Event Notification Report for March 01, 2000

FITNESS FOR DUTY EVENT

A LICENSED OPERATOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL DURING A FOR CAUSE TEST. THE OPERATOR'S PROTECTED AREA ACCESS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. CONTACT THE OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN IODINE-131 SPILL AT CLINICAL PHARMACY SERVICES LOCATED IN GRAY, TENNESSEE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the State of Tennessee, Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Radiological Health (DRH):

"Event Report ID No.: TN-00-038"

"Event date and time: March 1, 2000"

"Event location: Gray, Tennessee"

"Event type: Contamination event"

"Event description: DRH was notified on 03/03/00 by a representative from Clinical Pharmacy Services of an iodine-131 spill in the pharmacy on 03/01/00. When moving a pig with syringe from one hood to another for dose calibration, the end of the syringe plunger caught on part of the hood and was pulled out. Most of the 150 millicuries of I-131 was lost and contaminated the area. The area read 150 mR/hr. This was shielded to 50 mR/hr with lead. The area was cleaned and covered to an extent, but this was discontinued when clothing and badges became contaminated. They have discontinued work in the room and I-131 preparation. They will distribute unit commercial doses for now. They have a hood in another room for their other work. The unrestricted air concentration was 10,000 times the limit. The occupational dose was 72% of the limit. Bioassays were performed. A written report will be submitted."

(Call the NRC operations officer for a State of Tennessee, Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Radiological Health, contact name and telephone number.)

- OVERDUE SHIPMENT OF NEW FUEL -

The licensee reported that a shipment of new fuel from General Electric was due to arrive onsite at 0500 on 03/01/00. The shipper (Kindrick Trucking Company) was contacted and the shipment was located in Canton, Ohio, at 0550 on 03/01/00. The new expected arrival time is 0900 on 03/01/00. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 0955 ON 03/01/00 BY PAT FALLON TO JOLLIFFE * * *

General Electric notified the licensee that the reason for the delay was that a tarp on the nuclear fuel truck blew off and is being recovered and reinstalled on the truck. Estimated time of arrival onsite now is 1300 on 03/01/00. The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified R3 IAT Jim Creed, R3DO Mike Jordan, NRR IAT Dick Rosano, NRR EO Chris Grimes, NMSS IAT Mike Weber, NMSS EO Brian Smith, and IRO Frank Congel.

* * * UPDATE AT 1254 ON 3/1/2000 BY COSEO TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

The licensee is retracting this event.

"10 CFR 73.67(g)(3) states that each licensee, either shipper or receiver, who arranges for the physical protection of special nuclear material of low strategic significance while in transit or who takes delivery of such material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall: conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour after the discovery of the loss of the shipment and within one hour after recovery of or accounting for such lost shipment in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71. In accordance with a General Electric (GE) letter to Detroit Edison, dated August 12, 1992, GE stated that they are responsible for in-transit physical protection of fuel shipments from Wilmington to the Fermi 2 site. Therefore, the notification to the NRC regarding lost or unaccounted for special nuclear material of low strategic significance while in transit should have been completed by GE.

"However, further evaluation of the event revealed that communication between GE and the truck driver regarding the trucks location and problem, did occur. Therefore, the truck was never lost or unaccounted for by GE. The delay in the estimated arrival time was apparently due to problems with the truck during the transit. Based on the above information and the fact that the shipment was never lost or unaccounted for, the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 do not apply in this event. Therefore, Detroit Edison is retracting the 1-hour notification."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the Operations Center notified the RDO (Jordan), EO (Smith), IRO (Congel).

AMERICIUM-241 SEALED SOURCE DISCOVERED TO BE MISSING FROM ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL LOCATED IN PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA.

At approximately 1030 on 03/01/00, representatives at Allegheny General Hospital located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, discovered that a 14-millicurie, americium-241, sealed source was missing from a stationary gamma camera. The licensee reported that the source was last seen at 1130 on 02/29/00.

The licensee stated that the source is a relatively low level source with longevity which is used to mark images. It is about the size of a pencil eraser, and it is typically glued into a holder on the gamma camera.

The licensee currently believes that the source may have become dislodged from the holder and that it may have fallen to the floor. If that occurred, the source may have been placed in the trash when the room was cleaned the on the evening of 02/29/00. The licensee's investigation is ongoing, and surveys are underway.

The licensee plans to notify the state inspector. (Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)

OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - NON CONSERVATIVE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

On March 1, 2000, at 1215 hours, resulting from evaluations performed in response to the McGuire Station Notification (02/04/2000, event # 36659), Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station has determined that a condition outside of design basis may have existed during past plant operation.

