Event Notification Report for January 19, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/18/2000 - 01/19/2000
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36604
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON CERNY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON CERNY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/19/2000
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2000
Event Time: 14:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2000
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2000
Event Time: 14:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY THAT UNIT SPECIFIC LOADS WERE ON COMMON BUSES
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"FSAR section 1A(B) for compliance to [Regulatory] Guide 1.81 states that [the Comanche Peak] design complies with the provisions of Revision 1 of this [regulatory] guide. Contrary to the above, unit specific [118-volt AC] loads fed from common buses XEC1-1 and XEC2-1 were shared between two units."
The licensee stated that affected loads involve a lot of different equipment and systems but did not specify which equipment or systems. The licensee also stated that the units are not currently in any technical specification limiting conditions for operation as a result of this issue because the loads are now aligned to an alternate power supply. Corrective actions have not yet been determined.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
*************** UPDATE AT 1412 ON 02/17/00 FROM SCOTTY HARVEY TO LEIGH TROCINE ***************
The licensee is retracting this event notification based upon the following text, which is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"After a further review of the condition (event #36604) reported on January 19, 2000, [the licensee] did not identify any deviation from the design basis requirements of the plant as defined in 10CFR50.2."
"The basic premise of the conservative reporting of this condition was that some unit specific DC [See note 1] and AC (118-volt AC) loads fed from common buses were shared between two units and that this condition may not be in compliance with the design basis of the plant. Although, it was deemed that the statements in the FSAR may not be clear and that CPSES may not be in verbatim compliance with every aspect of Regulatory Guide 1.81. The plant's as-built configurations maintained their ability to perform their specified safety functions and were not in a condition outside of the design basis as defined in 10CFR50.2. Therefore, this condition is not reportable under the auspices of 10CFR50.72/73. Accordingly, this report described in event [#36604] is hereby retracted."
"[NOTE 1: The licensee] believe[s] that the DC unit specific loads do not meet the specific requirements of the [regulatory guide (RG)]. However, [the licensee] believe[s] that this is technically [okay] and ... would justify this as an exception to the RG. The AC loads do not meet the RG as well, but [the licensee is] proposing changing some of the power sources and installation of an Automatic Bus Transfer as well."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Marschall).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"FSAR section 1A(B) for compliance to [Regulatory] Guide 1.81 states that [the Comanche Peak] design complies with the provisions of Revision 1 of this [regulatory] guide. Contrary to the above, unit specific [118-volt AC] loads fed from common buses XEC1-1 and XEC2-1 were shared between two units."
The licensee stated that affected loads involve a lot of different equipment and systems but did not specify which equipment or systems. The licensee also stated that the units are not currently in any technical specification limiting conditions for operation as a result of this issue because the loads are now aligned to an alternate power supply. Corrective actions have not yet been determined.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
*************** UPDATE AT 1412 ON 02/17/00 FROM SCOTTY HARVEY TO LEIGH TROCINE ***************
The licensee is retracting this event notification based upon the following text, which is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"After a further review of the condition (event #36604) reported on January 19, 2000, [the licensee] did not identify any deviation from the design basis requirements of the plant as defined in 10CFR50.2."
"The basic premise of the conservative reporting of this condition was that some unit specific DC [See note 1] and AC (118-volt AC) loads fed from common buses were shared between two units and that this condition may not be in compliance with the design basis of the plant. Although, it was deemed that the statements in the FSAR may not be clear and that CPSES may not be in verbatim compliance with every aspect of Regulatory Guide 1.81. The plant's as-built configurations maintained their ability to perform their specified safety functions and were not in a condition outside of the design basis as defined in 10CFR50.2. Therefore, this condition is not reportable under the auspices of 10CFR50.72/73. Accordingly, this report described in event [#36604] is hereby retracted."
"[NOTE 1: The licensee] believe[s] that the DC unit specific loads do not meet the specific requirements of the [regulatory guide (RG)]. However, [the licensee] believe[s] that this is technically [okay] and ... would justify this as an exception to the RG. The AC loads do not meet the RG as well, but [the licensee is] proposing changing some of the power sources and installation of an Automatic Bus Transfer as well."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Marschall).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36605
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: DALE NOEL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: DALE NOEL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/19/2000
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2000
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2000
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2000
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
FAILURE OF HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS (24-Hour Report) - (Refer the event #36018 for a similar event at Portsmouth and refer to event #35790 and event #36552 for related events at Paducah.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"On 01/19/00 at approximately 0900 hours during the scheduled semi-annual walkdown of the X-330 Process Building high pressure fire water (HPFW) systems, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that sprinkler systems #284 and #365 were not capable of meeting system operability requirements due to corrosion problems identified on adjacent sprinkler heads."
"Two adjacent heads on system #284 and three adjacent heads on system #365 were identified with corrosion around the valve seat. This condition prevents the heads from being able to actuate at normal water pressure. When two adjacent heads are inoperable, the system is considered unable to perform its design function. The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and [technical safety requirement (TSR)] required actions were initiated and completed."
"Further inspections of the Process Building sprinkler systems are planned. This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems are determined to be inoperable."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
At the time of this event notification, Portsmouth personnel had completed repairs and were in the process of closing out the paperwork to be able to declare the systems operable again.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and a Department of Energy site representative.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a site contact telephone number.)
