Event Notification Report for January 13, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/12/2000 - 01/13/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36585
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEWART DRESSER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEWART DRESSER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/13/2000
Notification Time: 02:55 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2000
Event Time: 00:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2000
Notification Time: 02:55 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2000
Event Time: 00:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
SWITCHYARD FAULT RESULTED IN MAIN GENERATOR TRIP/TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP.
At 0059CT, a Reactor Trip occurred on Unit 2. A fault in the switchyard resulted in a Main Generator Trip which caused a Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip. All rods fully inserted into the core. All other systems responded per design with the following exceptions:
1). A Unit 1/Unit 2 Containment Ventilation Actuation occurred (caused by electrical spike in the switchyard). This is not an Engineered Safety feature (ESF) Actuation because all the Containment Ventilation Isolation valves were already closed.
2). A Fuel Handling Building Ventilation ESF Actuation occurred (caused by the electrical spike in the switchyard).
3). An 'A'-Train Main Control Room Makeup Air Filter Unit ESF Actuation occurred (caused by the electrical spike in the switchyard).
All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. At this time, the Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is maintaining proper Steam Generator Water Levels with T(ave) being maintained at a no load temperature of 557°F.
The switchyard fault is being investigated.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
At 0059CT, a Reactor Trip occurred on Unit 2. A fault in the switchyard resulted in a Main Generator Trip which caused a Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip. All rods fully inserted into the core. All other systems responded per design with the following exceptions:
1). A Unit 1/Unit 2 Containment Ventilation Actuation occurred (caused by electrical spike in the switchyard). This is not an Engineered Safety feature (ESF) Actuation because all the Containment Ventilation Isolation valves were already closed.
2). A Fuel Handling Building Ventilation ESF Actuation occurred (caused by the electrical spike in the switchyard).
3). An 'A'-Train Main Control Room Makeup Air Filter Unit ESF Actuation occurred (caused by the electrical spike in the switchyard).
All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. At this time, the Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is maintaining proper Steam Generator Water Levels with T(ave) being maintained at a no load temperature of 557°F.
The switchyard fault is being investigated.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36586
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM BURGESS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM BURGESS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/13/2000
Notification Time: 04:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2000
Event Time: 03:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2000
Notification Time: 04:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2000
Event Time: 03:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 FOR 17 MINUTES DUE TO LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE BETWEEN THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE AUXILIARY BUILDING.
A LOW CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WAS DISCOVERED WHILE A CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPENSATORY ACTION WAS IN EFFECT DUE TO AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM WORK. THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 AT 0326 ET. AT 0333 ET, THE LICENSEE SECURED THE '2A' AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION FILTER EXHAUST FAN. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 WAS EXITED AT 0343 ET AFTER CONTROL ROOM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WAS VERIFIED ABOVE THE MINIMUM LIMIT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/02/00 AT 1644 BY TRUESDALE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The determination to declare both trains of the control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) inoperable on 01/13/00 was based on the data from only one of the two CRAVS intakes. At the time this decision was made, the 'A' train of the CRAVS was in operation. When the control room pressure was checked, the only intake alignment that was tested was the Unit 2 intake alignment. No test was performed using the Unit 1 intake for CRAVS. This was done because of how the procedure was written for the control pressure check.
A licensee engineering evaluation was performed to review CRAVS test data and alignment before, during and after the event. This evaluation determined that the inability to pressurize the control room to technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement required value of 0.125 inches water gage using the Unit 2 intake caused one CRAVS train (but not both) to be inoperable. The cause of the event was a failed auxiliary building ventilation system supply damper. This supply damper prevented the auxiliary building system from supplying adequate air into the auxiliary building to compensate for the amount of air being exhausted by the auxiliary building system unfiltered and filtered exhaust fans. TS 3.7.10, Action A (restore CRAVS train to OPERABLE status within 7 days), not action E (enter TS 3.0.3 for two CRAVS trains inoperable), should have been followed. The inoperable train was restored to operable status by realigning auxiliary building exhaust and supply fans which restored auxiliary building pressure to normal. Thus, since only one train of CRAVS was inoperable, neither unit was ever in TS LCO 3.0.3 for this event. Therefore, this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(l)(ii)(B) and the previous notification is being retracted. In addition, as a result of this event notification retraction, licensee event reporting regarding this issue is not required nor is planned.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO (Kerry Landis).
A LOW CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WAS DISCOVERED WHILE A CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPENSATORY ACTION WAS IN EFFECT DUE TO AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM WORK. THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 AT 0326 ET. AT 0333 ET, THE LICENSEE SECURED THE '2A' AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION FILTER EXHAUST FAN. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 WAS EXITED AT 0343 ET AFTER CONTROL ROOM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WAS VERIFIED ABOVE THE MINIMUM LIMIT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/02/00 AT 1644 BY TRUESDALE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
The determination to declare both trains of the control room area ventilation system (CRAVS) inoperable on 01/13/00 was based on the data from only one of the two CRAVS intakes. At the time this decision was made, the 'A' train of the CRAVS was in operation. When the control room pressure was checked, the only intake alignment that was tested was the Unit 2 intake alignment. No test was performed using the Unit 1 intake for CRAVS. This was done because of how the procedure was written for the control pressure check.
A licensee engineering evaluation was performed to review CRAVS test data and alignment before, during and after the event. This evaluation determined that the inability to pressurize the control room to technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement required value of 0.125 inches water gage using the Unit 2 intake caused one CRAVS train (but not both) to be inoperable. The cause of the event was a failed auxiliary building ventilation system supply damper. This supply damper prevented the auxiliary building system from supplying adequate air into the auxiliary building to compensate for the amount of air being exhausted by the auxiliary building system unfiltered and filtered exhaust fans. TS 3.7.10, Action A (restore CRAVS train to OPERABLE status within 7 days), not action E (enter TS 3.0.3 for two CRAVS trains inoperable), should have been followed. The inoperable train was restored to operable status by realigning auxiliary building exhaust and supply fans which restored auxiliary building pressure to normal. Thus, since only one train of CRAVS was inoperable, neither unit was ever in TS LCO 3.0.3 for this event. Therefore, this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(l)(ii)(B) and the previous notification is being retracted. In addition, as a result of this event notification retraction, licensee event reporting regarding this issue is not required nor is planned.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO (Kerry Landis).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36589
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE JOBE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE JOBE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 01/13/2000
Notification Time: 17:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2000
Event Time: 10:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2000
Notification Time: 17:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2000
Event Time: 10:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT -
A NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR (PLANT EMPLOYEE) WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL DURING A FOR-CAUSE TEST. THE SUPERVISOR'S PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN REVOKED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. CALL TO THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
A NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR (PLANT EMPLOYEE) WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL DURING A FOR-CAUSE TEST. THE SUPERVISOR'S PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN REVOKED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. CALL TO THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.