Event Notification Report for January 07, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/06/2000 - 01/07/2000
EVENT NUMBERS
365743656836569365703657136572
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36574
Rep Org: WASHINGTON DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR021-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRAZEE (E-MAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR021-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRAZEE (E-MAIL)
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/10/2000
Notification Time: 09:15 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2000
Notification Time: 09:15 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
BRIAN SMITH EO (NMSS)
JEFF SHACKELFORD (R4)
BRIAN SMITH EO (NMSS)
STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE.
A MODEL 3440 TROXLER GAUGE, SERIAL # 19036 CONTAINING 8 MILLICURIES OF Cs-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES OF Am-241/Be, WAS STOLEN FROM A GAUGE OPERATOR'S TRUCK AFTER HE HAD TAKEN IT HOME FOR THE NIGHT. THE GAUGE WAS LEFT CHAINED TO THE PICKUP ALL NIGHT AND THE OPERATOR DID NOT DISCOVER IT WAS MISSING UNTIL HE WAS HALF WAY TO THE JOB SITE THE NEXT MORNING. THE POLICE WERE NOTIFIED AND BY MID-AFTERNOON, TWO INDIVIDUALS HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND THE GAUGE WAS RETURNED TO THE LICENSEE.
A MODEL 3440 TROXLER GAUGE, SERIAL # 19036 CONTAINING 8 MILLICURIES OF Cs-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES OF Am-241/Be, WAS STOLEN FROM A GAUGE OPERATOR'S TRUCK AFTER HE HAD TAKEN IT HOME FOR THE NIGHT. THE GAUGE WAS LEFT CHAINED TO THE PICKUP ALL NIGHT AND THE OPERATOR DID NOT DISCOVER IT WAS MISSING UNTIL HE WAS HALF WAY TO THE JOB SITE THE NEXT MORNING. THE POLICE WERE NOTIFIED AND BY MID-AFTERNOON, TWO INDIVIDUALS HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND THE GAUGE WAS RETURNED TO THE LICENSEE.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36568
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: OSCAR PIPKINS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: OSCAR PIPKINS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 09:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 07:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 09:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 07:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY THAT FIRE SYSTEM FPM-18 HAD BEEN OPERATING OUTSIDE THE PLANT DESIGN BASIS
"[At 0730 CST on 01/07/00], with the plant operating at 100% power, the licensee determined that Fire System FPM-18 had been operating outside the plant design basis due to having a sprinkler system pressure and flow demand that could exceed the water supply capability (fire pumps). [Fire] System FPM-18 was found to be deficient by over 170 psi. The fire area (RAB-6) is an electrical penetration area located at the +35[-foot elevation] of the Reactor Auxiliary [Building]. This area has cables from both trains located therein. The 'B' Train is the protected train, with [1-hour] fire wrap. This area is also provided with [fire] detection and suppression. Ongoing determinations found the fire loading in the fire area to exceed the [1-hour] fire rating of the cable fire wrap. At that point, it was determined that a fire in that area could result in not being able to achieve safe shutdown. The system had been declared inoperable on [01/05/00,] and compensatory measures [including the posting of a continuous fire watch] were established. There was no actual fire event involved, so there had been no actual impact on health and safety as a result of this condition."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
"[At 0730 CST on 01/07/00], with the plant operating at 100% power, the licensee determined that Fire System FPM-18 had been operating outside the plant design basis due to having a sprinkler system pressure and flow demand that could exceed the water supply capability (fire pumps). [Fire] System FPM-18 was found to be deficient by over 170 psi. The fire area (RAB-6) is an electrical penetration area located at the +35[-foot elevation] of the Reactor Auxiliary [Building]. This area has cables from both trains located therein. The 'B' Train is the protected train, with [1-hour] fire wrap. This area is also provided with [fire] detection and suppression. Ongoing determinations found the fire loading in the fire area to exceed the [1-hour] fire rating of the cable fire wrap. At that point, it was determined that a fire in that area could result in not being able to achieve safe shutdown. The system had been declared inoperable on [01/05/00,] and compensatory measures [including the posting of a continuous fire watch] were established. There was no actual fire event involved, so there had been no actual impact on health and safety as a result of this condition."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36569
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 08:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 08:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
UNIT ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.0.3 AFTER BOTH SUBSYSTEMS OF THE LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (LPCI) SYSTEM WERE RENDERED INOPERABLE DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.