* * * RETRACTION AT 1800 HOURS ON 02/03/00 BY ERIC SPAETH TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
The above listed sprinkler heads were replaced and taken to the USEC Laboratory for testing. Of the seven sprinkler heads tested, all operated at the proper temperature, 5 operated at < 7 psi pressure, one operated at 12 psi pressure and one operated at 16 psi pressure.
An Engineering Evaluation (EVAL-SS-2000-0038) completed on 01/25/00, calculated that at roof level with 20 or more heads flowing, system pressure would remain at 18.4 psi. The corroded sprinkler heads were found at lower levels which have smaller pressure losses and less friction losses due to shorter piping runs. Since the available system pressure would have been greater than 18.4 psi and the sprinkler heads all operated at 16 psi or less, it was determined that the sprinkler heads would have operated when needed and performed their intended safety function.
Since the sprinkler heads were operable, this condition is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120[c][2]. Accordingly, this event is being retracted. R3DO (Vegel) & NMSS EO (Holonich) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the certificate holder.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"On 01/19/00 at approximately 0900 hours during the scheduled semi-annual walkdown of the X-330 Process Building high pressure fire water (HPFW) systems, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that sprinkler systems #284 and #365 were not capable of meeting system operability requirements due to corrosion problems identified on adjacent sprinkler heads."
"Two adjacent heads on system #284 and three adjacent heads on system #365 were identified with corrosion around the valve seat. This condition prevents the heads from being able to actuate at normal water pressure. When two adjacent heads are inoperable, the system is considered unable to perform its design function. The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and [technical safety requirement (TSR)] required actions were initiated and completed."
"Further inspections of the Process Building sprinkler systems are planned. This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems are determined to be inoperable."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
At the time of this event notification, Portsmouth personnel had completed repairs and were in the process of closing out the paperwork to be able to declare the systems operable again.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and a Department of Energy site representative.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a site contact telephone number.)
* * * RETRACTION AT 1800 HOURS ON 02/03/00 BY ERIC SPAETH TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
The above listed sprinkler heads were replaced and taken to the USEC Laboratory for testing. Of the seven sprinkler heads tested, all operated at the proper temperature, 5 operated at < 7 psi pressure, one operated at 12 psi pressure and one operated at 16 psi pressure.
An Engineering Evaluation (EVAL-SS-2000-0038) completed on 01/25/00, calculated that at roof level with 20 or more heads flowing, system pressure would remain at 18.4 psi. The corroded sprinkler heads were found at lower levels which have smaller pressure losses and less friction losses due to shorter piping runs. Since the available system pressure would have been greater than 18.4 psi and the sprinkler heads all operated at 16 psi or less, it was determined that the sprinkler heads would have operated when needed and performed their intended safety function.
Since the sprinkler heads were operable, this condition is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120[c][2]. Accordingly, this event is being retracted. R3DO (Vegel) & NMSS EO (Holonich) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the certificate holder.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36606
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CAROL KRONICK
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CAROL KRONICK
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/19/2000
Notification Time: 21:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2000
Event Time: 14:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2000
Notification Time: 21:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2000
Event Time: 14:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF A LOOSE STEM NUT AND THE INABILITY TO MANUALLY OPERATE A SAFE SHUTDOWN MAKEUP PUMP (SSMP) INJECTION VALVE FOLLOWED BY DISCOVERY THAT THE VALVE WAS NOT FULLY CLOSED
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On January 19, 2000, at 1357 [CST], the MO 2-2901-8 [valve] (SSMP injection to Unit 2) was taken [out of service] for planned maintenance on the valve position limit switches. At 1455 [CST], the Maintenance Supervisor notified the control room that the stem nut was found loose and [that] the valve could not be manually operated. For Unit 2, a 14-day technical specification [(TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO)] was entered per TS 3.8.J, and a 14-day LCO for administrative technical requirements (ATR) was entered. At 1605 [CST,] it was determined that the valve was not fully closed, and the SSMP system [was] declared inoperable to Unit 1. [As a result, a] 14-day LCO for [TSs] and a 14-day ATR [were] entered for Unit 1. A plan is being developed to repair/correct the MO 2-2901-8 [valve]."
"It was determined at 2040 [CST] that this event is reportable ... ."
The licensee stated that both the pump and the valve have quarterly surveillances and that the surveillances were up to date.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"On January 19, 2000, at 1357 [CST], the MO 2-2901-8 [valve] (SSMP injection to Unit 2) was taken [out of service] for planned maintenance on the valve position limit switches. At 1455 [CST], the Maintenance Supervisor notified the control room that the stem nut was found loose and [that] the valve could not be manually operated. For Unit 2, a 14-day technical specification [(TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO)] was entered per TS 3.8.J, and a 14-day LCO for administrative technical requirements (ATR) was entered. At 1605 [CST,] it was determined that the valve was not fully closed, and the SSMP system [was] declared inoperable to Unit 1. [As a result, a] 14-day LCO for [TSs] and a 14-day ATR [were] entered for Unit 1. A plan is being developed to repair/correct the MO 2-2901-8 [valve]."
"It was determined at 2040 [CST] that this event is reportable ... ."
The licensee stated that both the pump and the valve have quarterly surveillances and that the surveillances were up to date.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.