor Building Ventilation isolation.
Group 2 Isolation of:
Drywell Sump Isolation Valve (2G11-F004),
Post Accident Sampling Valve (2E41-F121),
Fission Product Monitor Valve (2D1 l-F072), and
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Refueling Ventilation Isolation.
Other valves did not activate on the Group 2 Isolation signal from High Drywell Pressure because they were out of service for refueling outage maintenance activities.
Investigation is ongoing as to the cause of this event.
All systems have been returned to normal status.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
Refer to related event #36796.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36796
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 03/15/2000
Notification Time: 00:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 22:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2000
Notification Time: 00:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 22:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
AL BELISLE (R2)
AL BELISLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
- ESF ACTUATIONS DURING A RELAY REPLACEMENT CAUSED BY AN ELECTRICAL SHORT -
While replacing the relay for TIP withdrawal & RHR valve #2A71B-K5C in Reactor Protection System relay panel #2H11-P609, an electrician caused an electrical short which resulted in the following:
- Units 1 & 2 Standby Gas Treatment System actuation (1A, 1B, 2A and 2B trains/fans started)
- Units 1 & 2 Outboard [B] Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation
- Units 1 & 2 Outboard [B] Refueling Floor Ventilation System isolation
- Discovered Group 2 Outboard Post Accident Sampling Isolation Valve #2E41-F121 closed
- Discovered Group 2 Outboard Fission Product Monitor Valve #2D11-F072 closed
The licensee is investigating the cause of this event.
The licensee plans to return the above systems and components to normal status as soon as possible.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to related event #36795.
While replacing the relay for TIP withdrawal & RHR valve #2A71B-K5C in Reactor Protection System relay panel #2H11-P609, an electrician caused an electrical short which resulted in the following:
- Units 1 & 2 Standby Gas Treatment System actuation (1A, 1B, 2A and 2B trains/fans started)
- Units 1 & 2 Outboard [B] Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation
- Units 1 & 2 Outboard [B] Refueling Floor Ventilation System isolation
- Discovered Group 2 Outboard Post Accident Sampling Isolation Valve #2E41-F121 closed
- Discovered Group 2 Outboard Fission Product Monitor Valve #2D11-F072 closed
The licensee is investigating the cause of this event.
The licensee plans to return the above systems and components to normal status as soon as possible.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Refer to related event #36795.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36791
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 03:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 00:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 03:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 00:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 82 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNIT 1 MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING A FAILURE OF THE MAIN TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVES CONTROL SYSTEM
"The Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped following a failure of the main turbine governor valves control system. This failure resulted in the main turbine governor valves inadvertently going closed. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was at 82% power and proceeding to 100% power following the completion of maintenance outage 1P-00-2.
"Unit 1 has been stabilized in Hot Shutdown (550 degrees F, 2125 psig, and the reactor is subcritical). No radioactive releases have occurred nor are any planned."
Prior to the transient the turbine governor valve position limit was acting erratically. All control rods fully inserted. Following the trip, primary pressure increased to 2300 psig. Three(3) of eight(8) mainsteam (MS) safeties lifted and reseated on each MS header. Also, Bus "1H1" which supplies power to two Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) was slow in transferring to the startup transformer. This resulted in both "P32A" and P32C" RCPs tripping. The 1H1 bus remained energized during the transient.
Unit 1 is currently removing decay heat using RCPs "P32B" and P32D" (one operating in each reactor coolant loop) with steam discharging to the Main Condenser. All safety-related equipment including the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) is available, if needed. I&C is investigating the cause of the governor valves' control system failure and the Relay Department is evaluating the slow bus transfer.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Arkansas.
"The Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped following a failure of the main turbine governor valves control system. This failure resulted in the main turbine governor valves inadvertently going closed. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was at 82% power and proceeding to 100% power following the completion of maintenance outage 1P-00-2.
"Unit 1 has been stabilized in Hot Shutdown (550 degrees F, 2125 psig, and the reactor is subcritical). No radioactive releases have occurred nor are any planned."
Prior to the transient the turbine governor valve position limit was acting erratically. All control rods fully inserted. Following the trip, primary pressure increased to 2300 psig. Three(3) of eight(8) mainsteam (MS) safeties lifted and reseated on each MS header. Also, Bus "1H1" which supplies power to two Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) was slow in transferring to the startup transformer. This resulted in both "P32A" and P32C" RCPs tripping. The 1H1 bus remained energized during the transient.
Unit 1 is currently removing decay heat using RCPs "P32B" and P32D" (one operating in each reactor coolant loop) with steam discharging to the Main Condenser. All safety-related equipment including the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) is available, if needed. I&C is investigating the cause of the governor valves' control system failure and the Relay Department is evaluating the slow bus transfer.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Arkansas.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36792
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 04:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 00:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 04:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 00:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
MANUAL PHASE "A" AND CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION INITIATED DUE TO SHUTDOWN LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA).
"Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with Cycle 10 refueling outage in progress. At 0017 on 3/14/00 with RCS temperature at 145 F and RCS pressure at 330 psig. Unit 1 entered Abnormal Operating Procedure R.02 (Shutdown LOCA) due to decreasing pressurizer level. A manual Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation were initiated at 0035 as required by procedure. The loss of RCS coolant was initially contained in the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) until the PRT rupture disc ruptured. At 0125, AOP R.02 was completed and plant conditions were stabilized with RCS temperature at 156 F and RCS pressure at 145 psig. At present there is no RCS leakage, plant conditions are stable, and suspected cause is the RHR suction or discharge piping relief valve. Investigation is in progress."
The transient lasted approximately 30 minutes. The licensee suspects that when RCS pressure was lowered per the AOP, the relief valve reseated. There is no estimate of the lost RCS inventory at this time.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with Cycle 10 refueling outage in progress. At 0017 on 3/14/00 with RCS temperature at 145 F and RCS pressure at 330 psig. Unit 1 entered Abnormal Operating Procedure R.02 (Shutdown LOCA) due to decreasing pressurizer level. A manual Phase A and Containment Vent Isolation were initiated at 0035 as required by procedure. The loss of RCS coolant was initially contained in the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) until the PRT rupture disc ruptured. At 0125, AOP R.02 was completed and plant conditions were stabilized with RCS temperature at 156 F and RCS pressure at 145 psig. At present there is no RCS leakage, plant conditions are stable, and suspected cause is the RHR suction or discharge piping relief valve. Investigation is in progress."
The transient lasted approximately 30 minutes. The licensee suspects that when RCS pressure was lowered per the AOP, the relief valve reseated. There is no estimate of the lost RCS inventory at this time.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36802
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS CORNAX
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 03/16/2000
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 13:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2000
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2000
Event Time: 13:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LAURIE PELUSO (R1)
LAURIE PELUSO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
MECHANICAL BINDING OF FIRE DAMPERS DURING SURVAILLANCE TESTING
At 1341 on 03/14/00 during performance of a main transformer deluge test, three of eight fire dampers in the cable spreading room failed to drop. They were mechanically bound because of improper installation of the fusible links which were installed on 12/23/99. The licensee stated that all other systems functioned as required. An extent of condition review is currently in progress.
This event was determined to be reportable at 1205 on 03/16/00.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
At 1341 on 03/14/00 during performance of a main transformer deluge test, three of eight fire dampers in the cable spreading room failed to drop. They were mechanically bound because of improper installation of the fusible links which were installed on 12/23/99. The licensee stated that all other systems functioned as required. An extent of condition review is currently in progress.
This event was determined to be reportable at 1205 on 03/16/00.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.