Event Notification Report for February 21, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/20/2000 - 02/21/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
3671936715367113671236713
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36719
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/22/2000
Notification Time: 23:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 23:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2000
Notification Time: 23:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 23:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
JAMES CREED (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
HIGH DISCHARGE ALARM FOR THE W-2 COMPRESSOR. LEAK TESTING OF THE W-2 COMPRESSOR INDICATE A SEAL FAILURE WITH POTENTIAL FOR URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE OUT GASSING.
At approximately 2347 hours, 02/21/00, operations personnel received a Cascade Automatic Data Processing (CADP) smoke head alarm for Extended Range Product (ERP) W-2 withdrawal station compressor. Operations personnel had responded to a High Discharge Alarm for the W-2 compressor and upon arrival discovered the compressor shutdown and the CADP smoke head in alarm. No smoke was discovered during the investigation of the alarm, however the smoke head is located inside a heated housing not readily accessible to operations personnel. Leak testing of the W-2 compressor indicated a seal failure with potential for uranium hexafluoride outgassing.
Operations and engineering personnel are continuing to investigate the cause of the smoke head alarm, but have not provided evidence at this time to invalidate the alarm. PORTS is reporting this alarm as a valid actuation to a "Q" Safety System.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
At approximately 2347 hours, 02/21/00, operations personnel received a Cascade Automatic Data Processing (CADP) smoke head alarm for Extended Range Product (ERP) W-2 withdrawal station compressor. Operations personnel had responded to a High Discharge Alarm for the W-2 compressor and upon arrival discovered the compressor shutdown and the CADP smoke head in alarm. No smoke was discovered during the investigation of the alarm, however the smoke head is located inside a heated housing not readily accessible to operations personnel. Leak testing of the W-2 compressor indicated a seal failure with potential for uranium hexafluoride outgassing.
Operations and engineering personnel are continuing to investigate the cause of the smoke head alarm, but have not provided evidence at this time to invalidate the alarm. PORTS is reporting this alarm as a valid actuation to a "Q" Safety System.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36715
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ELLIS PFEFFER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ELLIS PFEFFER
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/21/2000
Notification Time: 19:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2000
Notification Time: 19:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
- Condensate System HELB could disable Div 1 125-vdc breaker control power in Div 1 4-kv switchgear room -
Based on the results of a UFSAR review with the plant on cold shutdown condition in a refueling outage, the licensee performed a reevaluation to determine the effect of a high energy line break (HELB) in the condensate system on the Division 1 switchgear. The licensee determined that the flood level in the Division 1 4-kv switchgear room could rise high enough to disable Division 1 125-vdc breaker control power; thus, the Division 1 4-kv switchgear would have been inoperable for this HELB event.
The licensee is determining corrective actions.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Based on the results of a UFSAR review with the plant on cold shutdown condition in a refueling outage, the licensee performed a reevaluation to determine the effect of a high energy line break (HELB) in the condensate system on the Division 1 switchgear. The licensee determined that the flood level in the Division 1 4-kv switchgear room could rise high enough to disable Division 1 125-vdc breaker control power; thus, the Division 1 4-kv switchgear would have been inoperable for this HELB event.
The licensee is determining corrective actions.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36711
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/21/2000
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 10:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2000
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 10:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/21/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
KENNETH BARR (R2)
KENNETH BARR (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THE LICENSEE DETERMINED A CONDITION OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS INVOLVING ECCS LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.
On February 21, 2000 plant personnel determined that a condition outside the design basis of the plant has occurred on Unit 1 & Unit 2 due to defeating part of a compensatory action for monitoring potential emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).
On February 10, 2000 Unit 1 Operations noted that no alarms were received when the residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) sump pumps automatically started to pump down their respective sumps. Further investigation determined that the computer point to initiate the alarms had been deleted from processing on 8/30/99 for sump level switch work. This computer point was part of a corrective action for an event reported in LER 413-98-016. The LER dealt with an issue where leakage from ECCS components outside containment may not be detected in the time frame specified in the UFSAR for a LOCA. This was reported in the LER as a condition outside the design basis of the plant. Upon discovery, the computer point was returned to service. In addition the security level of the computer point has been increased to require Operations permission prior to modifying the point in any manner.
On February 16, 2000, the same computer point was taken out of service without Operations permission for maintenance work. Upon discovery the computer point was returned to service. These events have been entered into the plants corrective action program for determination of the cause of these events and appropriate corrective actions.
The cause of this event was due to personnel error.
The Resident Inspector will be notified.
HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #34936
On February 21, 2000 plant personnel determined that a condition outside the design basis of the plant has occurred on Unit 1 & Unit 2 due to defeating part of a compensatory action for monitoring potential emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).
