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Event Notification Report for February 08, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/07/2000 - 02/08/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
368343667636670

General Information or Other
Event Number: 36834
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: HTS, INC CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON   State: TX
County:
License #: TX-L-02757
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 03/24/2000
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE YANDELL (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN / RECOVERED CPN NUCLEAR GAUGE IN HOUSTON, TX

The following text is from the facsimile received from the Texas Department of Health:

"Theft/Recovery of a nuclear gauge - licensee notified the agency [Texas Department of Health] Feb 8, 2000. Reports lost in mail. Faxed information today at request of Incident Investigation. Gauge recovered intact Feb 14, 2000. Leak tested Feb 15, 2000 was fully satisfactory."

* * * UPDATE AT 1255 ON 03/28/00 BY JAMES OGDEN TO JOLLIFFE * * *

The following is a more detailed version of the above Agreement State Report:

Texas Licensee #TX-L-02757, HTS, Inc. Consultants, Houston, Texas, reported to Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, the theft of a nuclear gauge in it's transport box from the bed of a company pickup truck on February 8, 2000. Gauge Manufacturer: CPN, Model: MC-3. Serial Number: M35116369. Two sealed sources: 1) Cs-137, maximum activity 10 millicuries and 2) Am-241/Be, maximum activity 50 millicuries. The gauge was stolen between 5:45 a.m. and 1:45 p.m. from a jobsite. Incident Report Number 16656300-H was filed with the Houston Police Department on February 8, 2000. Ten local pawn shops were notified by the licensee. The stolen gauge was discovered in a lot adjacent to Hemmi Autoworks, Houston, TX by the facility owner, Richard "Butch" Hemmi and reported to the City of Houston, Bureau of Occupational Health and Radiation Control. This organization recovered all components of the gauge intact on February 14, 2000 (Gauge, Transport box, Calibration Block, Guide Pin, Guide Plate, and paperwork of the last leak test.) The gauge was satisfactorily leak tested on February 15, 2000. The gauge was returned to storage and to service with the Texas licensee.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Kriss Kennedy and NMSS EO Brian Smith.


* * * UPDATE AT 1206 ET ON 04/14/00 BY HELEN WATKINS TO MACKINNON * * *

The licensee does not believe rad exposures to the public occurred. The Agency (BRC) is investigating the incident to obtain further information. R4DO (Chuck Paulk) & NMSS EO (Brian Smith) notified.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36676
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER HYNES
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 02/09/2000
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2000
Event Time: 12:09 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 93 Power Operation 93 Power Operation
Event Text
INFORMATION CALL REGARDING RIVER WATER PUMP PROBLEMS

"This report is being made to provide preliminary notification of an event that is currently under investigation at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 (BVPS Unit 1).

"River Water Pump #WR-P-1B at BVPS Unit 1 tripped on overcurrent shortly after it was attempted to be started at 1209 on 02/08/00. The Action Statement for Technical Specification 3/4.7.4.1 was entered for less than two River Water subsystems being operable. River Water Pump #WR-P-1C (swing pump) was then aligned to the 'B' train header and it also tripped on overcurrent shortly after it was started at 1716 on 02/08/00.

"Preliminary information identified that the #1B and #1C River Water Pumps would not operate due to the loss of gap between the pumps rotating assembly and the pump bowl. Investigation into the cause of the loss of the pumps' gap is ongoing. BVPS Unit 1 River Water Pump #1A on the 'A' train continues to operate satisfactorily and is operable. The 'A' train is being treated as protected equipment (i.e., no elective work is being done on or near 'A' train components). The BVPS Unit 1 operating crews have reviewed the procedures associated with operating the BVPS Unit 1 Auxiliary River Water System in the Alternate Intake Structure and the use of the cross tie connection with the diesel driven fire pump."

