Event Notification Report for March 13, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/12/2000 - 03/13/2000
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36790
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEARY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MCCLEARY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/13/2000
Notification Time: 22:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2000
Event Time: 19:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2000
Notification Time: 22:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2000
Event Time: 19:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE
The Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified of two seal test buggies on the cell floor of the X-333 facility containing a vacuum pump whose oil reservoir volume was greater than the NCSA PLANT 069.A00 requirement of a 1 quart reservoir. Boundaries were placed around the buggies and the buggies were made inoperable to prevent use. The NCSE allows 3 quarts for normal operations and an analyses for 5 quart reservoir for "abnormal operations." Therefore, the safety significance is low since the pumps supplied by the manufacturer have a reservoir volume of more than 3 quarts due to a design modification. The site only had 4 pumps (two installed and two on the shelf) with this design modification.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance of this event is low. The NCSE evaluates a pump filled to a capacity of 5 quarts and shows the system to remain subcritical. NCSE- PLANT 031 .E03, for similar carts, modeled a cart with a 5 quart vacuum pump adjacent to another cart and found that the system to be subcritical with a Keff +2q (sigma) of 0.841.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
The Kinney model vacuum pump has a volume capacity of less than 4 quarts. For a criticality to occur, a cart with a pump with a capacity of 5 quarts would have to be used. The chemical traps in front of the pump would have to be empty or saturated such that the pump oil becomes saturated with uranium, and a spacing violation would have to occur.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The controlled parameters in this NCSA are volume and interaction.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The carts are approved for use with 100% enriched material. The form of the material is uranium in oil. This system has been modeled and the Keff +2q(sigma) determined to be 0.841 for this upset.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The pump has been modified by the manufacturer to hold more than 3 quarts
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Established conditions as required by the Anomalous Condition procedure.
The double contingency cannot be established within 4 hours and is reportable.
The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Representative were notified.
The Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified of two seal test buggies on the cell floor of the X-333 facility containing a vacuum pump whose oil reservoir volume was greater than the NCSA PLANT 069.A00 requirement of a 1 quart reservoir. Boundaries were placed around the buggies and the buggies were made inoperable to prevent use. The NCSE allows 3 quarts for normal operations and an analyses for 5 quart reservoir for "abnormal operations." Therefore, the safety significance is low since the pumps supplied by the manufacturer have a reservoir volume of more than 3 quarts due to a design modification. The site only had 4 pumps (two installed and two on the shelf) with this design modification.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance of this event is low. The NCSE evaluates a pump filled to a capacity of 5 quarts and shows the system to remain subcritical. NCSE- PLANT 031 .E03, for similar carts, modeled a cart with a 5 quart vacuum pump adjacent to another cart and found that the system to be subcritical with a Keff +2q (sigma) of 0.841.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
The Kinney model vacuum pump has a volume capacity of less than 4 quarts. For a criticality to occur, a cart with a pump with a capacity of 5 quarts would have to be used. The chemical traps in front of the pump would have to be empty or saturated such that the pump oil becomes saturated with uranium, and a spacing violation would have to occur.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The controlled parameters in this NCSA are volume and interaction.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The carts are approved for use with 100% enriched material. The form of the material is uranium in oil. This system has been modeled and the Keff +2q(sigma) determined to be 0.841 for this upset.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The pump has been modified by the manufacturer to hold more than 3 quarts
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Established conditions as required by the Anomalous Condition procedure.
The double contingency cannot be established within 4 hours and is reportable.
The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Representative were notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36793
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: E.G. WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: E.G. WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 08:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2000
Event Time: 22:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 08:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2000
Event Time: 22:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
24-HOUR NON-CFR REPORT INVOLVING ACTUATION OF A SAFETY SYSTEM DUE TO A VALID SIGNAL
"At 2225 on 03/13/00, the PSS office was notified that a primary condensate alarm was received on the C-333A position 2 North autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure, removed from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Troubleshooting was initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.
"The safety system actuation Is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety Analysis Report, section 8.9, table 1 criteria J.2, Safety System actuation due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification.
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event."
"At 2225 on 03/13/00, the PSS office was notified that a primary condensate alarm was received on the C-333A position 2 North autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure, removed from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Troubleshooting was initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.
"The safety system actuation Is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety Analysis Report, section 8.9, table 1 criteria J.2, Safety System actuation due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification.
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36794
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HAVENNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
FRITZ STURZ (NMSS)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
FRITZ STURZ (NMSS)
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REPORTED A CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR (CAD) WAS LOST AT FT. HOOD, TX.
A M43A1 CAD CONTAINING 250 MICROCURIES OF AM-241 WAS LOST FOLLOWING A FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE AT FT. HOOD, TX. THE DEVICE WAS RUN OVER BY A VEHICLE ON 3/1/00 AND UPON RETRIEVAL, THE PIECES WERE PLACED IN TWO OPAQUE PLASTIC BAGS AND TAKEN BACK TO THE INSTALLATION WHERE IT WAS DETERMINED (ON 3/7/00) THEY HAD BEEN LOST. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE TWO BAGS WERE DISCARDED WITH THE TRASH IN THE ON-POST LANDFILL. A SEARCH OF THE LANDFILL WAS IMPLEMENTED, BUT THE BAGS COULD NOT BE FOUND. SINCE THE GENERAL PUBLIC DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THIS LANDFILL, THE ARMY HAS TERMINATED ITS SEARCH.
A M43A1 CAD CONTAINING 250 MICROCURIES OF AM-241 WAS LOST FOLLOWING A FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE AT FT. HOOD, TX. THE DEVICE WAS RUN OVER BY A VEHICLE ON 3/1/00 AND UPON RETRIEVAL, THE PIECES WERE PLACED IN TWO OPAQUE PLASTIC BAGS AND TAKEN BACK TO THE INSTALLATION WHERE IT WAS DETERMINED (ON 3/7/00) THEY HAD BEEN LOST. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE TWO BAGS WERE DISCARDED WITH THE TRASH IN THE ON-POST LANDFILL. A SEARCH OF THE LANDFILL WAS IMPLEMENTED, BUT THE BAGS COULD NOT BE FOUND. SINCE THE GENERAL PUBLIC DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THIS LANDFILL, THE ARMY HAS TERMINATED ITS SEARCH.