On February 10, 2000 Unit 1 Operations noted that no alarms were received when the residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) sump pumps automatically started to pump down their respective sumps. Further investigation determined that the computer point to initiate the alarms had been deleted from processing on 8/30/99 for sump level switch work. This computer point was part of a corrective action for an event reported in LER 413-98-016. The LER dealt with an issue where leakage from ECCS components outside containment may not be detected in the time frame specified in the UFSAR for a LOCA. This was reported in the LER as a condition outside the design basis of the plant. Upon discovery, the computer point was returned to service. In addition the security level of the computer point has been increased to require Operations permission prior to modifying the point in any manner.
On February 16, 2000, the same computer point was taken out of service without Operations permission for maintenance work. Upon discovery the computer point was returned to service. These events have been entered into the plants corrective action program for determination of the cause of these events and appropriate corrective actions.
The cause of this event was due to personnel error.
The Resident Inspector will be notified.
HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #34936
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36712
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/21/2000
Notification Time: 12:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2000
Notification Time: 12:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT -
Material storage areas transferred from DOE to USEC contain uncharacterized potentially fissile material that does not comply with USEC NCS program requirements. The stored material also does not meet DOE NCS requirements. Responsibility for the storage areas was transferred to USEC for more rapid remediation of the non-conforming conditions, in part to support the Seismic Upgrade Project in C-331 and C-335, and to improve overall site safety.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The DOE material storage areas were located within the boundaries of USEC leased space. Transfer to USEC control allows more timely remediation to establish double contingency controls on the material. Timely remediation will improve overall site safety. The material is in a stable condition and double contingency will be established using USEC procedures. These procedures ensure that safety is not degraded during the remediation actions.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCEANARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: In order for a criticality to be possible, more than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. The stored material is primarily equipment items in which the fissile material is deposited in small quantities widely dispersed over large surface areas.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, etc): Since no NCS controls were applied to the equipment, double contingency can not be demonstrated.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: No NCS controls (other than providing 10 feet buffer zone) where in place.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Areas are to be remediated in accordance with NCS program requirements.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-OO-1009: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-017.
* * * UPDATE 1232 4/18/2000 FROM PITTMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
An additional area, DMSA 30 in C-337, was transferred from DOE to USEC on 4/18/2000 at 1000 CST. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO (Ring), NMSS (Sturz).
* * * UPDATE 1640EDT ON 6/26/00 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * *
Assay results identified three converters each containing >400 grams U-235. This amount of material is beyond the scope of the NCS program. Corrective actions have not been identified. The assay results are as follows:
956 gms U-235 assay 42.65%
973 gms U-235 assay 57.45%
1230 gms U-235 assay 29.75%
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO(Leach) and NMSS(Piccone).
The following UPDATE information was received via fax:
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were discovered that contained greater than 5.5 wt. % enrichment and greater than 400 grams 235U. There are no actions specified in NCSA GEN-20 which will result in the ability to establish double contingency. Three items were discovered in DMSA-331-09 containing 956 grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and 1230 grams 235U at 29.75 wt. %.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items have been identified that contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The minimum critical mass Is based on optimum geometry, moderation, and reflection conditions. The material contained within the subject equipment is expected to be distributed throughout the equipment. Due to process nature and equipment design, there are no credible mechanisms for accumulation of material in an optimum geometrical configuration. The subject equipment openings are covered to preclude intrusion of fire sprinkler water and optimum moderation conditions are not credible. A minimum 10-foot exclusion zone has been established around the three equipment items to preclude Increased reflection effects due to equipment/ personnel in the immediate vicinity.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were identified as containing greater than the minimum critical mass. Since the three items contain approximately 105, 112, and 120% of the estimated minimum critical mass at their respective enrichments, the mass would have to exist in a near optimum geometry, moderation, and reflection before a criticality could occur.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.
UPDATE 6-26-00: The three subject equipment items respectively contained 956 grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and 1230 grams 235U at 29.75 wt. %. Limits as established in NCSA GEN-20 are 400 grams 235U at 5.5 wt. %.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone shall [be] established around the three equipment items located in DMSA-331-09 which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The exclusion zone shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge of the subject equipment.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone shall be established around the three equipment items located in DMSA-331-09 which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The exclusion zone shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge of the subject equipment.
Material storage areas transferred from DOE to USEC contain uncharacterized potentially fissile material that does not comply with USEC NCS program requirements. The stored material also does not meet DOE NCS requirements. Responsibility for the storage areas was transferred to USEC for more rapid remediation of the non-conforming conditions, in part to support the Seismic Upgrade Project in C-331 and C-335, and to improve overall site safety.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The DOE material storage areas were located within the boundaries of USEC leased space. Transfer to USEC control allows more timely remediation to establish double contingency controls on the material. Timely remediation will improve overall site safety. The material is in a stable condition and double contingency will be established using USEC procedures. These procedures ensure that safety is not degraded during the remediation actions.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCEANARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: In order for a criticality to be possible, more than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. The stored material is primarily equipment items in which the fissile material is deposited in small quantities widely dispersed over large surface areas.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, etc): Since no NCS controls were applied to the equipment, double contingency can not be demonstrated.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: No NCS controls (other than providing 10 feet buffer zone) where in place.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Areas are to be remediated in accordance with NCS program requirements.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-OO-1009: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-017.