The licensee stated that BVPS Unit 1 entered a 72 hour Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation at 1209 on 02/08/00. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE AT 1827 ON 02/10/00 BY DAN MURRAY TO JOLLIFFE * * *

The licensee has identified that the #1B and #1C River Water Pumps would not operate due to the loss of gap between the pump's rotating assembly and the pump bowl. This event is believed to have been initiated by a temporary operating procedure that started on 02/05/00 for maintenance on the non-safety related filtered water system. This procedure altered the filtered water system configuration which was the normal supply to the River Water Pumps' seal water system. One effect of this change was an increase in the seal water temperature at times as much as 30 degrees above its previous temperature which had been near the current river water temperature. This temperature increase adversely affects a pump in the standby configuration whereby thermal expansion of the pump's rotating assembly causes a loss of clearance. River Water Pump #WR-P-1A has remained operating satisfactorily throughout this event. The identified increased seal water temperature condition would not adversely affect an operating pump. Administrative controls have been implemented to require only the use of seal water supply sources with temperatures at or near the current river water temperature for the River Water Pumps.

This condition is being reported to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant because of the potential for one train of the two-train safety related River Water System (required to be operable per Technical Specification 3/4.7.4.1) to have been incapable of performing its design safety function for an extended period of time during operation.

The licensee plans to revise the test procedure, perform the tech spec surveillance test using the safety related seal water supply source, and exit the tech spec action statement.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this update.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Harold Gray of this update.

* * * UPDATE AT 1816 ON 03/07/00 BY JOHN THOMAS TO JOLLIFFE * * *

The following additional information is provided from a subsequent licensee evaluation of the safety related seal water design for the River Water System pumps at BVPS and the above event update:

River Water Pump #WR-P-1C at BVPS Unit 1 was placed into service on 03/03/00 with bearing and motor cooling water supplied by its own discharge via the safety related "Y" strainer #RW-YS-42. Within 10-15 seconds of pump startup, the seal water pressure dropped to approximately 5 psig from its normal operating pressure of approximately 30 psig. The control room operator then blew down the strainer and normal seal water operation ensued. The normal non-safety related sources of seal water for the River Water System pumps have only recently been removed from service as a result of the above event update. A review of the adequacy of the current BVPS Unit 1 seal water design for the River Water System was initiated as part of the above event update. The partial plugging of the "Y" strainer on 03/03/00 identifies that starting a River Water Pump which has been idle for a period of time may initially ingest a slug of silt from the Intake Structure Bay large enough to restrict the flow of seal water through this strainer. Following an evaluation, the licensee has determined that a potential inadequacy may exist in the BVPS Unit 1 seal water design for the River Water System pumps that has been credited since initial operation of BVPS Unit 1. Given that the strainer anomaly was quickly corrected, this seal water design concern involves the operability of a non-operating pump during startup. Seal water strainer plugging during pump operation is more gradual and allows time for control room operator action.

River Water System Pump #WR-P-1C remains in operation with seal water supplied from its self-supplied strainer. An Auxiliary River Water Pump in the Alternate Intake Structure is also available with its own separate seal water supply. BVPS Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel.

The seal water design condition was previously reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant because of the potential for one train of the two-train safety related River Water System (required to be operable per Technical Specification 3/4.7.4.1) to have been incapable of performing its design safety function for an extended period of time during operation. This additional information provides further basis that the seal water design for the River Water System pumps was not sufficient to meet the design basis of the plant.

The licensee is continuing to investigate this event and plans to resolve this issue prior to restarting Unit 1.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this update.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Greg Cranston of this update.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36670
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3     State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHRISTIAN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 02/08/2000
Notification Time: 07:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2000
Event Time: 03:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
ESF ACTUATION - OUTBOARD RECIRC SAMPLE VALVE CLOSED

During performance of Main Steam Isolation Valve Functional Test 0255-07-IA-2, the outboard recirc sample valve CV-2791 closed due to activation of a Group I isolation signal. The procedure step de-energized the DC power to verify that the outboard main steam isolation valves would remain open with AC power. However, the procedure did not recognize that the other Group I outboard valves would close when DC power was interrupted.

The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.