"At 0829 on 1/7/2000, the E1150-F015A Division I Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) Inboard Isolation Valve lost power. The Fermi 2 Accident Analysis takes credit for the operation of the E1150-F015A with the initiation of 'LPCI Loop Select Logic,' to inject with both divisions of LPCI during a [loss of coolant accident (LOCA)]. With the E1150-F015A inoperable, both Division 1 and Division 2 LPCI subsystems were declared Inoperable. T.S. 3.5.1 and T.S. 3.0.3 were immediately entered. Operators were dispatched to the [motor control center (MCC)] area and reported that MCC 72CF position 2C was in the open position. [An] operator noted maintenance activities in the area and no damage to the MCC.
"At 0837, the MCC was re-energized, restoring power to the E1150-F015A, and T.S. 3.5.1 and 3.0.3 were exited. Currently, all maintenance activities in the vicinity of the MCC area have been put on hold pending investigation.
"During the time of this event, [the] Division I Core Spray System was in a scheduled maintenance outage.
"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D), 'Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to: D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident'."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"At 0829 on 1/7/2000, the E1150-F015A Division I Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) Inboard Isolation Valve lost power. The Fermi 2 Accident Analysis takes credit for the operation of the E1150-F015A with the initiation of 'LPCI Loop Select Logic,' to inject with both divisions of LPCI during a [loss of coolant accident (LOCA)]. With the E1150-F015A inoperable, both Division 1 and Division 2 LPCI subsystems were declared Inoperable. T.S. 3.5.1 and T.S. 3.0.3 were immediately entered. Operators were dispatched to the [motor control center (MCC)] area and reported that MCC 72CF position 2C was in the open position. [An] operator noted maintenance activities in the area and no damage to the MCC.
"At 0837, the MCC was re-energized, restoring power to the E1150-F015A, and T.S. 3.5.1 and 3.0.3 were exited. Currently, all maintenance activities in the vicinity of the MCC area have been put on hold pending investigation.
"During the time of this event, [the] Division I Core Spray System was in a scheduled maintenance outage.
"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D), 'Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to: D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident'."
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36570
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VERNON CARLSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: VERNON CARLSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 15:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2000
Notification Time: 15:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OBSERVATION OF UNUSUAL CAVITATION NOISE AND VIBRATION OF THE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) PUMP DURING QUARTERLY INSERVICE TESTING (IST)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During the quarterly IST surveillance on the high pressure core spray pump, unusual cavitation noise and vibration was observed. Abnormal low suction pressure alarms were also noted. These conditions could not be explained, and therefore, the high pressure core spray pump was declared inoperable, and plant engineering was contacted to investigate. The data collected on the surveillance test was satisfactory including vibration readings. The abnormal conditions were noted during system realignment for continuation of the testing."
The cause of the unusual cavitation noise and vibration of the high pressure core spray pump is currently under investigation. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1, the reactor core isolation cooling system was verified to be operable within one hour. Technical Specification 3.5.1 also requires the licensee to restore the high pressure core spray system to an operable status within 14 days or place the unit in Cold Shutdown. The licensee stated that all other emergency core cooling systems are currently operable.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1826 ON 01/13/00 FROM MARK FELTNER TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Following the identification of the above condition, licensee actions were taken to investigate the reported deficiency. A loop calibration was performed on the HPCS pump suction transmitter with no abnormal conditions identified. The HPCS pump was run in a variety of configurations including the configuration that produced the original event, and all the data obtained was satisfactory. During each of these runs no abnormal noise, vibrations or pump characteristics were noted.
Based on the observed condition and the additional data obtained, a determination was made that the pump did not experience cavitation conditions for more than a short period of time (5 to 8 seconds) if at all. This, coupled with information obtained from the pump vendor, the subsequent successful performance of multiple pump runs, successful calibration of the suction pressure transmitter, and the lack of any abnormal noise or vibration; provides assurance that the HPCS pump is capable of performing its intended safety function.
Based on this information, the licensee determined that this condition is not reportable to the NRC and desires to retract this report.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Jeff Shackelford.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"During the quarterly IST surveillance on the high pressure core spray pump, unusual cavitation noise and vibration was observed. Abnormal low suction pressure alarms were also noted. These conditions could not be explained, and therefore, the high pressure core spray pump was declared inoperable, and plant engineering was contacted to investigate. The data collected on the surveillance test was satisfactory including vibration readings. The abnormal conditions were noted during system realignment for continuation of the testing."
