Event Notification Report for December 26, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/25/1999 - 12/26/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36540
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36540
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/26/1999
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/26/1999
Event Time: 05:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/26/1999
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/26/1999
Event Time: 05:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
MARK RING (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
ATTENDANT HAD TO EVACUATE AREA BEFORE THREE PIPE FLANGES TO A CELL WERE COVERED TO PREVENT MODERATION INTRUSION. (NRC Bulletin 91-01 24-hour notification)
AT 0545 hours on 12/26/99, an emergency response was initiated in the X-333 process building due to a report of smoke coming from a piece of process equipment., i.e., a seal exhaust pump (vacuum pump). All personnel in the building were required to evacuate "see & flee" to a safe area until the emergency condition was mitigated.
The "see & flee" took place while a maintenance evolution was ongoing that required a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) required attendant to be present. The "see & flee" resulted in the attendant being required to evacuate the work area with piping flanges uncovered (left three large compressor pipe openings uncovered to cell #33-8-9 after one of its compressors had been removed).
This violated requirement #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states, "openings/penetrations made during, or as a result of, maintenance activities will be covered to minimize the potential for moderation collection and moist air exposure when unattended." This constitutes the loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and interaction controls maintained throughout this event.
Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours by covering the openings under the direction of the Incident Commander and concurrence of NCS personnel.
There was no loss of hazardous/ radioactive/material or radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: The safety significance of this event is extremely low. The limited amount of time the flanges were uncovered and unattended did not allow any more moisture to enter than if work had continued and the equipment had been attended for the entire period. Lack of attending personnel during the "see & flee" simply removed the ability to mitigate an unlikely event involving the entrance of liquid water (or other moderator) into the equipment.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If the equipment had been mis-categorized and actually contained greater than the minimum critical mass of uranium (more than 900 pounds of uranyl fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment) and liquid water entered the exposed openings, a critical configuration might have formed inside the cascade equipment.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The controlled parameters include mass and moderation.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The exact amount is unknown; however, the cell was categorized as "uncomplicated handling" which means the cell has less than the safe mass (approximately 400 pounds uranyl fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment). The form would be uranyl fluoride.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: By leaving the exposed flanges unattended, control #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which requires, "openings/penetrations made during maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderation collection and moist air exposure when unattended.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours on 12/26/99, under the direction of Incident Commander, by covering the opening.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
AT 0545 hours on 12/26/99, an emergency response was initiated in the X-333 process building due to a report of smoke coming from a piece of process equipment., i.e., a seal exhaust pump (vacuum pump). All personnel in the building were required to evacuate "see & flee" to a safe area until the emergency condition was mitigated.
The "see & flee" took place while a maintenance evolution was ongoing that required a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) required attendant to be present. The "see & flee" resulted in the attendant being required to evacuate the work area with piping flanges uncovered (left three large compressor pipe openings uncovered to cell #33-8-9 after one of its compressors had been removed).
This violated requirement #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states, "openings/penetrations made during, or as a result of, maintenance activities will be covered to minimize the potential for moderation collection and moist air exposure when unattended." This constitutes the loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and interaction controls maintained throughout this event.
Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours by covering the openings under the direction of the Incident Commander and concurrence of NCS personnel.
There was no loss of hazardous/ radioactive/material or radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: The safety significance of this event is extremely low. The limited amount of time the flanges were uncovered and unattended did not allow any more moisture to enter than if work had continued and the equipment had been attended for the entire period. Lack of attending personnel during the "see & flee" simply removed the ability to mitigate an unlikely event involving the entrance of liquid water (or other moderator) into the equipment.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If the equipment had been mis-categorized and actually contained greater than the minimum critical mass of uranium (more than 900 pounds of uranyl fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment) and liquid water entered the exposed openings, a critical configuration might have formed inside the cascade equipment.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The controlled parameters include mass and moderation.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The exact amount is unknown; however, the cell was categorized as "uncomplicated handling" which means the cell has less than the safe mass (approximately 400 pounds uranyl fluoride, UO2F2, at 1.908 wt% enrichment). The form would be uranyl fluoride.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: By leaving the exposed flanges unattended, control #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which requires, "openings/penetrations made during maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderation collection and moist air exposure when unattended.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Moderation control was reestablished at 0655 hours on 12/26/99, under the direction of Incident Commander, by covering the opening.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.