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Event Notification Report for January 20, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/19/2000 - 01/20/2000

EVENT NUMBERS
366433660836609

General Information or Other
Event Number: 36643
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Region: 2
City: CHERRY POINT   State: NC
County:
License #: 45TAC23645TAC
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HIGGINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/31/2000
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
Event Text
U.S. NAVY REPORTED MISSING DROGUE LIGHTS AT THE MARINE CORP AIR STATION IN CHERRY POINT, N.C.

A DROGUE LIGHT (USED DURING NIGHT AIRCRAFT REFUELING) IS A BASKET ASSEMBLY CONTAINING 6 ISOLITES WHICH CONTAIN 1 CURIE OF TRITIUM EACH FOR A TOTAL OF 6 CURIES. THERE WAS A SECOND BASKET ASSEMBLY CONTAINING 5 ISOLITES WHICH ALSO CONTAINED 1 CURIE EACH OF TRITIUM AND A 6th ISOLITE WHICH CONTAINED 25 MILLICURIES OF KRYPTON-85. THEREFORE, THERE IS A TOTAL ACTIVITY OF 11 CURIES OF TRITIUM AND 25 MILLICURIES OF KRYPTON-85 MISSING. THEY HAVE BEEN SEARCHING FOR THESE SOURCES SINCE 01/20/00 WITH NO SUCCESS. ON 01/28/00, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS WAS A REPORTABLE EVENT. THEY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THESE SOURCES WERE NOT STOLEN OR LOST BUT WERE RETURNED TO THE NAVY SUPPLY SYSTEM AFTER THEY HAD BEEN REMOVED ON 12/14/99. THEY ARE HAVING A NAVY JAG INVESTIGATION ON THIS INCIDENT.

CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR A LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER.

* * * UPDATE AT 1033 ON 02/02/00 FROM HIGGINS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

The licensee has recovered the sources. The lights had been mistaken for surplus material, and had been installed on another aircraft.

The licensee has already contacted NRC Region 2 regarding this update. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO (Kerry Landis).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36608
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/20/2000
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2000
Event Time: 14:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
CABLES AND CONDUITS IN THE SALT WATER COOLING PIPE TUNNEL FOUND WITHOUT A PORTION OF THEIR FIRE WRAPS.

ON 1/19/00, FOLLOWING A PLANT WALKDOWN, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SOME CABLES AND CONDUITS IN THE SALT WATER COOLING PIPE TUNNEL WERE MISSING PORTIONS OF THEIR FIRE WRAPS. AFTER REVIEW OF PLANT DOCUMENTATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS CONDITION AFFECTED BOTH TRAIN "A" AND "B" SALT WATER COOLING PUMPS FOR UNIT 3. CONSEQUENTLY ON 1/20/00 @ 1400 PST IT WAS CONCLUDED THIS CONDITION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX "R" TO ASSURE ONE TRAIN OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT FREE OF FIRE DAMAGE IN THE EVENT OF A DESIGN BASIS FIRE.

THE LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY ENSURED THAT A ROVING FIRE WATCH HAD BEEN POSTED(AND WAS ALREADY IN PLACE FOR OTHER UNRELATED REASONS). THIS ACTION SATISFIED THEIR LCO ACTION STATEMENT REQUIREMENT.

IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE, PLANT OPERATORS WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RESTORE POWER TO THE SALT WATER COOLING SYSTEM(BY ISOLATING THE AFFECTED CABLES AND STARTING A PUMP FROM ITS SECOND POINT OF CONTROL). ADDITIONALLY, THE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING IN THE AFFECTED AREA IS EXTREMELY LOW(2 MINUTE FIRE DURATION), AND THAT AREA IS PROTECTED BY FIRE SPRINKLERS AND FIRE DETECTORS.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36609
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HYNES
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/20/2000
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2000
Event Time: 18:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
FELICIA HINSON (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
INADEQUATE SHORT CIRCUIT PROTECTION ON CONTROL WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THE LINE STARTER FOR MAIN TURBINE DRAIN VALVES

While performing a design analysis on Beaver Valley Unit 2 (BV-2) to confirm adequate electrical fault protection, as follow-up to an Engineering fire protection self-assessment completed in May 1999, it was determined that the control wiring associated with the line starter for the nine main turbine drain valves is not adequately protected from short circuits. This protection inadequacy results from a lack of required fuse protection and/or current limiting features described in Section 9.5.A.1.2.1.5(4) of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Due to this lack of adequate current limiting protection, an electrical fault on this circuit could result in a fire in multiple fire areas including the common Unit 1/2 Control Room, BV-2 Service Building, BV-2 Cable Vault, BV-2 Cable Tunnel, and BV-2 Turbine Building. The lack of current limiting protection for this circuitry introduces the possibility of a potential fire in these multiple areas, which is a violation of fire protection licensing basis commitments regarding safe shutdown capability.

The subject main turbine drain valves are non-safety related and not required for safe shutdown. As an interim measure, the circuit has been de-energized and will remain de-energized until adequate electrical protection can be provided.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 2/19/00 @ 1105 BY MARACEK TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION

Upon further review, it was determined that lack of adequate electrical fault protection for cable 2SDSNNC001 did not constitute a condition outside the design basis of the plant. The postulated fire event would be limited to non-safety related cable trays in which cable 2SDSNNC001 is routed and non-safety cables in the Control Room benchboard area. This determination is based upon use of flame test qualified cables, adherence to Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation criteria, and guidance provided by Generic Letter 81-12, regarding associated circuits for common enclosures. This cable is not routed in safety related Class 1E raceways. Review of cables in the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report indicates that the only safe shutdown related cables in the non-Class 1E raceways are for the station air compressors, which would already be assumed lost in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 Turbine Building (TB-1). For a fire in TB-1, safe shutdown is addressed in existing plant procedures to compensate for loss of equipment due to a fire in this area. Therefore, a fire resulting from a fault of cable 2SDSNNC001 would not have affected safety related circuits or the ability to achieve safe shutdown. Therefore the licensee is retracting this event.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Reg 1 RDO (Kinneman) was notified.