* * * UPDATE 1232 4/18/2000 FROM PITTMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
An additional area, DMSA 30 in C-337, was transferred from DOE to USEC on 4/18/2000 at 1000 CST. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO (Ring), NMSS (Sturz).
* * * UPDATE 1640EDT ON 6/26/00 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * *
Assay results identified three converters each containing >400 grams U-235. This amount of material is beyond the scope of the NCS program. Corrective actions have not been identified. The assay results are as follows:
956 gms U-235 assay 42.65%
973 gms U-235 assay 57.45%
1230 gms U-235 assay 29.75%
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO(Leach) and NMSS(Piccone).
The following UPDATE information was received via fax:
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were discovered that contained greater than 5.5 wt. % enrichment and greater than 400 grams 235U. There are no actions specified in NCSA GEN-20 which will result in the ability to establish double contingency. Three items were discovered in DMSA-331-09 containing 956 grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and 1230 grams 235U at 29.75 wt. %.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items have been identified that contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The minimum critical mass Is based on optimum geometry, moderation, and reflection conditions. The material contained within the subject equipment is expected to be distributed throughout the equipment. Due to process nature and equipment design, there are no credible mechanisms for accumulation of material in an optimum geometrical configuration. The subject equipment openings are covered to preclude intrusion of fire sprinkler water and optimum moderation conditions are not credible. A minimum 10-foot exclusion zone has been established around the three equipment items to preclude Increased reflection effects due to equipment/ personnel in the immediate vicinity.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were identified as containing greater than the minimum critical mass. Since the three items contain approximately 105, 112, and 120% of the estimated minimum critical mass at their respective enrichments, the mass would have to exist in a near optimum geometry, moderation, and reflection before a criticality could occur.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.
UPDATE 6-26-00: The three subject equipment items respectively contained 956 grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and 1230 grams 235U at 29.75 wt. %. Limits as established in NCSA GEN-20 are 400 grams 235U at 5.5 wt. %.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone shall [be] established around the three equipment items located in DMSA-331-09 which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The exclusion zone shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge of the subject equipment.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone shall be established around the three equipment items located in DMSA-331-09 which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The exclusion zone shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge of the subject equipment.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36713
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG JANAK
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG JANAK
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/21/2000
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 08:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2000
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2000
Event Time: 08:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
- 24 hour Report, Violation of Operating License, condition existing longer than permitted by Plant Tech Specs -
Carbon samples obtained from Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filtration Unit Train A failed laboratory tests. The Plant Technical Specification 4.7.8.a.2 limit of less than 1% methyl iodide penetration was exceeded. The as-found methyl iodide penetration results were 1.07%. This resulted in the Train A Fuel Handling Exhaust Filtration Unit being inoperable since the time that the carbon samples were obtained at 0900 CST on 02/17/00. This results in the system being inoperable for longer than 7 days which is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. Action a. The sample results were obtained at 0840 CST on 02/21/00.
This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, Section 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Plant Technical Specifications.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1604 ON 02/23/00 BY GREG JANAK TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Plant Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8 (b) requires that periodic samples be taken from charcoal beds and analyzed within 31 days after removal. These requirements were met and action to declare that train inoperable was taken upon notification of unsatisfactory results. Based on previous practice, a 24-hour report for a violation of the operating license was made to the NRC as a result of this failure.
While onsite for an inspection of the Effluents Program, an NRC inspector questioned the reportability of this event. After further investigation into the issue, and input from both Region IV and NRR on this issue, the licensee has determined that this event is not reportable to the NRC as long as the charcoal in question is replaced within the allowed outage time, as specified in the Plant Technical Specifications. Based on the above, the licensee retracted this event.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Charles Marschall.
Carbon samples obtained from Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filtration Unit Train A failed laboratory tests. The Plant Technical Specification 4.7.8.a.2 limit of less than 1% methyl iodide penetration was exceeded. The as-found methyl iodide penetration results were 1.07%. This resulted in the Train A Fuel Handling Exhaust Filtration Unit being inoperable since the time that the carbon samples were obtained at 0900 CST on 02/17/00. This results in the system being inoperable for longer than 7 days which is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. Action a. The sample results were obtained at 0840 CST on 02/21/00.
This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, Section 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Plant Technical Specifications.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1604 ON 02/23/00 BY GREG JANAK TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Plant Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8 (b) requires that periodic samples be taken from charcoal beds and analyzed within 31 days after removal. These requirements were met and action to declare that train inoperable was taken upon notification of unsatisfactory results. Based on previous practice, a 24-hour report for a violation of the operating license was made to the NRC as a result of this failure.
While onsite for an inspection of the Effluents Program, an NRC inspector questioned the reportability of this event. After further investigation into the issue, and input from both Region IV and NRR on this issue, the licensee has determined that this event is not reportable to the NRC as long as the charcoal in question is replaced within the allowed outage time, as specified in the Plant Technical Specifications. Based on the above, the licensee retracted this event.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Charles Marschall.