Event Notification Report for January 17, 2000

CONFIGURATION ERROR RESULTING IN AN ALTERNATE LOW-TO-HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (SI) RECIRCULATION FLOW PATH OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS ISSUE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On 10/10/1999, prior to plant startup from the last refueling outage, [SI] manual butterfly valve SI-1863 was closed as directed by refueling procedure SOP-RP-20, 'Draining the Refueling Cavity.' This valve is required to be open as directed by check off list COL-RHR-1, but the [check off list] was performed prior to the refueling procedure. As a result, it appears that the valve SI-1863 had been closed since startup from the refueling outage in October 1999. [Valve] SI-1863 is located in an alternate low-to-high head flow path. [Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)] Table 6.2-8 describes the use of this flow path should the normal low-to-high head recirculation flow path be unavailable (i.e., isolated in response to a passive failure). Hence, the inappropriate closure of [valve] SI-1863 could [have prevented] the ability of the [SI] system to accommodate a certain passive failure described in the FSAR during recirculation following a postulated event. This configuration error potentially placed the SI system outside its design basis. This mispositioning was discovered on 01/14/2000 during an extent of condition review for a suspected [chemical and volume control system] valve mispositioning in the excess letdown flow path. Valve SI-1863 was opened shortly after discovery. The extent of this condition for this event is still ongoing. Review of this deviation event report on Monday, 01/17/2000, determined that this event [was] potentially outside the system's design basis."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

DISCOVERY OF A POTENTIAL CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE PATH AND DEGRADED SAFETY BARRIER

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"This is ... American Electrical Power, D.C. Cook Plant Units 1 and 2 calling with a [4]-hour notification in accordance 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) of a condition which was found while the reactor is shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.

"During the ongoing In-Service Program inspection of the Unit 2 containment liner, an indication was found that appeared to be a weld repair. After surface preparation to allow for further inspection, it was determined that the indication was actually a previously repaired area on the liner plate, probably dating from construction. The mechanism used for surface preparation was a needle gun, and the force exerted by the needle gun dislodged the weld metal that had been deposited in the damaged area. The result was a through-liner hole approximately 3/16 of an inch in size that is roughly circular.

"Although the Unit 2 containment successfully passed its 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix-J, Integrated Leak Rate Testing in 1992, concern exists that under thermal stress of a postulated accident condition, the weld material could have become dislodged. This would potentially represent a containment leakage path and a degraded safety barrier.

"This hole will be repaired in accordance with ASME Section XI, Repair or Replacement Program, prior to startup."

The licensee stated that both unit are currently defueled.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

SECURITY REPORT. FITNESS-FOR-DUTY QUESTIONED DUE TO INATTENTIVENESS. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

* * * UPDATE 1140EST ON 1/19/00 FROM MATTHEW ARSENAULT TO S.SANDIN * * *

THIS REPORT IS BEING RETRACTED BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

"On January 17, 2000, at 6:32 EST, North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North Atlantic) submitted a 1-hour report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 regarding a Security Officer that was discovered to be inattentive to duty (NRC Event Report 36596).

"Subsequent to the report and after a thorough review, it was determined that this incident was loggable and did not meet the criteria for a 1-hour report. Specifically, this condition did not constitute an uncompensated loss as defined in Regulatory Guide 5.62 because the original capability was restored within 10 minutes of discovery of the event. Additionally, consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-03, events involving inattentive security personnel can be logged if they are properly compensated for in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62 and NUREG-1304. Therefore, North Atlantic retracts the 1-hour report. This event has been captured in the event log."

The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO (Hinson).