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Event Notification Report for February 10, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/09/2000 - 02/10/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
366833667836679

Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36683
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/11/2000
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2000
Event Time: 23:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC Bulletin 91-01, 24 Hour Report - Loss of 1 of 2 Controlled Parameters (Geometry) -

At 2330 on 02/10/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being maintained in the X-705 decontamination facility. While performing an NCS Self Assessment, facility personnel noticed an operation where requirements for the control of "Inadvertent Containers" was not being met. The Inadvertent container was a rectangular support structure for a ventilator that was approximately 5.5 inches deep and did not have any holes or slots to provide drainage. The critical height dimension is 1.5 inches from the bottom of the container.

Requirement #5 of NCSA-0705-076.A00 states, in part that modifications to inadvertent containers, where practical, shall be accomplished by drilling holes or making slots in the container to provide drainage. This structure, not having drainage holes, was a loss of one control (geometry). The other control (concentration) was maintained.

At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were established per plant procedures. At approximately 0130 on 02/11/00, double contingency controls were reestablished.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT:

The safety significance of this event is low. The inadvertent container is an iron support structure for a ventilator that is approximately 5.5 inches deep by 24 inches wide and just over 60 inches long. This structure is in the high bay of the X-705 building bolted to the floor under the overhead storage system. However, there were no indications that any solution had collected in the container or that any leakage had occurred from the overhead storage in this area. Also, data on the concentration of uranium in the overhead storage indicates that it is currently less than 500 ppm.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:

The potential pathway for a criticality is a failure of the overhead storage system. This would allow uranium bearing solution to collect in the container. Since the container has a depth greater than the safe slab depth of 1.5 inches for 100% enriched material, a criticality could occur if the collected solution's depth exceeds 1.5 inches and the uranium concentration of the solution exceeds 11,600 ppm.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

The parameters being controlled are geometry (container geometry and overhead storage piping) and concentration of solution in the overhead storage.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND PER CENT WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):

There was no uranium material involved with this event. If the overhead storage were to leak, the enrichment is considered to be 100% and the form would be U02F2 solution (worst case).

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:

The geometry control of container was lost. The NCSA requires that holes or slots be added to the container to limit the height of the solution that could collect to less than 1.5 inches.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

Compliance was regained at 0130 on 02/11/00 when plastic has placed over the container to prevent the introduction of solution.

There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.

Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Site DOE Representative.

PTS-2000-009 PR-PTS-00-00829


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36678
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4     State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 02/10/2000
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2000
Event Time: 14:14 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF A 120-GALLON CONTAINMENT SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK LEVEL DEVIATION

During review of calculations and calibration methods for the containment spray additive tank level indicator, it was determined that actual spray additive tank level was approximately 120 gallons below the technical specification required volume. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.7 had been entered earlier in the day due to planned maintenance, and efforts to restore spray additive tank level minimum volume are underway. The impact of the 120-gallon level deviation is being further evaluated at this time to determine the impact on the plant design basis. The licensee expects to be able to resolve this issue prior to expiration of the 72-hour LCO.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36679
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/11/2000
Notification Time: 00:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2000
Event Time: 18:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
THE LICENSEE SUBMITTED A 24 HOUR OPERATING LICENSE DEVIATION REPORT.

While performing the Penetration Seal Firestop Configuration verification project, engineering determined that 37 firestop penetrations are not configured in accordance with existing approved details. Therefore, these 37 penetrations are not operable, putting the plant in a LCO action statement. Remedial action has been taken per Selected License Commitment 16.9-5 Fire Barrier Penetrations, this action establishes hourly fire watches on each affected penetration.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.