The specific condition is a deficiency in the current Limiting Condition for Operation for Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation. For one inoperable channel (in the Emergency Feedwater suction swap over on low suction pressure, RWST [Reactor Water Storage Tank] swap over to RB [Reactor Building] Sump on low level, and/or Containment Spray actuation on High-3 pressure) the Technical Specification (TS) action is to place the channel in bypass with no Allowed Outage Time (AOT) limit. These are energize to actuate functions. At this point the actuation logic changes from 2 out of 4 to 2 out of 3.

Because of the indefinite period of time that this condition is permitted to remain in effect, this condition cannot be considered a single failure during a design basis accident. During a design basis accident, a single failure involving a loss of power to the opposite train instrumentation, while one or more of these functions were in bypass, would prevent the safety function from automatically occurring. Manual operator action is specified in the station Emergency Operating Procedures.

Currently all four channels for each of the above functions are OPERABLE. Therefore, Summer is not operating with a single failure vulnerability at this time. A preliminary PRA [Probability Risk Assessment] assessment shows the change in Core Damage Frequency to be 2.4 E-8 for placing one channel from each of these functions in bypass indefinitely.

Administrative controls have been developed to limit the AOT for these particular channels to be in bypass until such time as a TS change request can be submitted and approved.

REACTOR MANUALLY SCRAMMED DUE TO A LOSS OF 3 OF 5 RECIRCULATION PUMPS.

STARTUP TRANSFORMER "A" WAS BEING USED TO FEED ELECTRICAL POWER TO 4.16 kV NON- VITAL BUS "A" AND VITAL BUS "C". EARLIER IN THE DAY THE REACTOR HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF LINE SO THAT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER "M1A" COULD BE PLACED BACK IN SERVICE. AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER "M1A" WAS REPAIRED OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. WHEN AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER BREAKER "1A" WAS CLOSED TO TRANSFER STATION ELECTRICAL LOADS FROM THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER TO THE "M1A" AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, STARTUP TRANSFORMER "A" BREAKER "S1A" OPENED AS EXPECTED BUT "1A" BREAKER DID NOT CLOSE. THE FAILURE OF BREAKER "1A" TO CLOSE RESULTED IN A LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO BOTH NON-VITAL BUS "A" AND VITAL BUS "C".

THE LOSS OF NON- VITAL BUS "A" CAUSED THREE OF FIVE REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS TO TRIP. THE OPERATORS MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES. ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE. LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO VITAL BUS "C" CAUSED A LOSS OF POWER TO 1/2 OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM. THIS RESULTED IN VITAL BUS EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR #1 TO AUTOMATICALLY START AND LOAD ONTO THE BUS. THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED WHEN REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE DECREASED BELOW 850 PSIG.

AT THE PRESENT TIME THE ISOLATION CONDENSER IS BEING USED TO COOL THE REACTOR VESSEL DOWN. WHEN REACTOR PRESSURE DROPS BELOW 100 PSIG THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES CAN BE REOPENED. OFFSITE POWER HAS BEEN RESTORED TO NON- VITAL BUS "A" AND VITAL BUS "C" VIA STARTUP TRANSFORMER "A." EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR # 1 IS BEING PROPERLY SECURED. DURING THIS INCIDENT BOTH NON-VITAL BUS "B" AND VITAL BUS "D" REMAINED IN SERVICE.

THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING WHY "1A" BREAKER DID NOT CLOSE.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVEN BY THE LICENSEE.

UNANALYZED CONDITION - USING THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TO FEED THE STEAM GENERATORS VIA THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS UNANALYZED.

ANO engineering has determined that using the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump to feed steam generators (S/Gs) via the Main Feedwater (MFW) System is unanalyzed. The ability of the MFW block valves to shut and isolate the affected S/G on a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) has not been fully evaluated. Preliminary evaluation indicates that the valves may not shut under worst case conditions (low voltage supplied to the MOV and high D/P across the valves). This condition is only applicable during low power operations with AFW feeding via the MFW piping.

AFW is not an Engineered Safety Feature at ANO Unit 2. The plant has a separate Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System which is not affected by this problem.

The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1336 ON 03/07/00 BY TOM SCOTT TO JOLLIFFE * * *

A licensee engineering review has determined that the consequences of the above event would have had no safety significance. Review of the Hot Zero Power (HZP) Containment Analysis for a MSLB showed that consequences of a small amount of additional AFW would be bounded by the current limiting MSLB containment analysis for Hot Full Power. A previous sensitivity analysis of the effects of isolating EFW to the S/Gs indicated no significant impact due to continued flow for the HZP Nuclear Steam Supply System MSLB analysis. Since the consequences of having operated in an unanalyzed condition have been determined not to have significantly compromised plant safety, reporting to the NRC per 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) is not applicable.

Thus, the licensee desires to retract this event.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Dave Loveless.