The cause of the unusual cavitation noise and vibration of the high pressure core spray pump is currently under investigation. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1, the reactor core isolation cooling system was verified to be operable within one hour. Technical Specification 3.5.1 also requires the licensee to restore the high pressure core spray system to an operable status within 14 days or place the unit in Cold Shutdown. The licensee stated that all other emergency core cooling systems are currently operable.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1826 ON 01/13/00 FROM MARK FELTNER TO JOLLIFFE * * *
Following the identification of the above condition, licensee actions were taken to investigate the reported deficiency. A loop calibration was performed on the HPCS pump suction transmitter with no abnormal conditions identified. The HPCS pump was run in a variety of configurations including the configuration that produced the original event, and all the data obtained was satisfactory. During each of these runs no abnormal noise, vibrations or pump characteristics were noted.
Based on the observed condition and the additional data obtained, a determination was made that the pump did not experience cavitation conditions for more than a short period of time (5 to 8 seconds) if at all. This, coupled with information obtained from the pump vendor, the subsequent successful performance of multiple pump runs, successful calibration of the suction pressure transmitter, and the lack of any abnormal noise or vibration; provides assurance that the HPCS pump is capable of performing its intended safety function.
Based on this information, the licensee determined that this condition is not reportable to the NRC and desires to retract this report.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Jeff Shackelford.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36571
Rep Org: HOWARD UNIVERSITY
Licensee: HOWARD UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 08-00386-19
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREGORY TALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: HOWARD UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 08-00386-19
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREGORY TALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
INFORMATION REPORT REGARDING A FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES FOR RECEIPT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (3 mCi OF TRITIUM) AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY IN WASHINGTON D.C.
On 07/02/99, 3 mCi of tritium was transferred from George Washington University to Howard University using a private vehicle, and the Radiation Safety Office at Howard University was not notified until today (01/07/00) at 1630. An individual brought the material with him when he transferred from George Washington University to Howard University and locked the material in a laboratory. Apparently, this individual had the mistaken understanding that the material could remain in his laboratory until he became an authorized user. After completing his training and becoming an authorized user, the individual informed the Radiation Safety Officer at Howard University (on 01/02/00) that he had brought 3 mCi of tritium with him from George Washington University (on 07/02/99).
The licensee stated that all of the paperwork for the transfer of the material was in order and that the Radiation Safety Office at George Washington University was informed of the transfer of radioactive material at the time of the transfer. Between 07/02/99 and 01/02/00, the tritium was locked in a laboratory at Howard University. It was still in its original container.
Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.
On 07/02/99, 3 mCi of tritium was transferred from George Washington University to Howard University using a private vehicle, and the Radiation Safety Office at Howard University was not notified until today (01/07/00) at 1630. An individual brought the material with him when he transferred from George Washington University to Howard University and locked the material in a laboratory. Apparently, this individual had the mistaken understanding that the material could remain in his laboratory until he became an authorized user. After completing his training and becoming an authorized user, the individual informed the Radiation Safety Officer at Howard University (on 01/02/00) that he had brought 3 mCi of tritium with him from George Washington University (on 07/02/99).
The licensee stated that all of the paperwork for the transfer of the material was in order and that the Radiation Safety Office at George Washington University was informed of the transfer of radioactive material at the time of the transfer. Between 07/02/99 and 01/02/00, the tritium was locked in a laboratory at Howard University. It was still in its original container.
Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36572
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN SEWELL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN SEWELL
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 21:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 18:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Notification Time: 21:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2000
Event Time: 18:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF TRANSFORMER XST1 (ONE OF TWO OFFSITE POWER SOURCES TO THE CLASS-1E BUSES)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1807 CST, Comanche Peak experienced a loss of power to transformer XST1 (one of two offsite power sources to class 1E buses). Unit 2 momentarily [lost] power to [the] train 'A' and 'B' safeguards buses due to the [automatic] transfer to alternate offsite power. [The] train 'A' and 'B' blackout sequencers operated to realign [engineered safety feature (ESF)] equipment. [The] train 'A,' [train] 'B,' and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps started due to the blackout signal. All safeguards equipment responded as designed."
"Currently, ESF equipment has been restored to a normal lineup[, and transformer] XST2 is supplying offsite [Class-1E] power to [both Units] 1 and 2. An investigation into the cause of the event is in progress."
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1807 CST, Comanche Peak experienced a loss of power to transformer XST1 (one of two offsite power sources to class 1E buses). Unit 2 momentarily [lost] power to [the] train 'A' and 'B' safeguards buses due to the [automatic] transfer to alternate offsite power. [The] train 'A' and 'B' blackout sequencers operated to realign [engineered safety feature (ESF)] equipment. [The] train 'A,' [train] 'B,' and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps started due to the blackout signal. All safeguards equipment responded as designed."
"Currently, ESF equipment has been restored to a normal lineup[, and transformer] XST2 is supplying offsite [Class-1E] power to [both Units] 1 and 2. An investigation into the cause of the event is in progress."
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."