Event Notification Report for March 07, 2000

BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT

On March 7, 2000 at 1410 hours, it was discovered that a plastic 55 gallon laundry drum (containing used rubber totes) was left unattended in the X-705 Decontamination Building High Bay Area with the lid ajar. Following correction, the condition was identified again at 1508 hours. This violates requirement #5 of NCSA-0705_076.A00 which requires modification or covering of containers to prevent geometrically unfavorable accumulation of uranium bearing solution. This constitutes the loss of Control A (Volume) of the double contingency principle. Control B (primary integrity or the overhead piping) was maintained throughout the event. Each of the two non-compliances identified was corrected within thirty minutes of discovery under the direction of plant Nuclear Criticality Safety personnel. Following discovery of the repeat occurrence, a facility stand down was initiated in X-705 to conduct crew briefings and determine appropriate follow-up.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

- TEN OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE FOR 19 MINUTES -

At 1504 on 03/07/00, the licensee notified Brunswick County Officials that ten offsite emergency sirens for Brunswick County were inoperable from 1444 to 1503 on 03/07/00. Alternate offsite notification mechanisms were available during this 19 minute period.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

- NEWS RELEASE REGARDING THE RETRIEVAL OF BOXES OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE -

The following news release was issued by the licensee to the general public at 1422 PST on 03/07/00 regarding the retrieval of boxes of radioactive waste that also may contain a hazardous substance:

"Energy Northwest retrieves low-level radioactive waste shipment - RICHLAND, WA --

Acting on its own initiative, Energy Northwest has retrieved four boxes of low-level radioactive waste from US Ecology Inc. because the boxes possibly also contain what is classified as a hazardous substance. The combination of radioactive and hazardous wastes is considered mixed waste. US Ecology operates the commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal site at Hanford. US Ecology is not licensed to accept mixed waste. Energy Northwest discovered this potential problem internally and notified US Ecology, the state departments of Health and Ecology, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other interested parties. Energy Northwest owns the Northwest's only commercial nuclear power plant, which produces enough electricity to serve a city the size of Seattle with power at a competitive price. The plant is located about 10 miles north of Richland. During the plant's last refueling outage, which ended in October, Energy Northwest used a specialized process to clean and coat the interior of certain steam lines that had become somewhat corroded during 15 years of operation. The pipe was cleaned with blasting grit that became slightly radioactive. The grit and the corrosion deposits removed from the pipe are considered to be low-level waste. Immediately after cleaning, a metal coating was sprayed onto the inside of the piping. The spray was created by melting a nickel-chromium wire in an electrical arc, creating fine particles that coated the walls of the piping. Some of these fine particles possibly mixed with some of the used grit. The nickel-chromium wire is made of materials very much like those used to make kitchen cookware. However, under certain conditions nickel-chromium could be considered to be hazardous waste. When the pipe cleaning-coating operation was under way, it wasn't clear to Energy Northwest officials that the final waste could be classified as mixed waste. In October, waste from the pipe operation was gathered and placed in four metal boxes, each four feet by four feet by six feet. In December, the boxes were taken to the US Ecology disposal site on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. The US Ecology site is licensed for low-level radioactive waste, such as that from medical clinics. In January, an Energy Northwest employee questioned whether the mixture of arc-spray residue and grit might possibly be classified as mixed waste, rather than low-level waste. Energy Northwest then told US Ecology it would retrieve the boxes. The boxes had not yet been buried. Energy Northwest retrieved the boxes in late February. A plan to sample and analyze waste is being prepared. The material will be tested to determine if the waste should be classified as mixed waste. If not, the boxes will be returned to US Ecology. If the waste is classified as mixed waste, Energy Northwest will explore other storage and disposal options."

The licensee notified Washington State Officials and plan to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

- C-333A AUTOCLAVE WATER INVENTORY CONTROL SYSTEM PRIMARY CONDENSATE ALARM RECD -

At 0232 CST on 03/07/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a primary condensate alarm was received on the C-333A Position 2 South autoclave Water Inventory Control (WIC) System. The WIC System is required to be operable while heating in Mode 5 according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure, removed from service, and the WIC System was declared inoperable by the PSS.

Troubleshooting was Initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.

The safety system actuation is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.9, Table 1, Criterion J.2, Safety System Actuation due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification.

The NRC resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

PGDP Problem Report No, ATR-00-1340; PGDP Event Report No, PAD-2000-020.

BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT

At 1038 hours on 3/7/00, it was discovered that a 5 gallon bucket containing used, potentially contaminated oil was spaced less than 2 feet from another like container. The two containers were 23 inches apart rather than the minimum 24 inches required by NCSA-PLANTO45.AO1 Requirement #5. This spacing violation constitutes the loss of one control of the double contingency principle. The spacing violation was corrected at 1055 hours. A walk-down of the affected area verified that no other spacing issues exist.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS

"On February 9, 2000, it was discovered that the Flux Multiplication Alarm (which is used to mitigate boron dilution accidents) was not functional. It was not recognized at that time that this caused the associated extended range neutron detector to be inoperable. If an extended range detector is inoperable in Modes 3, 4, and 5 the Technical Specifications requires that operations be suspended involving positive reactivity changes.

"On March 1, 2000 at 0017 hours Unit 1 entered Mode 3 as part of a shutdown to support refueling activities.
Immediately following Mode 3 entry testing was performed which involves raising control rods to perform drop
testing. Raising control rods constitutes positive reactivity which is contrary to requirements of the Technical
Specifications.

"This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76 Condition 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications."

The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1417 ON 03/27/00 BY KEN TAPLETT TO JOLLIFFE * * *

Further licensee review determined that the extended range neutron detector in question had been operable during the positive reactivity change activity. During the time of the original notification, the Flux Multiplication Alarm was thought to be non-functional. A non-functional Flux Multiplication Alarm causes the associated extended range neutron detector to be inoperable. It was determined that the Flux Multiplication Alarm was actually functional at the completion of surveillance testing conducted on February 9, 2000. The surveillance procedure requires an alarm reset prior to exiting the surveillance test which arms the Flux Multiplication Alarm circuit thus making it functional. Although this step was performed on February 9, 2000, the performers did not recognize at the time that this corrected the perceived loss of alarm function.

Prior to the February 9, 2000 surveillance test, the last satisfactory performance of the Flux Multiplication Alarm surveillance was conducted on November 16, 1999 with a grace period to March 10, 2000. Unit 1 entered Mode 6 (where the requirement was no longer applicable) on March 3, 2000 and has remained in that mode for a refueling and steam generator replacement outage. A satisfactory surveillance test was conducted on March 16, 2000.

The licensee plans to revise the test procedure to preclude recurrence of this event.

Based upon the above justification, the licensee desires to retract this event.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Kriss Kennedy.